

# MUNK MONITOR

VIEWS, NEWS, PEOPLE AND EVENTS FROM THE MUNK SCHOOL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS

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Trinity College Site



MUNK  
SCHOOL  
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GLOBAL  
AFFAIRS



VIEW FROM THE DIRECTOR

JANICE GROSS STEIN

## SIGNS OF SHIFTING POWER

These are extraordinary times in the world and at the new Munk School of Global Affairs. Canada is host to unprecedented back-to-back sessions of the G8 and the G20 as world leaders struggle to cope with big security challenges and a still fragile global economy. Even more important, these two summits are graphic evidence of a shift in power from the developed world to dynamic economies in Asia, Latin America, and in Africa.

The struggle over the bank tax is a photomontage of a world reforming before our eyes. Canada has lined up with India and China, Brazil and Mexico against its traditional friends in Europe and the United States to oppose a tax on banks that would provide a cushion against future bank failures. It is not so much the substance of the debate that matters as it is the new patterns of alignment.

Much the same holds true on Prime Minister Stephen Harper's signature issue at the G8 of maternal and child health. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the U.S. position on the funding of abortion clear when she was in Canada. At one time that would have been enough. No longer. Leaders of some of the emerging economies made it clear that they too opposed funding for abortion, and a consensus quickly developed to let each country find its own solution in the context of broad support for women's reproductive health.

On core security issues such as sanctions against Iran, formally the province of the G8, Brazil and Turkey, both members of the G20, stepped outside the consensus as they put together

Continued on page 2

## The New Global Security Agenda

COVER STORY BY WESLEY WARK

A strange air of nostalgia hangs over any discussion of the global security agenda. Faced with a bewildering array of challenges to security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we look back on the Cold War with a longing for its alleged simplicities.

The U.S. political scientist John Mearsheimer captured this emergent nostalgia early on, in a piece he wrote for the *Atlantic Monthly* in August 1990, entitled "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War." Mearsheimer, as can happen to prophets, was right for the wrong reasons. His main concern at the time was the likely return to a more violence-prone, multi-polar world order, which would make us relish the relative stability of the bipolar world that mostly described the Cold War. Mearsheimer's logic was rooted in the primacy of nation-state actors and the realist position that an



*The pall lingers: A decade after the 9/11 attacks, which enveloped the Woolworth Building in smoke (above), we are still failing to come to grips with the globalization of terrorism.*

international system with multiple armed states was more likely to go down the path of war than was a bipolar system with military power relatively equally distributed and with the horror of nuclear weapons making nugatory the idea of nuclear war. No fault of his that he couldn't see the coming horrors of transnational terrorism, cyber aggression, and rapid climactic change.

The 9/11 attacks spelled the end of a decade and forced new thinking about the new horrors. The process began with the famous U.S. national security strategy of September 2002. The "Bush doctrine," as it quickly came to be known, laid down a list of threats to U.S./global security, inevitably strongly flavoured by the shock of the 9/11 attacks. At the top of the U.S. list were global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the potential nexus of belligerent state and non-state actors that might fuse a nuclear-weapons proliferator and rogue state (all eyes on Iraq) with an Al-Qaedaesque terrorist group. At the heart of the U.S. response to these challenges was an overhasty abandonment of the policy of containment in favour of a more robust doctrine of preventive war, and the embrace of unilateralism as and when necessary.

Canada followed suit with its own national security policy, "Securing an Open Society," in April 2004. The Canadian policy identified no less than eight contemporary threats: terrorism, WMD proliferation, failed and failing states, foreign espionage, natural disasters, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, organized crime, and pandemics.

In doing so, Canada signaled that it was going to embrace an "all hazards" approach to understanding the security environment, rather than follow in the wake of the U.S. terrorism-centric approach. But the Canadian document was effectively left to gather dust with the end of the Liberal government, and the current Harper

Continued on page 4

## THE NEW MUNK SCHOOL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Visionary thinking by philanthropists Peter and Melanie Munk has borne fruit with the creation of the Munk School of Global Affairs.

The Munks have donated \$35 million, the largest gift in the University's history, for the School. This gift, combined with two landmark gifts from the Ontario and federal governments, will help establish the Munk School as a leading voice in the global conversation about the forces that are reshaping the international landscape.

The Ontario government has announced a \$25 million gift for the School and the federal government has announced a further \$25 million gift to create the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies at the Munk School.

"To become global leaders today, students need more than the core functional disciplines. They also need a deep understanding of the broader architecture and forces that shape the global system," noted Professor Janice Gross Stein, Director of the Munk School.

As Peter Munk told the *Globe and Mail*: "We're not in a bipolar world anymore. The world has come to question more and more American values and the American way of doing things. Canada has a unique opportunity to step into the shoes that America has vacated, and I think that requires an elite group of highly educated, globalized Canadians who can be the spokespersons of every aspect of globalization."

Noting the previous generosity of the Munks over many years, University of Toronto President David Naylor said: "Their latest gift — a truly remarkable benefaction — will lift the Munk School to global significance. It also reinforces Canada's new position as a confident interlocutor in the conversation between the current and emerging world powers."

The Munk School incorporates the existing centres of academic excellence at the former Munk Centre for International Studies. It will accept its first 40 students into the new Master of Global Affairs degree program in September 2010 and later add doctoral and undergraduate programs. Students will be required to go outside the country for four months to work with a global corporation, an international institution, or a global foundation or nongovernmental organization. "The school will produce Canadians who will have thought about global society and can come back to Canada and build global bridges," noted Professor Stein. "I am excited by the unprecedented opportunities the Munk School creates and look forward to working with new students and faculty until the University completes its search for my successor, a worldwide search which the generous benefaction from Peter and Melanie Munk has made possible."

## CITIZEN LAB: A SHADOW WORLD EXPOSED

### VIEW FROM THE DIRECTOR

*Continued from page 1*

a separate deal. China, now a central member of the G20 — more aptly of an emerging G2 with the United States — has worked hard to dilute the content of a sanctions resolution. Regardless of the issues, members of the G20 are now making their voices heard and actively shaping the global debate.

The new Munk School of Global Affairs comes into being in the midst of this transformation in world politics. Peter and Melanie Munk understand well the significance of these extraordinary global changes for Canada and for the world. They led with a magnificent benefaction to create the new school. Their gift will enable the hiring of new faculty, the appointment of post-doctoral fellows, and the opportunity to attract distinguished visitors from all over the world and from all fields. All of these appointments will enrich beyond measure the students in our new professional Master of Global Affairs who will be joining us in September.

The Province of Ontario contributed the funding to restore a magnificent heritage building on the northern gateway to the University of Toronto. And the Government of Canada joined to create and fund the new Canada Centre for Global Security Studies within the Munk School.

Together, this funding creates an unprecedented opportunity for Canada to analyze these changes and to be one of the world's hubs in innovating and shaping the new global policy agenda. Our students will have a unique opportunity to be part of this global conversation, to work and study in these emerging economies, and to help build the bridges and platforms that Canada needs to thrive in a changing world.

We at the Munk School are deeply grateful to Peter and Melanie Munk for their vision, their leadership, and their commitment to excellence. I look forward to leading the Munk School as we put in place new architecture for research, education, and global partnership, and search the world for the very best people to bring to the Munk School of Global Affairs.

