HOW IT WORKS, AND HOW IT’S INFLUENCED

On Saturday March 5th, 2011, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) convened for its annual session. The Congress consists of some 3,000 delegates elected by China’s provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities and the armed forces.

Under China’s 1982 constitution, the Congress is the most powerful organ of the state. But reality is otherwise. The NPC meets merely once a year; otherwise there is a standing committee that meets every several months. But even this 150 member Standing Committee is hardly the heart of Chinese decision-making. Furthermore, neither the Standing Committee nor the full NPC plays any discernible role in Chinese foreign and security policy.

Recently a number of studies have been undertaken that seek to describe Chinese decision-making and in particular China’s foreign and security policy.

Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox have provided valuable research in their SIPRI-produced policy paper. This is effort is notable for authors effort to draw on contemporary sources to further elaborate on the decision-making model including with Chinese officials.

In addition to this valuable research piece, I had the opportunity to review Jeremy Paltiel’s, valuable research piece on China’s foreign policy published by the Canadian International Council (CIC) – a nation wide network located at the University of Toronto with some 15 branches spread across Canada. Paltiel is a long-time and well-known China scholar in Canada.

Any inquiry of foreign policy decision-making is difficult in almost any country but it is particularly challenging in the case of China. Here where so much is opaque and difficult for foreigner to understand let alone seek to influence.

For the SIPRI authors one of their basic conclusions is that there has been a growing “cacophony of voices” urging decision-makers in China to choose a particular course of action. China’s growing integration into the global economy – its significant and sustained economic growth – and at the same time the emergence of the Chinese military even if only regionally has created in raising China to the level of a new significant actor in the international system. More dramatically China has become a leading power in the emerging G20 Leaders Summit. This global governance leaders “high table” has occupied a central role following the emergence of the global financial crisis and the effort to repair the global economy. All these influences and changes have led to a growing number of actors seeking to influence China’s foreign and security policy.

So where does the real decisions in China’s foreign policy get made, and who are the key actors in making those decisions?

The heart of the decision-making mechanism is situated not in the state but in the CPC. In fact the Standing Committee of the Politburo retains the ultimate decision-making authority. But the sources of influence have multiplied. Today there are several CPC organs, government agencies and elements of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) that all seek to influence the outcome and to influence Standing Committee agreement.

The number of agencies can vary significantly depending on the issue. There can be no presumption that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, plays a dominant role. Indeed, the MFA is regarded today as a rather weak agency. But the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has significant influence in energy policy or in climate change negotiations including international ones. And the Ministry of Commerce has a strong influence in investment decisions. The PLA has historically played an important role in Chinese foreign policy, though the professionalization of China’s military may well have narrowed its broader political role. Still the Central Military Commission remains an important organ in Chinese foreign policy formation.

And while the PLA has a continuing influence in arms control and proliferation the more difficult evaluation is to determine its influence in China’s Korean policy or in the policy formation of the South China Sea.

Still the basic conclusion from Jakobson and Knox stands that “authority over foreign policy has fractured.” This conclusion is critical since a major factor influencing Chinese foreign policy formation and decision-making is a continuing desire for consensus by the China’s leaders. So the bargaining and negotiating have become even difficult in efforts to reach policy consensus.

And as both research pieces point out even President Hu Jintao — head of the state, the military and of the CPC — must seek consensus in the name of collective CPC leadership.

Decision-making has become lengthier, more complicated and at various times no decision can be reached. This consensus seeking has also encouraged private networking or guanxi (关系). Thus, who has influence may have little to do with formal titles.

While China’s decision-makers recognize the growing importance of China’s integration into the global economy, there is significant contention over the priority that should be given to internationalization and its impact on growth and political change in China.

Thus many leaders urge that China not take strong leadership in global governance, for instance, preferring to repeat the dictum from Deng Xiaoping that China – taoguang yanghui (韬光养晦) – conceal one’s capabilities, bide one’s time.

In global governance leadership, for example, it has meant that China has often failed to take responsibility – causing me to brand China – “a part-time global leader.” As one of my colleagues in China has argued, China’s leadership appreciates the G20, for example, and sees it as a legitimate forum for global decision-making, though at the same time the leadership wants to maintain complete sovereignty over China’s economy.
Finally, there is a growing sense that China needs to actively defend and pursue its interests internationally. While it is hard to determine what the voices from the internet and from media – often quite nationalist – do, there is no question that the netizens and more broadly media are striving, “to influence the formulation of foreign policy,” according to the SIPRI authors. And the growing Chinese assertiveness may well reflect echoes of that internet nationalism.

It all adds up to a very complicated picture of foreign and security policy formulation. The pluralisation of society and the growing Chinese interdependence result in growing strains on the current CPC leadership. It leaves most foreign governments bewildered in seeking to influence China’s leaders.

