EGL co-director Steven Bernstein in Nature Sustainability

Here we present in more detail the insights of our assessment related to the political impact of the SDGs since their launch in 2015, organized around the five dimensions identified in the preceding. Note that the few literature references we provide are merely illustrative examples of larger trends in the hundreds of studies that we analysed in depth.

Impact on global governance

First, regarding the global governance system, we find that the political impact of the SDGs has been mostly discursive, for example, through their adoption as a reference point in international policy pronouncements and in a changed discourse within global institutions. While the governance principles that underpin the SDGs—such as universality, coherence, integration and ‘leaving no one behind’—have become part of mainstream discourses in multilateral institutions, actual reforms in the operations of these organizations since 2015 have been modest, and there is no strong evidence that the SDGs have had a transformative impact on the mandates, practices or resource allocation of international organizations and institutions within the United Nations system (for example, refs. ^11,12). The literature thus suggests a mismatch between the formal aspirations of the United Nations to promote the SDGs as central guidelines in global governance and their limited transformative impact.

Moreover, observable changes often reflect longer trajectories in global governance that had started well before the launch of the SDGs. It is difficult to identify in the literature robust change in such long-term trends that can be causally related to the launch of the SDGs in 2015. There is rarely any clear and unidirectional causality that a major reform process has been initiated because of the SDGs.

Studies also suggest that the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development has not lived up to expectations of becoming an effective ‘orchestrator’¹³ in global sustainability governance. This forum, created after the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, is meant to serve as a regular meeting place for governments and non-state representatives to review the implementation of the SDGs and to assess global progress towards sustainable development. There is evidence that the High-Level Political Forum is serving as a platform for voluntary reporting and peer learning among governments. For example, the voluntary national reviews process has helped to disseminate best practices of SDG implementation across countries and actors¹⁴, and the forum has offered new opportunities for non-state and sub-national actors to become involved in global policy processes (for example, ref. ¹⁵). Yet there is no robust evidence that such peer learning, reporting and broad participation have steered governments and other actors towards structural and transformative change for sustainable development. The forum has not provided political leadership and effective guidance for achieving the SDGs (for example, ref. ¹⁶), and it has failed to promote system-wide coherence, largely because of its broad and unclear mandate combined with a lack of resources and divergent national interests (for example, refs. ^15,17,18).

Likewise, parallel reforms in the United Nations system for development cooperation have not been transformational, mostly because of governments’ incoherent signals in the governing bodies and funding practices that impede integrated approaches (for example, refs. ^19,20,21). As for environmental policy, the United Nations Environment Programme, mandated to catalyse international action and cooperation, has not been able to expand its leadership after the adoption of the SDGs. The fragmented nature of global environmental governance continues to limit institutional change and produces inconsistencies and inefficiencies (for example, refs. ^22,23,24).

Impact on domestic politics

The SDGs must eventually be implemented in domestic political contexts through policies and programmes enacted by governments and public agencies with the support and engagement of non-state actors.

We find some evidence that state and non-state actors have started to implement the SDGs at the national and local levels. Many countries have begun to integrate SDGs into their administrative systems, and some governments have designated bodies or formed new units for goal implementation. Yet the performance of national governments varies, and most countries lag behind in implementing the SDGs. Observable institutional change often merely replicates existing priorities, trajectories and government agendas, and governments tend to selectively implement those SDGs that support policies they have already prioritized (for example, refs. ^25,26). For instance, Paraguay’s current 2030 National Development Plan was adopted in 2014, a year before the adoption of the SDGs, and the two processes were never merged²⁷.

There is scant evidence that governments have substantially reallocated funding to implement the SDGs, either for national implementation or for international cooperation. The SDGs do not seem to have changed public budgets and financial allocation mechanisms in any important way, except for some local governance contexts (for example, ref. ²⁸). The lack of substantial funding could prevent stronger political impact of the SDGs and indicate that the discursive changes that we have identified will not lead to transformative change in terms of policy reform or resource allocation.

Some evidence suggests that sub-national authorities, and especially cities, are often more pioneering and progressive than their central governments in building coalitions for implementing the SDGs²⁹. In several national political systems, civil society actors have begun to hold public actors accountable for their commitments to realize the vision of leaving no one behind. In particular, some studies in African countries^30,31 highlight the role that civil society organizations play in mobilizing participation and bringing the voices of those on the front lines of poverty, inequality and vulnerability into the implementation and progress review on specific SDGs, such as SDG 15. This growing role of actors beyond national governments suggests an emerging multi-faceted and multi-layered approach to implementing the 2030 Agenda (for example, refs. ^28,32,33).