*Janice Gross Stein, Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs, is an acknowledged expert on conflict resolution and international relations, with an emphasis on the Middle East. A Fellow of the Trudeau Foundation, Professor Stein has served on many international advisory panels, including the Working Group on Middle East Negotiations at the United States Institute of Peace. Professor Stein is the co-author of We All Lost the Cold War (1994), The Cult of Efficiency (2001), and The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (2007).*



*Watching Big Brother: Ron Deibert and his colleagues released their report on cyber spying to the world at a Munk School press conference.*

**T**he Munk School's Citizen Lab has a habit of making international headlines. Director Ron Deibert and colleagues Rafal Rohozinski, Nart Villeneuve, and Greg Walton co-authored a startling report this April that exposed one of the biggest online spy rings ever cracked.

Called "Shadows in the Cloud: Investigating Cyber Espionage 2.0," the report unveiled a global network of "botnets" — computers controlled remotely and made to report to servers in China. Their report caused ripples of alarm around the world. Its findings were the result of a year-long investigation by Citizen Lab, the SecDev Group, and the Shadowserver Foundation.

Their report documented evidence

of a cyber espionage network that compromised government, business, and academic computer systems in India, the Office of the Dalai Lama, and the United Nations. Numerous other institutions, including the Embassy of Pakistan in the United States, were also compromised.

The report analyzes the malware ecosystem employed by the Shadows' attackers. The system leveraged multiple redundant cloud computing systems, social networking platforms, and free web hosting services in order to maintain persistent control while operating core servers located in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although the identity and motivation of the attackers remain unknown, the report provides evidence that the attackers operated or staged their

operations from Chengdu, PRC.

Professor Deibert has pointed out that cyberspace has become a battleground for intense military competition. Many countries are developing offensive cyberwarfare capabilities, including targeted espionage.

This is the second time the group's work has attracted international attention. In 2009 they released "Tracking GhostNet: Investigating Cyber Espionage Network." That investigation uncovered a network of more than 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries.

In recognition of his groundbreaking work, Professor Deibert was awarded the Carolyn Tuohy Impact on Public Policy Award.

For the report "Shadows in the Cloud," go to <http://shadows-in-the-cloud.net>

### NEED A SOURCE?

*Munk School scholars can be contacted for further comment on issues raised in this edition at [munkschool@utoronto.ca](mailto:munkschool@utoronto.ca).*

Commentators in this issue:

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Louis W. Pauly, *Director of the Centre for International Studies*  
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# MUNK SCHOOL EVENTS

## THE 2010 GELBER PRIZE WINNER: THE GENERALISSIMO

The 21<sup>st</sup> annual Lionel Gelber Prize for the world's best book on international affairs was presented at a Munk School event in March. An overflow audience was on hand as author Jay Taylor accepted the award for his book, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China*. Jury Chair George Russell called the book "a remarkable achievement," adding that it is "a fresh and impeccably documented approach to a vital issue that puts the histories of the Chinese Revolution and of Chiang Kai-shek ... in a new and more favourable light." The book also provides insights into how modern Confucianism, as espoused by Chiang, informs present-day Chinese domestic and foreign policy, particularly relations the United States.


Taylor's book is a gripping read, drawing as it does on previously unavailable diaries Chiang wrote over 53 years. Chiang's foibles, strengths, and driving character are fully developed as the author traces the life of the man who rivaled Mao as a dominant figure in the history of China. With the authority of an old China hand who spent 37 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, including stints in Beijing and Taipei, Taylor mines Chiang's diaries as well as new Chinese sources to present an objective portrayal of Chiang's effort to fulfill his vision of one China: first on the mainland through nearly 30 years of international and civil wars, then, after Chiang's decisive loss to Mao in 1949, on Taiwan, where he laid the foundations for democratic governance.

The long struggle between Mao and Chiang, according to Taylor, was driven by competing visions. Both believed that China's sovereignty and rightful place in the world could be recovered only through national unity, but they differed greatly on the means of achieving it. For Mao, "the absolutist tenets of Marxism-Leninism and China's ancient Legalists shaped his draconian means and utopian ends." But for Chiang, who eventually became a Christian, albeit with a record of episodic brutality, tyranny, and philandering, "the Confucian precepts of conformity, harmony, stability, and practicality helped fashion his authoritarian methods and his expectations of human progress."

Mao's vision may have triumphed in 1949, but Taylor comes to a very different conclusion about whose vision has ultimately prevailed in modern



From left: George Russell, Jury Chair, looks on as Noah Rubin, Chair of the Gelber Prize Foundation Board (centre), presents the prize to Jay Taylor.



China. He concludes his book: "Truly, the vision that drives modern China in the twenty-first century is that of Chiang Kai-shek, not of Mao Zedong."

Taylor expanded on that conclusion in his remarks to the Gelber Prize audience. "The vision that drives China today is that of modern Confucianism, like that of Chiang Kai-shek," he said, noting that beginning with Deng, Chinese leaders have viewed Confucianism as a needed ethical or moral component to their society. A good society in Confucian mode is "prosperous and stable, and, above all, well controlled by a government of firm, benevolent men," Taylor said, "while freeing the industriousness of the people."

The Chinese embrace of Confucianism is also crucial to understanding U.S.-China relations, he stressed. Chinese foreign policy is


rooted in Confucian concept of "the Great Harmony," which has a number of principles: non-interference in internal affairs, multilateralism, equality, and mutual benefit. Taylor demonstrated how China is applying these principles in its dealings with the United States, North Korea, Iran, and Africa.

While U.S. policy toward China has swung sharply, he said, China has not seemed ruffled. Under the Bush administration, China was seen as a major enemy to the U.S. in the long term, as was demonstrated when the Pentagon retargeted its nuclear arsenal from Europe to Asia. Under the Obama administration, the view is that "the best policy is to treat China as an ally and a strategic partner" — a fact underlined by the growing financial interdependence of the two countries. Throughout the coolness of the Bush administration, U.S. policy failed to elicit a hostile reaction from China. Why? China has been taking a Confucian approach, Taylor explained, meaning "do not lead, do not mount challenges, do not risk things. First, we must build for decades, economically, scientifically, and technologically, as the basis for a new modern China."

Widely considered the world's most important prize in nonfiction, the Lionel Gelber Prize recognizes the year's best book on international affairs. It is presented in partnership with the Munk School of Global Affairs and *Foreign Policy* magazine.

To view Jay Taylor's address, visit the webcasts page of the Munk School website.

## THE 2010 GELBER PRIZE FINALISTS



**THE DEAD HAND**  
The Untold Story  
of the Cold War Arms Race  
and Its Dangerous Legacy

David E. Hoffman

A foray into the darkest reaches of the Cold War, from illegal Soviet bioweapons programs and a doomsday machine, to the maneuvering that brought the world's greatest nuclear rivalry to its still dangerous but much-improved state.

Doubleday




**REFLECTIONS ON THE  
REVOLUTION IN EUROPE**  
Immigration, Islam,  
and the West

Christopher Caldwell

A sharply observed, provocative rumination on the cultural contradictions and challenges faced by post-modern Europe amid a rising tide of immigration from the far side of the Mediterranean, which poses the question: Will Europe survive?

Doubleday




**THE GAMBLE**  
General David Petraeus and  
the American Military  
Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008

Thomas E. Ricks

A Pulitzer Prize-winning military journalist displays extraordinary journalistic skills in tracing the struggle to generate and implement the still-controversial U.S. "surge" in Iraq — as seen by most of its chief U.S. military participants.