 

RELATED MATERIAL FOR THE WEEK OF MARCH 14

BACKGROUND

History

In 1949, the Chinese Civil War ended with the Communist Party of China (CPC) as victors, and the Guomindang (the reigning political party) retreating to Taiwan.  On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese Revolution, stood atop the Tiananmen and proclaimed The People’s Republic of China.

From 1958-1961, the Chinese Communist Party launched the Great Leap Forward, an economic and social campaign meant to transform China from an agrarian economy into a modern communist society through agriculturalization, industrialization, and collectivization. Per Mao’s instructions, large centralized organizations in the countryside called People’s Communes were created. These communes allowed for a meshing of government administration with economic production in rural areas where government officials could directly manage agricultural and industrial production by rural workers. The campaign ultimately failed: political disorganization and incentives for falsifying information from lower officials led to an agricultural collapse and the starvation of roughly 20 to 30 million people. In the years following, the First Five Year Plan of rehabilitative economic policies were implemented and between 1962-1965, the economy recovered rapidly.

In 1966 and continuing through 1976, Mao Zedong pursued a social movement known as the Cultural Revolution that sought among other things to remake the CPC. The Cultural Revolution was based on four broad goals: to facilitate a change of succession; discipline corrupt bureaucracies; expose the youth to revolutionary sentiments; and make changes to policy to eliminate inequality and material incentives. In practice, the movement destroyed a great deal, including many of China’s antiquities, and achieved very little. The mobilization of Chinese youth into forming Red guard groups resulted in a violent revolutionary class struggle and led to the destruction of local government, millions of civilian deaths and the paralysis of the CPC and the State.

After the death of Mao, his main leftist supporters were ousted in a coup and reformists led by Deng Xiaoping took power. From 1978 onwards, a period of reform  – reform and opening (geige kaifang – 改革开放)  – led by Deng brought about a decentralization of power within the State and the abandoning of mass political terror as a method of policy implementation. Reformist policy changes allowed for economic development through agricultural reform, privatization of state-owned industry and opening up to foreign direct investment. During this reform period, China moved from a planned economy towards a market economy – a capitalist economy with Chinese characteristics – and opened up to the outside world. Between 1978 and 2010, the Chinese economy experienced rapid and unprecedented growth and has recently surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy after the United States.

Today

China’s political reality consists of a highly fragmentized “market conforming system”, with weak connections between central policymakers and regional government organs that implement policy.

The Chinese system of policy making is both a top-down and bottom-up process. The centre passes policy resolutions that circulate to regional administrative branches. On the other end, local administrators write reports addressed to higher-level Party authorities with suggestions and comments on the implementation of central policies. Though this top-down, bottom-up flow of information is meant to create a communication system among privileged participants at different levels of government, the bottom-up flow of information is checked by the actions of the centre: reports by the lower level are censored by senior leaders and only those that are read and authorized by the centre are circulated to other departments.

The development foreign policy falls under the responsibility of the State Council, the central executive body of the Chinese state. Under the State Council, foreign policies are coordinated by bodies like the FALG (The Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group), which leads discussions on issues of national security, the Ministry of Foreign affairs, which handles bilateral relations and communicates with foreign governments; and the Ministry of Commerce, which oversees international trade and investment policies. Once a year, policy reports by the State Council and other bodies are heard by the National People’s Congress, where legislations are debated and passed by a vote among 2900 part time-legislators.

In practice, the implementation of policy is extremely varied between localities, and regional governments have been known to go against central party interests for economic advantage. For instance, grassroots officials have a keen interest in attracting foreign investment to their region while central leaders oppose introducing foreign competition to local industry. However, local officials have lent their support to foreign firms in opposing Chinese anti-dumping actions. Since local governments have discretion over the way regulations are implemented, there are no meaningful checks for inconsistencies in policy implementation on a regional level.

[For more on these topics you can read: The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform ed. David Lampton (2001), New Directions in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy ed. Alaister Ian Johnson and Robert Ross (2006), Governing China by Kenneth Lieberthal (2004).]

RELATED MATERIALS

  • Xinhua reported that on Thursday, March 10th the presidium of the Fourth Session of the 11th National People’s Congress (NPC) laid out drafts for China’s twelfth five-year plan, which aims for an average of seven per cent growth over the next five years and plans to tackle income inequality and inflation. Xinhua’s online edition also provides day-to-day coverage of the NPC as it unfolds.
  • The Wall Street Journal also reported that the NPC has set out to investigate the implementation of fiscal and monetary policy in China, a goal that is relevant both to Chinese economic growth and to the relationship between China and its global partners.  The Journal also featured an interview with a Chinese official, who insisted that China is prepared to appreciate its currency against the dollar in the upcoming year. Such a move would likely be applauded in international forums, which have been pushing for China and other emerging economies to strive for balanced growth.
  • The Financial Post featured a guest blogger, Chatham House’s Kerry Brown, who provided a preview and guide to the NPC.