Opposition Rule: Controlling Corruption Under Autocracy

Description

How does the opposition govern under autocracy? In this paper, I analyze a unique instance where pro-democratic forces took control of political institutions in a prominent electoral autocracy: the success of the non-systemic opposition in the 2017 Moscow municipal council elections. Even in a repressive environment, I show that opposition forces can improve governance and reduce corruption from within government, suggesting that developing an alternative to autocratic rule may be best served by joining rather than boycotting institutions.

About the speaker

David Szakonyi is Assistant Professor of Political Science at George Washington University and co-founder of the Anti-Corruption Data Collective. His academic research focuses on corruption, clientelism, and political economy in Russia, Western Europe, and the United States. His most recent book — Politics for Profit: Business, Elections, and Policymaking in Russia (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, 2020) — examines why businesspeople run for political office and how their firms benefit. He has also led numerous investigations into political corruption and opacity in the private equity and real estate industries, which have been published in the Washington Post, Foreign Policy, the Daily Beast, and the Miami Herald, among other outlets. He received his PhD in political science from Columbia University and his BA from the University of Virginia.