The Penguin Press



**THE TEETH MAY SMILE  
BUT THE HEART  
DOES NOT FORGET**  
Murder and Memory in Uganda

Andrew Rice

An illuminating, intimate autopsy of one man's search for justice in the charnel house vacated by Idi Amin Dada, which lays bare the deep fissures and frustrations of revolution and recovery in a battered, post-colonial, African nation-state.

Metropolitan Books

# MUNK SCHOOL EVENTS

## THE NEW GLOBAL SECURITY AGENDA

*Continued from page 1*

government, in office since 2006, has not seen fit to issue its own version. Agenda-setting and strategic thinking about the global security environment have been left to others.

The Obama administration has now come forward with its own iteration of the U.S. national security doctrine. Not surprisingly, it is different in tone and substance from its Bush-era predecessor. Its emphasis is on the need to restore U.S. leadership in the global community, to begin to fix a broken international system, and to achieve both these aims by shoring up the prerequisites of American power at home in terms of economic security. The Obama doctrine pays less attention to a listing of threats and more attention to the primacy of American values, conveyed with the same high-minded rhetoric that has marked the new Democratic administration in Washington since the inauguration.

Yet the new Obama administration is mindful of the threat environment that it faces, now and in the foreseeable future. This was made clear in the threat assessment prepared by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and delivered to Congress in February 2010. The DNI Director told Congress that the “strategic landscape” had changed considerably for the U.S., even over the past year. His report highlighted a wide range of security concerns, including global economic weaknesses, terrorism, and proliferation. It profiled the political environment in troubled regions (Afghanistan-Pakistan and the Middle East), surveyed key countries (China, Russia, India), and even gave broad-brush treatment to continents where ongoing instability was a concern (Africa and Latin America). But what was most interesting, and most forward looking, in the document were its bookends.

The DNI placed the cyber threat at the head of the list of national security threats, reflecting a growing consciousness about both the scale and diversity of attacks on the U.S. communications network and a heightened awareness of the depth of U.S. public- and private-sector vulnerabilities. The other bookend in the U.S. threat assessment concerns a basket of equally “new” (or newly appreciated) security threats, including climate change, global health challenges, aggressive intelligence efforts by foreign state and non-state actors, and the increasing virus of international organized crime.

The DNI’s threat assessment is a powerful reminder of how new threats, including cyber warfare and climate change, have been layered on top of old

ones, of how old or long-established threats, such as espionage and organized crime have mutated, and of how attention has shifted in relative terms from state actors and war to more diffuse dangers emanating from non-state actors. Indeed, the 21<sup>st</sup>-century environment is being shaped even by threats that exist, at least in part, outside human agency altogether, such as climate change, pandemics, and natural disasters.

The cyber security threat is postulated on an appreciation that those who engage in cyber aggression — the offence — have the upper hand over those who engage in cyber protection — the defence. No state has yet managed to come up with a convincing cyber

have to decide how to deploy state resources to measure and monitor the threat. No state, so far as I am aware, has yet reached the logical conclusion that climate change will become a top priority problem for 21<sup>st</sup>-century intelligence services.

WMD proliferation is a perennial priority on the threat assessment list. In its starkest form — the dreaded use of one or more nuclear weapons — it presents an existential threat to human society. Concerned states are putting renewed effort into locking down the source material for nuclear weapons and into trying to shore up non-proliferation treaties. Where we lack sufficient effort and knowledge is in building an under-

that a handful of terrorist groups can develop a global strike capacity, but that Al Qaeda has been a pioneer in applying an age-old doctrine of statecraft — alliance building — to the international projection of terrorism and the conservation of terrorist resources and security. We also continue to struggle with the phenomenon of home-grown terrorism, by failing to realize that it is yet another offshoot of the globalization phenomenon, in which Al Qaeda has managed to generate a model and example of jihad as ideology and warfare that is infinitely exportable. Terrorism in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is genuinely new and will persist until that far-off time when the idea of global jihad no longer has leaders or followers.

States are paying renewed attention in national security doctrines to the threat of espionage. This may seem strangely old-fashioned. But the reality is that 21<sup>st</sup>-century espionage has found its own path to the new. States are forced to rely more and more on their intelligence systems for an understanding of the complex security environment at home and abroad. The espionage players are also changing. Non-state actors are increasingly coming to the fore in international espionage — terrorist groups, organized crime, and private-sector companies all have a stake in developing espionage or intelligence-gathering capabilities. Counter-intelligence is also being transformed as the need to protect state secrets and societal infrastructure grows, just as the ability to detect agents from without or within lessens. Indeed, a good deal of foreign intelligence, and likely more to come, is being conducted by machines remotely targeted to siphon up valuable information through a variety of sensors. Treason, man-made or machine-made, will become increasingly hard to spot.

A security agenda that features such diverse, top-tier threats as cyber aggression, climate change, WMD proliferation, transnational terrorism, and espionage reminds us that the times have truly changed. The common denominator may be the newness of these threats, but it is also the shallowness of knowledge about them. The former CIA Director, James Woolsey’s oft-quoted and colourful remark about the post Cold War world — “we have slain the dragon, but there remain many snakes in the jungle” — still looks on the money. No one wants the dragon back, but we haven’t yet invested the time required to know our snakes. Slaying them will be no romance.

*Wesley Wark is a Professor in the International Relations Program and the Master of Global Affairs Program at the Munk School.*



*New threats layered on old ones: In April this year, Greek police cordoned off a neighbourhood in central Athens where they discovered a terrorist arms cache.*


strategy, nor have we begun to think seriously about maintaining societal resiliency in the face of attack. This requires sustaining a critical backbone of communications infrastructure, in the event of a crisis of some kind or another, sufficient to let people get on with their lives in a slightly, if temporarily, less connected world. As for an international regime, or any movement towards international norms, we are nowhere.

The climate security threat, which requires a wrenching turn towards thinking about how climate change could impact on human security, is beginning to make a large impact on national security thinking, as indicated in the DNI’s threat assessment. But the leading Cassandra on this topic has been the United Kingdom, which boldly proclaimed climate change as the number one security threat in a 2008 national security paper. As we start to think about climate change more and more in security terms, we will also

standing in detail of the specific motivations that drive proliferators like Iran, North Korea, and — briefly and unsuccessfully — Syria. Nor have we really been willing to grasp the nettle of terrorism and WMD. What would it take for a terrorist group to acquire WMD? What early warning system needs to be developed to monitor and prevent this? What would terrorists do with WMD if they acquired such weapons, and what defences might we need?

On the terrorism front, we are beguiled by the spectre, as the Bush doctrine originally put it, of “terrorists of global reach.” Much of the doctrine behind the war on terror was designed not to eradicate terrorism, but to put it back in its regional or local box, and thus turn back the clock to a day (pre-9/11, pre-1998 maybe) when terrorism could safely be pigeonholed as a lesser national security threat. A decade after the 9/11 attacks, we are still failing to come to grips with the true face of the globalization of terrorism. It is not just

## THE FUTURE OF THE G8



**Michael Wilson**

Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs. He is a former federal Minister of Finance and participant in G7 meetings, and served as Canadian Ambassador to Washington.

*“There is a sense of joint responsibility among leaders, which is reinforced each year by an accountability report.”*

**T**he G8 is dead. Long live the G20!

Not so fast. Despite rumours to the contrary, there is still very much a place and a responsibility for the G8 in the international governance architecture.