There is also evidence of increased interest and participation from corporate actors in sustainable development through public–private partnerships, even though the effectiveness of such arrangements is uncertain³⁴. Some corporate actors, including banks and investors, increasingly engage with and invest in sustainability practices, promote green finance, facilitate large-scale sustainable infrastructure projects or expand their loan portfolios to include environmental and social loans (for example, refs. ^35,36,37,38). Such practices are often discursively linked to the SDGs. Some studies, however, warn of ‘SDG washing’ by corporate actors, selective implementation of SDGs and political risks linked to private investments in the context of continued shortage of public funding. For example, while one study found that 70% of CEOs see the SDGs as a powerful framing to accelerate sustainability-related efforts of their companies, the SDGs could also be used to camouflage business-as-usual by disguising it using SDG-related sustainability rhetoric³⁹. Overall, fundamental changes in incentive structures to guide public and private funding towards more sustainable pathways seem to be lacking.

We conclude that the domestic political impact of the SDGs has remained mostly discursive. Governments increasingly refer to the SDGs in policy documents, and 176 countries have presented their voluntary national reviews at the High-level Political Forum (for example, ref. ⁴⁰). Sub-national authorities refer to the SDGs in their communications as well, and many have offered voluntary local reviews of their initiatives. In addition, several corporate actors and civil society organizations use the language of the 2030 Agenda. All these references to the SDGs in the political debate could be seen as a first step towards more far-reaching transformational changes. Yet it is uncertain whether these discursive effects of the SDGs signal the beginning of a deep transformation towards sustainable development or whether their impact will remain mostly discursive until and beyond 2030.

Impact on domestic institutional integration and policy coherence

The 17 SDGs and their 169 targets form a complex mesh of normative aspirations that seek to address all areas of human activity. Some studies suggest that synergies among SDGs can be achieved by designing policies in a holistic way (for example, ref. ⁴¹). Others argue, however, that inherent trade-offs in the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs are too often neglected in academic research and require more attention (for example, ref. ⁴²). Overall, the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs are expected to provide guidance and resolve normative conflicts, institutional fragmentation and policy complexity.

We find that substantial academic work has been devoted to the conceptualization of governance fragmentation, institutional interlinkages and integration. Yet limited empirical research has studied how these concepts play out in national implementation of the SDGs. Several case studies, for example, on Bangladesh, Belgium, Colombia, Germany, India, the Netherlands, Sri Lanka and small island developing states indicate that synergies and trade-offs in the 2030 Agenda manifest differently across political systems and governmental levels (for example, ref. ⁴³). Broader comparative assessments of the impacts of SDG interlinkages on national politics are lacking.

Several governments have taken first steps to align their institutions towards the SDGs. Some countries, such as the Netherlands, have established coordination bodies within central agencies (for example, ref. ⁴⁴), and others, such as Germany, have promoted inter-ministerial exchanges to bring their public-administrative systems in line with the SDGs (for example, ref. ⁴⁵). These attempts, however, differ from country to country, leading to large variations in institutional SDG-inspired integration. For example, the responsibility for the SDGs lies with one or two ministries in some countries and with the head of state or government in others. The impact of either strategy remains uncertain and warrants further investigation.

Overall, governments still fall short of enhancing policy coherence to implement the SDGs, despite modest advances in some countries. Where we see evidence of integrating SDGs into national strategies and action plans, this has not yet led to new or adjusted cross-sectoral policies and programmes that cohere with one another (for example, ref. ⁴⁶). Experts are divided in their expectations as to whether stronger policy coherence for the SDGs will emerge before 2030.

Several studies point to remaining barriers to institutional integration and policy coherence in administrative systems (for example, ref. ⁴⁷). These include cumbersome bureaucracies, lack of political interest, short-term political agendas and waning ownership of the SDGs. Studies agree that breaking down such barriers will take time and require political leadership, continuous efforts by policymakers and pressure by civil society organizations. So far, there are few indications that the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs has helped to greatly reduce such barriers.

Impact on inclusiveness

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs are meant to address inequalities within and among countries and to ensure that no one is left behind. Vulnerable groups and countries are extensively mentioned in the 2030 Agenda and in several SDGs and their targets. In addition, two SDGs are dedicated to the reduction of inequality within and between countries (Goal 10) and the promotion of equality for women and girls (Goal 5). However, evidence suggests a mismatch between rhetoric and action. On the one hand, vulnerable people and countries are often discursively prioritized in the implementation of the SDGs, as evidenced by the broad uptake of the principle of leaving no one behind in pronouncements by policymakers and civil society activists. On the other hand, the normative or institutional effects of such discursive prioritization remain limited.

