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The Statebuilder’s Dilemma

The central task of all statebuilding is to create a state that is regarded as legitimate by the people over whom it exercises authority. States sufficiently motivated to bear the costs of building a state in some distant land, however, are likely to have interests in the future policies of that country, and will therefore seek to promote loyal leaders who are sympathetic to their interests and willing to implement their preferred policies. Except in rare cases where the policy preferences of the statebuilder and the population of the country whose state is to be built coincide, as in the famous success cases of West Germany and Japan after 1945, promoting a leader who will remain loyal to the statebuilder undermines that leader’s legitimacy at home. Paradoxically, the greater the interests of the statebuilder in the target country, the more difficult it is to build a legitimate state that can survive on its own. The analysis is illustrated through the case of U.S. statebuilding efforts in Iraq after 2003.

David A. Lake is the Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. He presently President of the American Political Science Association.

Register at: https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/events/

When

October 13, 2016 from 5:00pm-7:00pm

Where

Vivian and David Campbell Conference Facility,

Munk School of Global Affairs, 1 Devon shire Place, Toronto