This should not challenge the place of the G20, which was clearly designated at the Pittsburgh G20 meeting as the world’s premier forum for economic cooperation. It is fast filling that very important position. By the end of this year, there will have been five summits since November 2008. Leaders have talked about the economic and financial crisis, financial regulation, trade, and climate change. These are issues that must be addressed by a broader forum than the G8 if there is to be progress.

But the G20 does not replace the G8, which includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A grouping of like-minded, advanced industrial countries, they have regularly worked together for over 30 years on some very tough issues. Finance ministers of the G7 (the G8 minus Russia) meet regularly to assess current conditions and the progress they have made in meeting agreed objectives such as financial regulation reform. The G8 countries are also the major players in all of these big issues. China is the only major player not in the G8. More on that later.

As a practical matter, the G8 has the advantage of having only eight voices around the table. As a result, there can be deep and detailed dialogue on the issues, leading to better decisions. The intimate nature of the meetings leads to enhanced personal relationships among leaders, which encourages more contact between meetings. There is also a sense of joint responsibility among leaders, which is reinforced each year by an accountability report.

The G8 acts as a catalyst, a policy driver, and a prime mover in advancing and funding initiatives. As a result, the G8 is able to play a leadership role on the most important global issues. This combination of leadership and tangible support is important in moving global priorities forward. Canada, for example, is

taking a leadership role in establishing maternal and children’s health as priority issues at this G8. The need for action is well established. The solutions are broadly agreed and the time is ripe. The G8 is best positioned to lead.

No G20 decision on key global issues will be reached without the broad support of G8 countries. On the other hand, the G8 countries will not be able to “steamroll” an issue over the opposition of other G20 countries. Deadlocks at the UN and the WTO make that point clearly. If differences among G8 countries can be resolved outside the G20 meetings, resolution of the issues at the top of the global agenda will be speedier.

Having said that, G8 countries should never go into G20 meetings with the assumption that, because they have agreed amongst themselves, the conclusion on any particular issue is preordained. They must be ready to listen and adjust as other G20 members express their views in this broader forum.

Globalization has moved quickly

that engage and hopefully motivate others to join.

It is important to develop a strong linkage between the two bodies. With respect to the G8 leaders, there is great benefit in sharing the outcome of their discussions, and the reasons for their decisions, with their G20 counterparts. This is very important to China, in particular, because of its growing importance on the world scene. It should also contribute to making the ensuing G20 discussion more productive.

G8 meetings are not focused on the forthcoming G20 agenda. Leaders within the G8 discuss a range of issues that are outside the purview of the G20. At the top of the agenda are global security, intelligence sharing, terrorism, development assistance, and organized crime.

Canada should be an active player in the G8/G20 process. We are not a great power like the US, Japan, Germany, Russia, or China. We do not have a colonial past like the UK, Russia, France, or Italy. We can bring a unique perspective as a successful middle power, which can be helpful in bridging differences.

Our success can be measured in a number of ways. We have a large GDP for a country of our population size. We have a diverse citizenry. We have come through the economic and financial crisis in better shape than most. Our banking system is strong. We have made a

strong contribution to the NATO effort in Afghanistan. We are active in many international organizations. We are viewed as a reliable partner and participant in the global community. As such, we should not hesitate to express our point of view in either the G8 or G20 dialogue. Our views are welcome. And this year we have been instrumental in getting the G8 back to basics and focused on global security and development.

In conclusion, I believe there is a continuing, though changing, place for the G8 and an important role for Canada to play in both the G8 and G20.



*Smaller is better: With only eight voices around the table, the G8 offers the chance for more intimate meetings, such as this session between U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Prime Minister Stephen Harper.*

in recent years and the need for broader leadership beyond the major industrial powers is now widely recognized. Nevertheless, G8 leaders share a sense of global responsibility and have been taking leadership positions for years. Not all G20 leaders have accepted these responsibilities with respect to global financial imbalances and barriers to investment and trade. Nevertheless, all G20 members wish to influence the decisions that are taken. Leadership must be provided by those wishing to do so while being sensitive to the views of the others. The G8 is the logical catalyst of major new initiatives, but it must do so in ways

## THE FUTURE OF THE G20



**John Kirton**  
 Director of the G8 Research Group  
 and Co-director of the  
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 Munk School of Global Affairs

*“Their first task is to stay the course on stimulus until private-sector-led recovery is assured.”*

**T**he 2010 Group of Eight (G8) and Group of Twenty (G20) summits, taking place respectively on June 25–26 in Muskoka and June 26–27 in Toronto, Canada, are unusually significant events. For the first time, these two systems for global governance will be held in tandem. For the first time, the G20 will embark on its new mission, proclaimed at its last summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009, to serve as the world’s premier, permanent forum for international economic governance. The twin summits in Canada will provide the expanded global governance capacity to address many pressing global issues across the financial and economic, social and development, and political and security domains. But the greatest pressure to prove its worth is on the newly recast G20.

It sprang to life as a summit in November 2008 at a special meeting of heads of state and government called in response to the great global financial and economic crisis erupting at the time. Now its members must deal with the many entrenched global problems that remain in reinforced form after the galvanizing effect of the crisis has passed.

When the G8 leaders leave their two-day Muskoka meeting to join their other G20 colleagues in Toronto for discussions on the evening of June 26 and the next day, they will focus on the critical issues of economics and finance. Many will still have vivid memories of the recent global financial and economic meltdown, and its continuing costs for some member states’ job and housing markets. All will likely be re-energized by the new sovereign debt crisis that erupted in Europe in the spring.

Their first task is to stay the course on stimulus until private-sector-led recovery is assured, while simultaneously designing and implementing smart exit strategies to convince nervous markets that they have credible medium-term plans for fiscal consolidation. A closely related challenge is implementing and improving the Framework for Strong Sustainable and Balanced Growth they invented in Pittsburgh, by ensuring that all

members produce their promised national plans with precise numbers. This is a prerequisite for a proper analysis of how the plans fit together to achieve shared global objectives and to identify the options that are available for necessary adjustments. Only then can the leaders at Toronto credibly signal their determination to make the balanced and broadly shared exchange rate, fiscal, microeconomic, and social policy changes required to put a durable recovery in place.

The second task is to modernize G20 members’ domestic financial regulations and supervision in a more comprehensive, forward-looking, and internationally coordinated way. Here the priorities, which leaders will likely achieve, are to tighten consen-



*Last year in Pittsburgh: The G20 has emerged as a summit of leaders facing great pressure to prove its worth.*

sus on definitions and higher quality and quantity of bank capital and liquidity, to avoid getting bogged down by divisive, politically driven debates over new taxes or levies on banks, and to advance stronger, shared standards on accounting and derivatives.

The third task is to open trade and investment in order to fuel private-sector-led growth and development, especially in the emerging and developing economies upon which future global prosperity increasingly depends. G20 leaders will again promise to avoid and redress protectionism and get the overdue Doha development round of multilateral trade negotiations done. But they could, following the lead of their Canadian co-chair, more usefully cut tariffs unilaterally, forge ambitious bilateral and plurilateral trade, investment, and regulatory agreements, and create regimes to contain financial protectionism, eliminate nuisance tariffs, and foster

freer trade in environmentally enhancing services and goods.