Within countries, the political impact of the SDGs in reducing inequalities varies considerably and seems to be determined by domestic politics. The literature indicates that the SDGs have not stimulated new forms of normative or institutional steering that promotes inclusiveness. The SDGs have been leveraged, if at all, as an overarching international normative framework to legitimize existing national policies and institutions for the promotion of inclusiveness (for example, refs. ^48,49,50). In some cases, we see counterproductive effects when political elites use the SDG discourse to overlay the existing non-inclusive institutional settings or to add legitimacy to entrenched marginalization. For example, a study on Paraguay found that the government cooperates in the framework of SDG implementation mostly with agribusiness companies, while civil society organizations were not offered any avenues for meaningful participation²⁷.

Internationally, there is no evidence that the adoption of the SDGs has advanced the position of the world’s most vulnerable countries in global governance and in the global economy. For one, there are hardly any indications that the SDGs have steered global governance structures towards more inclusiveness, especially regarding least developed countries (for example, refs. ^51,52). Studies doubt whether the SDGs will ever be able to transform legal frameworks towards increased political participation of these countries in global governance. In addition, continued lack of compliance with long-standing norms that seek to support the least developed countries, such as special commitments on aid from the Global North, further indicates the limited steering effect of the SDGs on the ability of poorer countries to fully participate in and benefit from the global economy.

There is evidence, however, that emerging economies in the Global South increasingly frame their aid and investment commitments to poorer countries as promoting the SDGs. For example, China has in recent years increased its aid and investments under the Belt and Road Initiative, claiming that this would promote the SDGs⁵³. Similarly, the literature suggests that civil society organizations use the SDGs as a reference framework to hold governments to account (for example, ref. ⁵⁴), pointing to advantages of granting larger roles to civil society organizations in shaping and implementing policy initiatives such as the SDGs. This trend might be important to prevent policy backlash against inclusiveness, especially in countries that are less welcoming to civil society influence.

Impact on ecological integrity at the planetary scale

The SDGs pronounce their ambition to resolve the fundamental concerns of both people and the planet and to ensure life-sustaining conditions on Earth. However, there is widespread doubt that the SDGs can steer societies towards more ecological integrity at the planetary scale. There is also little evidence that any normative and institutional change in this direction has materialized because of the SDGs.

Studies on international governance indicate a limited role of the SDGs in facilitating the clustering of international agreements by serving as a set of collective ‘headlines’. While the SDGs seem to have influenced discussions around the climate and biodiversity regimes (for example, ref. ⁵⁵) and have consolidated support for specific concerns and interlinkages, many such changes had been part of these negotiations well before 2015 (for example, refs. ^56,57). At the regional level, the SDGs have fed into policies and programmes of regional governance bodies and steered the creation of new institutions, although even here the political impact of the SDGs towards better environmental protection remains limited (for example, refs. ^58,59,60). Within countries, there is also little evidence that the SDGs have strengthened environmental policies (for example, refs. ^61,62). For example, the South African Integrated Resource Plan, which defines the country’s energy mix and was adopted four years after the SDGs, projects that coal power will still account for 59% of South Africa’s electricity supply by 2030, potentially bringing about adverse impacts on other goals related to health, water, climate and life on land.

Many studies concur that the SDGs lack ambition and coherence to foster a transformative and focused push towards ecological integrity at the planetary scale (for example, refs. ^63,64,65). There are indications that this lack of ambition and coherence results partially from the design of the SDGs (for example, ref. ⁶⁶), for example, global economic growth as envisaged in SDG 8 (notwithstanding regional development needs) might be incompatible with some environmental protection targets under SDGs 6, 13, 14 and 15 (for example, ref. ¹). Certain studies also argue that the focus of the SDGs on neoliberal sustainable development is detrimental to planetary integrity and justice (for example, ref. ⁶⁷). As a result, experiences from the implementation of the SDGs in domestic, regional and international contexts provide little evidence of political impact towards advancing ecological integrity, as countries in both the Global South and the Global North largely prioritize the more socioeconomic SDGs over the environmentally oriented ones, which is in alignment with their long-standing national development policies (for example, refs. ^68,69). Overall, scholars argue that while the SDGs may help to highlight environmental protection as an important concern, parts of their targets are structurally incompatible with efforts to steer towards a more ambitious programme for ecological integrity at the planetary scale.