‘LISBON’ OPENED NEW GROUND, BUT AFGHANISTAN REMAINS THE STORY

NATO concluded its summit meeting in Lisbon in 2010, where it adopted a new strategic concept better suited to the security challenges of the twenty-first century.  Moving away from Cold War origins and rhetoric, the trans-Atlantic defensive alliance looked over the horizon to identify cybersecurity, narcotics and drug lords, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation as the threats of the future.  Alliance leaders persuaded some of the more skeptical members to sign on to a mobile missile defense system—to protect against missiles from “rogue states” and, in so doing, gave NATO a mission and a mandate.

Discussion of the new strategic concept faded into the background as leaders quickly turned their attention to the unending story of Afghanistan.  President Obama and his most senior advisers had been twisting arms for months to dissuade Canada and European partners from leaving the field.  In Amsterdam and Ottawa, in Berlin and London, this is an increasingly unpopular war, a war with seemingly no end, and a war from which leaders would love to extricate themselves.  That is exactly what the United States wanted to prevent.

President Obama and General Petraeus together put forward a new strategic doctrine for “success” in Afghanistan.  NATO will step up its effort to force Taliban out of key areas in the south, in an effort to level the playing field for a political process of reconciliation with the Taliban. Along with the targeting of key Taliban strongholds comes a significant investment in the training of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan police, an effort that will stretch out at least until 2014. NATO’s Secretary General orchestrated a series of commitments from members, including Canada, to the stepped-up training mission.

The subtext of the message NATO is trying to send to the Taliban is clear. The allies are not vacating the field. They are committed until at least 2014 and likely longer; the Secretary-General was deliberately vague when asked if the timeline of 2014 for training was a hard deadline. Closely related was the emphasis by General Petraeus on continuing military action against the Taliban. Taliban leaders had no reason to expect, therefore, that their casualties would diminish, nor that the acceleration in the size of the Afghan army would ease. In short, if the Taliban were hoping that public fatigue with the decade-long war in the contributing countries would force their governments to quit the field, NATO leaders insisted, they were wrong. It is this willingness to stay the course that should provide the strongest incentive for the Taliban to come to the table and negotiate a solution.

How likely is the “new” NATO strategy in Afghanistan to succeed? Sceptics remain unconvinced.  Numbers of Taliban casualties are both unreliable and questionable as a measure of success. “Body counts” as a measure of success were discredited as long ago as the Vietnam. The ability of NATO to “hold” after they have “cleared” territory is also in doubts; operations in some parts of Afghanistan certainly cleared Taliban but Taliban reappeared in the same villages within days. The success of training is also unclear: the numbers of Afghan police are growing, but it is not at all certain that their effectiveness has increased. Nor is it clear that the negotiations with the Taliban that NATO facilitated recently were real; apparently the lead Taliban negotiator was an imposter. Add to that the ineffectiveness of the Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai.

Looking ahead, it is entirely possible that, four years from now, NATO members will be debating exactly the same questions under circumstances that are not much better than they are today.

 

RELATED MATERIAL FOR THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 29

FIGHTING INSURGENCIES IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

On 7 October 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) with the approval of the UN Security Council to bring down the Taliban government in Afghanistan, where the headquarters of terrorist organization Al Qaeda was said to be located. The operation was a response to the September 11 terrorist attacks organized by the Al Qaeda on the United States. On 20 December 2001, the UN Security Council established a NATO security mission called the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide military support for a newly established pro-Western government. Since 2002, the UN has been engaged in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) to support the Afghan government in its efforts to improve security, governance and regional cooperation. In spite of UN development initiatives, Afghanistan remains a weak state. The political reach of President Hamid Karzai, who won the 2004 presidential elections, is limited to the near surroundings of Kabul; warlords have regained control over a large portion of Afghanistan; and opium has become the country’s primary agricultural crop.

Afghanistan continues to be plagued by the Taliban insurgency and suffers from attacks by improvised explosives and suicide bombers. In 2007, there were more than 140 incidents of suicide bombings that killed more than 300 people and in 2008, attacks by Taliban insurgents in eastern Afghanistan increased by 40% compared to 2007. On 1 December 2009, US President Barack Obama sent an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan to battle insurgent groups. In addition, efforts are being made by the UN and NATO to strengthen the Afghan state and build up Afghan forces to a target strength of 300,000 by 2011 so they can contain the widening insurgency. However, NATO’s progress is hampered by high desertion rates and an Afghan government that is too corrupt and unstable to survive long without foreign military support.

In spite of the UN and other development initiatives, Afghanistan remains a weak war-ravaged state. The political reach of President Hamid Karzai, who won the 2004 presidential elections – though not without great controversy, is limited largely Kabul and its surroundings. Warlords have regained control over large portions of Afghanistan; and opium has become the country’s primary agricultural crop again.

The insurgency has also spilled over to Pakistan, which shares its northwestern border with Afghanistan. Pakistan also faces threat from a number of militant networks including al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. More recently, there was a shift in the nature of the insurgency in Pakistan as violence from the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan moved into the heartland of the country. At the moment, Pakistan has no effective counter-insurgency strategy as Pakistani leaders continue to support some insurgent groups and fail to generate policy to protect civilians. The Pakistani military, especially the security service – the ISI – appears to have continuing ties with the insurgents.  Furthermore the traditional military is more focused on India its regional rival and apparently unwilling to refocus all its resources to the insurgency concern.  To halt the advance of militants, Pakistan needs to decide to commit to a more concerted effort against the insurgents, strengthen local police forces, provide aid and assistance to displaced civilians, expand development efforts, and create new legal structures – all these initiatives the US has pledged support during the US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogues.

In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, a stronger state, a more capable army and greater loyalty from the people are necessary for counterinsurgency efforts to succeed. The strength of these variables will determine whether NATO will be able to fulfill its pledge to turn over control to local forces and withdraw its troops by the 2014.

RELATED MATERIAL AND SITES

  • The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO coalition in Afghanistan, has a website containing breaking news, interviews with ranking officers, and factsheets.
  • The Human Security Report project at Simon Fraser University has compiled a Pakistan Conflict Monitor, which compiles reporting on issues related to conflict in Pakistan, including the ongoing insurgency.
  • The United Nations News Centre website on Afghanistan and the UN provides a brief history of UN involvement in Afghanistan as well as a detailed account of UN activity in Afghanistan since the September 11th terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) provides news, press releases, and weekly news summaries and photos on its website.
  • Foreign Policy online and the New America Foundation have created the AfPak channel, a website focused exclusively on the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The website reported on NATO discussions on the war in Afghanistan earlier this week.
  • The NATO website has featured several articles on the recent leaders’ summit in Lisbon, including a recap of NATO leaders’ talks with Afghan Prime Minister Hamid Karzai and the official text of the Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, issued on 20 November 2010. Additionally, the text of the final declaration from the recent NATO leaders’ summit in Lisbon can be found here.