The fourth task is to reform the international financial institutions. This starts with shifting 5 percent of the voting share at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from relatively shrinking established economies to rapidly rising emerging ones, and doing so in ways that make it easier for legislatures in all member countries to ratify the change. Also important is expanding resources and improving governance within the IMF and World Bank, as well as considering their role in any future large financial support packages that embattled countries other than Greece might need.

Outside this financial and economic core is an array of social issues that the G20 will again wish to advance. These include climate finance, starting with the delivery of the \$30 billion a year in new money promised to developing countries at the United Nations’ Copenhagen conference in December; the reduction of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies; the promotion of green growth; the mainstreaming of the environment; the generation of good jobs and training; and following

up on the first G20 labour ministers’ meeting in Washington. Other priorities include addressing food security, health, development, tax havens, and terrorist finance. G20 leaders will want to act in ways that support their larger political security goals.

Beyond the challenges of managing these tightly interconnected issues, the leaders face the institutional challenge of developing the new permanent G20 club. They must demonstrate that the G20 is a global club of equals that can meet the challenge of global economic governance. They must establish the G20 as a real summit so it can deal as an equal with the G8 and other plurilateral summit institutions. Leaders must demonstrate that they can provide the integrated, innovative initiatives in accountable and effective ways that a more open global economy, society, and political community wants and needs.

## VOICES FROM THE PAST: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF FINANCIAL STABILITY



**Louis W. Pauly**  
 Director of the Centre  
 for International Studies at the  
 Munk School of Global Affairs

*“In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, it is time for some serious fishing.”*

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, many are hoping that the newly expanded G20 and its newly refurbished Financial Stability Board will foster cooperative policies and resilient markets. I wonder if my late friend Jacques Polak would have considered this hope realistic.

Polak lived almost long enough to celebrate his 96<sup>th</sup> birthday this spring. One of the most distinguished macroeconomists of his generation, his career began in the League of Nations in 1937. In 1947, he joined the International Monetary Fund, where he worked in one prominent capacity or another until 2007. During my sojourn on the Fund’s staff in the late 1980s, Polak and his equally distinguished legal counterpart, Sir Joseph Gold, had a profound impact on my own practical education in monetary and financial affairs.

The post-war history of the Fund and the UN system of which it remains a part is continuous with the history of the League of Nations. The League’s economic and financial files, for example, were passed on to the UN; and certain officials, like Polak and his friend, the late, great Canadian, Louis Rasminsky, began their careers in the League, then, after the war, took their experience with them directly into the nascent IMF. With good reason, Polak in particular felt that the League had been too “political,” or unprofessional, that it had not subordinated narrow national interests to common global interests. The League, in his view, lacked clear authority. Its consensus decision-making practice made it too cautious, and it could not rise above petty concerns. When emergencies arose, it found itself on the sidelines, without resources and without legitimacy. Its small economic staff was ineffective and, in the end, powerless.

The Fund, on the other hand, was different. Polak and Gold both insisted so. It had a constitutional charter, authority delegated by ratified treaty, a clear mandate, the financial resources to fulfil that mandate, and, most importantly, a highly qualified, knowledgeable, technocratic, legally independent, and politically neutral staff. Together with a management team that was accountable to, but also empowered by, member states, and in the absence of the binding constraint on decisions posed by a unanimity principle, Polak and Gold believed that the staff could and did act as system regulators within an important, if bounded, policy arena.

The 1944 Bretton Woods Agree-

ment and its amendment in 1976 did represent signal evolutionary steps toward a more integrated world. At base, they formally obligated member states of the Fund to account to one another on the external consequences of their main economic policies, consequences now increasingly transmitted through more open financial markets.

Polak and Gold were clearly correct that the key to making this novel and necessarily compromised form of accountability substantive and as effective as possible was the Fund staff. Only these permanent staffers or their equivalents could make operational the idea of meaningful accountability, given the continuing fact that national governments and their delegates ultimately remained politically responsible to their citizens alone. In the long run, only a neutral international staff could be the legitimate institutional memory, keep the files, record promises, and compile follow-up data. Without them, commitments were too easy to make in a global setting and even easier to forget back home.

In precisely this context, we can discern the main flaw of the multilateral process now focused on the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which the G20 created in April 2009 as a strengthened successor to the Financial Stability Forum. Working in collaboration with the IMF and other international financial institutions, the FSB is intended to address vulnerabilities affecting financial systems in the interest of global financial stability. Without disrespecting the honourable work of the qualified people now associated with it, the small, impermanent, and very loosely mandated staff of the FSB suggests a historical reversion. It is only too easy to imagine it being created by and within the early League, only to be practically washed away by the financial tsunami of 1931. A plenary body agreeing on policies by consensus, a chair dealing with the politics associated with the quest for unanimity, a secretary general with limited powers, a very small secretariat, and the expectation of voluntary policy implementation by national authorities. This was the essence of the League’s economic and financial machinery, and the current structure of the FSB matches it almost completely.

Admittedly, plans for the FSB do represent a step beyond the G7, G8, and G20 processes out of which it has developed. As useful as they may sometimes be, the Gs have had

no secretariat. Indeed, at the University of Toronto we can be very proud of the fact that the globally recognized substitute for that function — the archive, the institutional memory, and the constructively critical reviewer of promises made at international meetings — has for many years now been the G7, G8, and G20 research programs carried out by Professor John Kirton and generations of his students at the Munk School. Is it time for governments seriously to build on the base they have created?

In fact, governments leading the charge toward financial globalization have long preferred to deal with market-stability policies in very restricted fora. They have been very leery of empowering the international civil service actually required to hold them accountable to one another. The transformation of the Financial Stability Forum into the FSB, with a very small and impermanent staff, may be a modestly positive development, given the complicated technical issues involved. But if its work allows member states to render even more obscure the intimate connection between financial regulation and supervision and the international effects of core macroeconomic policies, systemic financial risk will increase.

Rasminsky once said to me, “At the League, we were expected to catch fish, but we had no bait.” We do not need to relearn our history lessons the hard way. In the wake of the crisis of 2008, it is time for some serious fishing. The big fish goes beyond the scope of anything the FSB has yet proposed; it is a deep and binding arrangement for fiscal and monetary burden-sharing adequate to sustain integrating financial markets. If we really cannot imagine the bait that will help us catch it, now that the urgency of the financial crisis is dissipating, then we should abandon the dream of resilient global markets. This may eventually mean facing once again the much broader sorts of insecurities all too familiar to the founders of the League and the UN. If we are not that brave and we do not believe that under crisis conditions national leaders will discern the common good, then it is far preferable to return seriously to the hard work of building or adapting an actual governing organization at the system level — with staff. We may then discover that, indeed, Polak, Gold, and Rasminsky simply were ahead of their time.

## BREAKING UP DARK CLOUDS IN CYBERSPACE



**Ron Deibert**  
Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs



**Rafal Rohozinski**  
CEO of the Ottawa-based SecDev Group

*The Munk School's Citizen Lab made international news headlines in April with a report documenting a complex ecosystem of cyber espionage that systematically targeted and compromised computer systems in India, the Offices of the Dalai Lama, the United Nations, and several other countries. Entitled Shadows in the Cloud: An Investigation into Cyber Espionage 2.0., the report was published by the Citizen Lab, the SecDev Group, and the Shadowserver Foundation. Below is an essay by the authors on cyber espionage.*

**C**rime and espionage form a dark underworld of cyberspace. Whereas crime is usually the first to seek out new opportunities and methods, espionage usually follows in its wake, borrowing techniques and trade-craft. Our Shadows in the Cloud report illustrates the increasingly dangerous ecosystem of crime and espionage and its embeddedness in the fabric of global cyberspace.

As our everyday lives move online, criminals and spies have migrated to this domain. They leverage complex, adaptive attack techniques to take advantage of the fissures that have emerged in an era where “e” is everything. Every new software, social networking site, cloud-computing system, or web-hosting service represents opportunities for the predatory criminal ecosystem to subvert, adapt, and exploit.

This situation has also emerged because of poor security practices among individuals, businesses, and governments. The age of mass Internet access is less than 20 years old. Public institutions — particularly those in developing countries — have embraced these new technologies faster than procedures have been created to deal with the vulnerabilities they introduce. Today, data is transferred from laptops to USB sticks, over wireless networks at cafe hot spots, and stored across cloud-computing systems whose servers are located in far-off jurisdictions. The sheer complexity makes thinking about security in cyberspace mind-

bogglingly difficult. Paradoxically, documents and personal information are probably safer in a file cabinet, under a bureaucrat's careful watch, than they are on today's networked PC.

*“No country is secure in the global sea of information.”*

The ecosystem of crime and espionage is also emerging because of strategic calculus. Cyberspace is the great equalizer. Countries no longer need to spend billions of dollars to build globe-spanning satellites to pursue high-level intelligence gathering, when they can do so by harvesting information

we uncovered, but no doubt others have been that escaped our gaze.

Canada's cybersecurity strategy has been long promised, but a domestic cybersecurity plan is only a partial solution. In a networked world, you are only as secure as the weakest link — and that link can be anyone, including your allies and partners. Notably, our investigation discovered that Canadian visa applications submitted to Indian consulates in Afghanistan were stolen along with those of 12 other nationalities.

Improving cybersecurity requires a global effort, and one in which Canada's security and foreign policy must be attuned and synchronized to the unique needs of cyberspace. We should take the lead in pushing

for a global convention that builds robust mechanisms of information sharing across borders and institutions, defines appropriate rules of the road for engagement in the cyberdomain, puts the onus on states to not tolerate or encourage malicious networks whose activities operate from within their jurisdictions.

At the same time, Canada should work to defend the openness of the global Internet commons — to ensure that policies and practices appropriate to

security in the information age do not restrict, constrain, or threaten to roll back the gains in development, human rights, and democracy — values we as Canadians embrace — and which cyberspace has helped propel globally over the past 20 years.

Today, no country is secure in the global sea of information. Preserving cyberspace requires a strategy to address the dark side of the Internet. This requires urgent international co-operation, level-headed judgment, and a commitment to preserve our values of freedom of speech and access to information, so as to ensure that in our quest for online security we do not secure ourselves into a new dark age.

*This essay first appeared in The Globe and Mail.*



*Cat and mouse: Every new software site, cloud-computing system, or web-hosting service represents opportunities for the predatory criminal ecosystem.*

from government computers connected to the Internet.

Governments are engaged in a rapid race to militarize cyberspace, to develop tools and methods to fight and win wars in this domain. This arms race creates an opportunity structure ripe for crime and espionage to flourish. In the absence of norms, principles, and rules of mutual restraint, opportunists, criminals, spies, and others rush to fill the vacuum.

Against this context, the absence of Canadian policy for cyberspace is notable. For years, Canadian telcos have acted as the frontline against a surging tide of criminal botnets, malware, and other malicious online behaviour — largely in the absence of government policy. At least one Canadian institution was ensnared in the Shadow network



## CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN, RUSSIAN, AND EURASIAN STUDIES



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### UKRAINE'S NEW COURSE: AWAY FROM THE WEST

**T**he election of Viktor Yanukovich as Ukraine's fourth president in February 2010 led to a sharp discontinuity in the country's foreign and domestic policies. After a few months in office, President Yanukovich has already renounced many of the legacies of his predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko. He takes a distinctly different approach to the issues of language politics, national history, energy relations, and national security. Yanukovich has also managed to consolidate his political power by securing control over the government, the parliament, the courts, and the electronic media.

What impact will this have on the country's democratic credentials and European aspirations? Will Yanukovich's presidency turn Ukraine into another post-Soviet hybrid regime dependent on Moscow for political and economic survival? Or will Yanukovich fall victim to the same peculiarities of Ukraine's ethno-linguistic makeup that prevented all of his predecessors from pushing the country decisively in one direction?

While the Yanukovich presidency may still take a few unexpected turns, several outcomes seem increasingly likely.

against viewing the 1930s famine in Ukraine as an act of genocide, initiated the revision of history textbooks to eliminate their nationalist bent, and embraced Russia as Ukraine's main foreign partner. While these policies may solidify the president's support among his electorate, they further alienate and intensify animosity towards Yanukovich among many Western Ukrainians. As a result, East-West political cleavage, which surfaced during the Orange Revolution, is likely to remain an enduring feature of Ukraine's electoral politics. Yanukovich will further exploit this cleavage in order to maintain his re-election chances. At the same time, lack of overwhelming popular support will make him dependent on the continued backing of his oligarchic sponsors, who control media outlets and financial resources.

Second, Yanukovich will gradually erode the democratic gains of the Orange Revolution, particularly media freedoms, a level electoral playing field and the space for independent political activities. The news coverage on the main TV channels, controlled by friendly oligarchs, has become increasingly subservient to the new president. Yanukovich's "Party of Regions" has also emerged as the dominant political force with no serious rivals among the opposition parties. Its nationwide party network will improve Yanukovich's capacity to rig the electoral process and limit the space available for potential challengers. The local elections in 2011 will serve as the first test of the effectiveness of the incumbent's party machine.

Yanukovich will also maintain control over the court system and use political corruption as an incentive for loyalty. The Constitutional Court has already issued several controversial rulings, which openly favoured the president's political agenda. Similarly, the Supreme Court and the High Justice Council, responsible for appointing judges, have been staffed with president's supporters, precluding any prospects of genuine judiciary reform. The new president has also approved high-level appointments of his business cronies to the key government posts in exchange for their continued loyalty. Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's leading billionaire, has three business partners doing his bidding in the lucrative positions of the deputy prime minister, minister of transportation, and minister of industrial policies. Overall, Yanukovich's government has the largest number of businessmen of all previous cabinets. Out of six deputy prime ministers, three are official multimillionaires with active business ties.

The use of coercion may also be revived as an informal weapon in the president's hands. Yanukovich has installed loyalists in charge of all the law enforcement agencies, thus ending the multiple political allegiances which had characterized Yushchenko's presidency. The prosecutor-general has already opened an investigation into the financial mishandlings of the previous government and interrogated several former government members. Although Yanukovich is unlikely to go after the prominent opposition leaders, fearing a popular backlash, he will try to increase the potential costs of supporting the opposition for many businessmen and regular political activists.

Third, as he moves further along in reversing Ukraine's democratic freedoms, Yanukovich will become increasingly dependent on Russia for outside political support and legitimacy. The Western powers, while distinctively open-minded about Yanukovich at the outset of his presidency, will be unlikely to tolerate his authoritarian policies in the future. This will make Yanukovich's strategy of preserving a neutral stance between Russia and the West untenable. Ukraine may, therefore, become non-aligned *de jure*, but *de facto* it will increasingly resemble Russia's client — giving up some of its assets and sovereignty in exchange for continuous political and economic backing. The contradictory nature of Yanukovich's foreign policy vision became apparent in his decision to sign an agreement with Russia on extending the lease of a military base for the Russian Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol until 2042. While guaranteeing a 30 percent discount on Russian gas supplies until 2019 (the last year of Yanukovich's potential second term), the deal with Russia will undermine any credibility of Ukraine's nonaligned status.

The logic of President Yanukovich's political strategy and his own worldview will inevitably reverse the attempts of his predecessors to move Ukraine closer to Europe. However, given the country's regional diversity and the strong pro-European sentiments among many Ukrainians, the president's new course will not gain wide public acceptance. Rather, Yanukovich will face intense popular disapproval in Western Ukraine and areas of Central Ukraine, which will sustain the continued competitive nature of the country's political process. Whether it will eventually bring about another regime change and usher in a new generation of pro-Western reformers depends on the ability of the emerging opposition to formulate a more unifying vision for the badly fractured nation.



*Sechange in Ukraine: Supporters celebrate the election of Viktor Yanukovich.*

First, President Yanukovich will remain a polarizing figure, whose political fortunes will depend primarily on his ability to placate his electoral base and key oligarchic backers. All of Yanukovich's policies over the last few months have been largely consistent with his campaign rhetoric and targeted primarily at his core voters in the Southeastern regions of the country. He lifted strict requirements on the use of Ukrainian language in official, educational, and media settings, argued

*“Yanukovich will gradually erode the democratic gains of the Orange Revolution.”*



Louise Fréchette: "The alternative is simply not sustainable."

## A CLARION CALL FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

One of Canada's most distinguished former diplomats has added her voice to the growing chorus calling for total disarmament of nuclear weapons. "This is our best hope," Louise Fréchette, UN deputy secretary-general from 1998 to 2006, told a Munk School audience this spring. "The alternative is simply not sustainable."

Acknowledging that it appears "utopian" today to expect countries to give up their nuclear weapons, Fréchette maintained that outlook could change over time if steps are taken toward that goal. As an example of progress, the former ambassador and deputy minister pointed out that the number of warheads has been slashed from 60,000 during the Cold War to some 23,000 today, 80 percent belonging to Russia and the United States, who, at the time of her speech, were moving to lower that number to 2,000. "Once that happens," said Fréchette "total disarmament will not seem that far-fetched." Fréchette's words were prescient: in April, the two countries signed a pact to reduce the number of nuclear warheads on each side to 1,550 over seven years, and agreed to seek progress toward broader international disarmament.

For Fréchette, her belief that total disarmament can be achieved is reality based. She maintained that the current global regime, legitimized by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), is unsustainable because it allows a handful of nations

to possess nuclear warheads in perpetuity while denying access to those weapons to every other nation, also in perpetuity. When the treaty was negotiated in the late 1960s, "most countries did not even dream of acquiring the knowledge to build nuclear weapons. "But now, any country that wants one, can build one," said Fréchette. "Just look at North Korea. If they can, anyone can."

[North Korea signed the NPT, violated the treaty, and then withdrew from it. Other nuclear powers such as India and Pakistan have refused to sign.]

As more countries seek to obtain nuclear weapons, the effort to enforce a status quo that prohibits them from obtaining these warheads is doomed to failure, Fréchette said. "If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, then Saudi Arabia and Egypt will follow," she added. "The more nations that have weapons, the higher the risk — and that's not a risk I'm prepared to take."

Fréchette, who is a distinguished fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Waterloo and chair of its Nuclear Energy Futures project, made her remarks at the Munk School as part of a broader exposition on the project's report, *Nuclear Energy and Global Governance to 2030*. The report debunks the popular view that a "nuclear renaissance" is underway that will see a doubling of nuclear power plants by 2030. Instead, the study projects only modest overall nuclear power growth, with almost all of it occurring in nations that already have plants, such as China, Russia, and India. To view the report, visit [www.cigionline.org](http://www.cigionline.org).

## THE BRIAN STEWART INTERVIEW: BRIGADIER-GENERAL JONATHAN VANCE

A top Canadian general with a reputation for brutal frankness has shifted his assessment of the Afghanistan mission, Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance, recently reappointed as Commander of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, last year described the nearly decade-long battle against the Taliban as "desperate" and a "major emergency." But the commander of Canadian and NATO forces in Kandahar province for nine months in 2009 is optimistic now that the situation is improving dramatically. "I believe we *can* win, but I don't know if we *will* win," Vance told Munk School Distinguished Senior Fellow Brian Stewart in a wide-ranging conversation on "Afghanistan — 2010 and Beyond."

The Vance interview was the first in a series of public discussions on Canadian and American policies to be conducted by Stewart, a former foreign correspondent. The Vance session took place before he returned to Kandahar at the end of May to replace Brigadier-General Daniel Ménard.

Vance told Stewart his change of heart is a direct result of a surge in American troops, a key element in President Barack Obama's attempts to escalate the battle against the Taliban. "Between 2006 and 2009, there was a small effort in Kandahar, mostly Canadian," the general said. "We did not have the capacity to do everything that needed to be done to achieve success through counter insurgency. All we could do is not lose."

Today, with more troops, the situation has changed for the better. Said Vance: "The surge is reinforcing the international commitment to the long term and allowing for tactical local objectives. We now are in a position to

make permanent investments in communities. We are moving beyond security to stability."

As for the Taliban, Vance said despite its occasional headline-making actions, it is incapable of achieving total success. He explained: "The Taliban have a problem — they don't have a plan. It's not a particularly good insurgency. They have a safe haven across the international border [Pakistan] and an exhausted population, but they are not driving toward unseating the government or forcing out the 'infidels.'"

"The Taliban don't outnumber, out equip, or out lead the Afghan security forces. They absolutely don't have the military capacity to challenge the government or the security forces. All they can do is be a spoiler."

In Vance's view, the Taliban face an even harder road to victory as the enhanced troop presence over the next few years will allow community-building efforts to establish strong roots. "The machinery of NGOs and government actors is starting to extend basic government and humanitarian services," he said. "There will be setbacks, but the Taliban have no answer to stabilization operations."

Vance is confident that operations over the next year, before Canadian troops leave Afghanistan, will be very productive. "I believe the reinstatement of the Afghan national army will be a success story," he said.

But Vance added that a functioning army is only part of the solution. "You can have the most brilliant army in the world, but you need to employ it correctly," he said. "It requires more than a security operation. History shows that Afghans, properly motivated, are a powerful force."

If Afghanistan is just one step away from a strategic victory when other fighting forces replace Canadian troops, the mission will have been a success. Said Vance: "We can say, 'Okay, Canada did its part.'"



Brigadier-General Vance (left) and Brian Stewart: "The Taliban have a problem — they don't have a plan."

# MUNK SCHOOL EVENTS



Photo: David Chan

Former Prime Minister Paul Martin (centre) flanked by Professor John Kirton and Munk School Director Janice Gross Stein.

Looking Beyond the June Summits: Even as preparations for the June summits in Canada were in full swing, former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin (above) was focusing on the next G20 summit in the Republic of Korea at a Munk School event as well as a public speech. Co-sponsored by the Munk School, his address to a joint session of the Canadian Club and the Empire Club outlined global priorities that should preoccupy summiteers when they gather in Korea in November this year. They should, he argued, be global poverty and climate change as well as the global banking crisis. He lamented that “the G20 has virtually ignored Africa and the issue of food security. Africa’s leaders have much to answer for, but clearly the G20 must respond much more urgently than it has if it is to live up to the hopes so many have vested in it.”

## THE G8/G20 RESEARCH GROUPS

The G8 and G20 research groups at the Munk School have established themselves as one of the world’s leading independent sources of information, analysis, and research on the institutions, issues, and members of the G8 and G20. Currently, they are taking full advantage of Canada’s

hosting both summits to mount a series of high-level conferences featuring international scholars and senior policymakers from government, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Experts focus on the role of the G20 in the global economy and in development (with specific reference to health, nutrition, and food), and on the role of summit diplomacy in governing global security.



Photo: David Chan

Keeping tabs on the summits: From left to right: Madeline Koch (Managing Director, G8/G20 research groups); Donald J. Brean (Co-director, G20 Research Group); John Kirton (Director, G8 Research Group); Co-director, G20 Research Group; and Jenilee Guebert (Director of research, G8/G20 research groups).



Amanda Burden: “Neighbourhoods are the key.”

## LESSONS IN RENEWAL FROM NYC

The woman who revolutionized planning in one of the world’s largest cities says the secret to success is rather simple: rezoning. Amanda Burden, New York City’s powerful and charismatic planning commissioner since 2002, described her efforts to transform

New York into a more livable city in a recent lecture sponsored by the Munk School’s Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance. “Our focus is on neighbourhoods,” Burden said. “Whether residential, business, industrial, or waterfront, we want to build neighbourhoods of choice — and choice neighbourhoods.”

Burden made rezoning a planning and development tool. To make streets more walkable, zoning rules were changed to require builders to plant trees in sidewalks as part of any new development. To make streets more fun, the prohibition on most sidewalk cafés was lifted. Store frontage was limited to allow for more variety of retail outlets per block. Incentives were provided for developers that provided space for not-for-profits and cultural institutions.

Said Burden: “To maintain our economic base, we need to attract people to New York. But we also need to provide the amenities for a dynamic and vibrant city that will keep them there. Neighbourhoods are the key. It’s an extraordinary adventure — and it’s still continuing.”

When Mayor Michael Bloomberg appointed Burden, zoning regulations had not been reviewed for

more than four decades. She discovered how, with community support, one could build the political will to implement zoning changes that would revitalize some neighbourhoods while preserving others.

“We concentrate on the human scale, how a street feels,” she said. “No one on my staff could bring forward a proposal unless that person had walked through the effected area at least a dozen times.”

Burden drew extensive parallels between New York and Toronto. “New York is a sister city,” she said. “Like Toronto, it is a city of neighbourhoods, a city of immigrants, a city where people believe in sustainability.”

She also congratulated Toronto on its innovative architecture. Said Burden: “In design, we used to compete with Chicago and San Francisco. No more. Now we are competing with the likes of Berlin, Barcelona, and Toronto.”

Like Toronto, New York plans to transform the waterfront from “industrial to post-industrial” use. “If we are successful in making the waterfront a more integral part of the city,” Burden said, “we will succeed in making New York the greatest city in the world.”



Photo: Tom Sandler

Anna Porter: An enthusiastic reception.

Anna Porter is the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies Writer-in-Residence. A co-founder of Key Porter Books, she has been one of Canada’s most respected book publishers for thirty years. Anna Porter’s most recent book is *Kasztner’s Train, the True Story of Rezso Kasztner, Unknown Hero of the Holocaust*, winner of the 2007 Writers’ Trust Non-Fiction Award and of the Jewish Book Award for Non-fiction. The manuscript that she is currently working on is about central Europe twenty years after the collapse of its Communist regimes and received an enthusiastic reception at a reading held earlier this year.



Photo: Deb Ransom

*Announcing the birth of the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies: from left, John Manley, Chair of the Advisory Board of the Munk School; Melanie Munk; Prime Minister Stephen Harper; Peter Munk; Nina Munk; David Naylor, President of the University of Toronto; Janice Gross Stein, Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs; and Gary Goodyear, Minister of State for Science and Technology.*

**T**he Munk School of Global Affairs is now home to a new centre devoted to the study of global security issues. The Canada Centre for Global Security Studies will bring together leading scholars and partners from around the world to do interdisciplinary research in five priority areas: cyber security, Arctic security, the Americas and global security, Asia-Pacific security, and transatlantic security.

The creation of the Canada Centre

has been made possible by a contribution of \$25 million from the federal government, which Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced in April. “Canada plays an active role in promoting global security at the G8 and through a broad range of other international activities,” said Prime Minister Harper. “This new centre will help us develop deeper expertise in addressing global security concerns.”

Establishment of the Canada

Centre will also draw on funds from Peter and Melanie Munk’s landmark \$35 million gift to the Munk School of Global Affairs, as well as an Ontario government commitment of \$25 million. The purpose of this public and private funding is to dramatically expand the School’s research capacity, hire new faculty, and expand facilities.

University of Toronto President David Naylor said the new federal funding will help Canada fulfill an

urgent need to cultivate Canadian expertise on global security and address the policy implications for Canada. “The new centre will definitely help Canada play a more significant role in the global conversation and resulting policy actions on pressing security issues,” President Naylor said. “With continuing concerns about global security, and the G8/G20 meetings taking place in Canada this June, the government’s action could not be more timely.”

Peter Munk also welcomed the government’s support, adding “The school’s leadership in the study of global affairs, and now the centre’s focus on security issues, will permit each to make important contributions to Canada’s future role in the world.”

Professor Janice Gross Stein, who is Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs, said the Munk School is uniquely positioned to undertake the centre’s ambitious agenda. “Issues of global security will be a defining framework for our country over the next decade and beyond and Canada needs a strong publicly supported research centre to put the Canadian voice on the international stage,” said Stein. “Given our strengths, the Munk School is the natural place to house this new centre.”

“Moreover, the Canada Centre will be able to draw upon the expertise of some of the best and brightest Canadian minds at a number of our faculties, such as law, engineering, the Rotman School of Management, and medicine.”

**J**ohn Manley is one of Canada’s most outstanding citizens. In private as in public life, he has demonstrated extraordinary commitment to his fellow citizens and given his time and energy to improving the lives of Canadians at home and to those in need abroad. He is a strong and persuasive advocate for the capacity of science and technology to improve lives and works effectively to create opportunities for others. He continues to answer the call for public service from private life and enriches our country’s public policy and performance. I could think of no one better, no one stronger, no one wiser, than John Manley to chair the Board of the new Munk School of Global Affairs.”

*From Janice Gross Stein’s citation at the conferring of The Honourable John Manley’s honorary degree.*



Photo: Lisa Sakulensky

*Honouring Dr. Manley: from left, Rana Sarkar, Co-chair of the Master of Global Affairs Advisory Board; Janice Gross Stein, Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs; Judith Wolfson, Vice-President of University Relations at the University of Toronto; David Peterson, Chancellor of the University of Toronto; David Naylor, President of the University of Toronto; John Manley, Chair of the Advisory Board of the Munk School of Global Affairs; Steven Bernstein, Director of the Master of Global Affairs Program; Shahrzad Mojab, Interim Principal of New College; Jonathan Hausman, Co-chair of the Master of Global Affairs Advisory Board.*