

# MUNK CENTRE MONITOR

IEWS, NEWS, PEOPLE AND EVENTS FROM THE MUNK CENTRE

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO  
**MUNK CENTRE**  
 FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
 AT TRINITY COLLEGE



VIEW FROM THE DIRECTOR

JANICE GROSS STEIN

## THE WORLD IN TRANSITION

**W**e are at a moment of transition in global politics. President George Bush and President Vladimir Putin, the two longest-serving heads of government, held their last summit in Bucharest in April. The two “old-timers” reminisced, mindful that the future is likely to be different from the present. President Putin is not leaving the stage; he is only changing titles. His hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, will not depart in any significant way from the policies of his predecessor. Indeed, Vladimir Putin will become prime minister and the centre of gravity in the Russian political system is likely to shift. We are likely to have transition without change.

This is not the case in the United States. Bush will be leaving office and his successor is still unknown. If one of the two Democratic candidates is elected, there are likely to be significant changes. The United States faces large challenges both abroad to its foreign policy and at home as its economy slides in the wake of the most serious global financial crisis in the last 50 years.

But the crisis is not limited to the United States. China feels itself at knife’s edge. Faculty from the Munk Centre were told last month in Beijing that China is deeply worried by the global financial crisis. A significant drop in U.S. consumption will cut deeply into Chinese exports even as the value of its dollar reserves is dropping. Sustained growth is critical as China copes with a large movement of people from the impoverished rural areas that come to the cities seeking jobs. It is economic growth and employment that allow the Chinese government to deflect the political pressures that simmer just beneath the surface in its rigid political system. Outsiders see China as a rising power, but China sees itself as fragile.

Continued on page 2

## China’s Confusing Rise

COVER STORY BY JOSEPH WONG

**W**hile in China recently with a delegation of colleagues from the Munk Centre, I was watching CNN in my Beijing hotel room. The anchorwoman was barely one sentence into a breaking story, “*protest and violence have escalated in Lhasa, the capital city of Ti...*” when the screen went blank. It stayed that way for about five minutes. Meanwhile, other channels such as Asia’s MTV continued to broadcast videos of China’s latest pop hits. CNN eventually came back on, though by then the anchorwoman had moved on to another story. Subsequently, all major foreign news websites were blocked. The world was aware of events in Tibet; even China’s security apparatus cannot completely stop the flow of global information. But still, the reach of China’s authoritarian state cast a shadow over the cosmopolitan hustle and bustle of Beijing’s streets just outside my hotel, in a city preparing to host the 2008 Olympics. The moment revealed China’s deep paranoia, about its place in the world and about the ruling regime’s ability to manage political change amidst China’s meteoric rise.



Land of promise? Shanghai’s soaring skyline symbolizes China’s double-digit growth rates since the late 1970s.

It may seem strange to talk about a paranoid China. A recent *New York Times Magazine* issue, for instance, featured an excerpt from Parag Khanna’s new book (see page 4), which argues that the challenge to America’s global leadership is hastened by China’s spreading economic and political influence among critical “second world,” “swing” states in Asia. For Khanna, America, China, and Europe now make up the world’s big three, “frenemies” that are the precarious anchors to a new global order. Thinking that the twenty-first century is “China’s Century” no longer seems such a farfetched assertion.

China is a rising power. That is indisputable. China has experienced double-digit growth rates since the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping opened China to global markets. China has positioned itself to be the manufacturing centre of the global economy. It is the preferred place for foreign investment. Multinational

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## MONITOR HIGHLIGHTS

The new global order, page 4; Israel at 60, by Emanuel Adler, page 9; Border crossings: Europe’s lessons for North America, by Randall Hansen, page 10; Centre Books, page 11.

## EVENTS TO WATCH FOR

MAY 21

*Invest in Success: Leveraging the Return from Global Cities*  
 With keynote speaker Greg Clark

MAY 29

*Munk Centre Distinguished Lecture Series*  
 Jean Edward Smith on Franklin D. Roosevelt:  
 Liberalism without Apology

OCTOBER 2-3

*Light in Shadows: Czechoslovakia 1968*

OCTOBER 17-18

*Political Change in China and Canada-China Relations*



THE LIONEL GELBER  
PRIZE

**2008 Lionel Gelber Prize Winner**  
*The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* by Paul Collier  
 For more on this year’s winner, see page 3.

## FEEDBACK

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A forum to extend and enhance the contribution of the Munk Centre for International Studies to public debate on important international issues and contribute to public education.

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Check the Munk Centre’s full listing of events at [www.utoronto.ca/mcis/](http://www.utoronto.ca/mcis/)





## AND THE WINNER IS ... RON DEIBERT'S CITIZEN LAB

### VIEW FROM THE DIRECTOR

*Continued from page 1*

vulnerable, and unfairly bearing the consequences of misguided policies that it had no part in shaping. The Olympic moment captures it all. People on the street in Beijing see China as the victim, while people on the street in London, Paris, and San Francisco protest against China the behemoth and the abuser.

These transitions are part of a larger picture that Parag Khanna drew when he visited the Munk Centre. Three great imperial centres of gravity, he argues – the United States, Europe, and China – are now shaping the new rules of globalization. In this dance of seduction, the not-so-subtle message is the rapid decline of the United States. Washington is unquestionably the world's great military power, but its narrative of counterterrorism and threat is less and less appealing. The European Union focuses on economic development, on governance, and on rights, and attracts those who wish to join its society, to travel without borders, and to share its prosperity. The EU is the world's largest outward investor and its presence far beyond its borders, he insists, is formidable.

Khanna's admiration for Europe is matched by his profound respect for what China has accomplished in a relatively short time. Its strategic reach is impressive. In America's backyard, in Africa, in the Gulf, and on its southern and western peripheries, China is making deals for resources, with no strings attached. Its overseas investments are growing as its trade surplus is mounting. And tens of thousands of Chinese aid workers and dam builders are found in virtually every corner of the globe. All this without firing a shot.

The transitions at the top are but the tip of the iceberg of much deeper, structural changes that are happening globally. How the three centres of gravity – each dependent on the other two – relate to one another in the next decade will determine how easily change is accommodated. How they deal with the “second world,” Khanna reminds us, will shape whose influence waxes and whose wanes. And how both worlds deal with the “bottom billion,” as Paul Collier, the winner of this year's Lionel Gelber Prize, told the Munk Centre, will underpin the stability of the evolving global order.

*Janice Gross Stein, Director of the Munk Centre for International Studies, is an acknowledged expert on conflict resolution and international relations, with an emphasis on the Middle East. A Fellow of the Trudeau Foundation, Professor Stein has served on many international advisory panels, including the Working Group on Middle East Negotiations at the United States Institute of Peace. She is currently a member of the Education Advisory Board to the Minister of Defence. Professor Stein is the coauthor of We All Lost the Cold War (1994), The Cult of Efficiency (2001), and The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (2007).*



Photographed by Loran Dhérimes

*Award presentation in Paris: from left, Mike Hull, psiphon chief; Ron Deibert, Citizen Lab Director; Jane Gowan, Citizen Lab Chief Designer; and Jean-Pierre Raffarin, former prime minister of France.*

**P**siphon, the Internet censorship-evading software project developed by the Munk Centre's Citizen Lab, has achieved further international recognition by capturing a major award: the inaugural Netxplorateur of the Year Grand Prix as the “world's most original, significant and exemplary Net and Digital Initiative.” A panel of French and international government, media, and business experts selected psiphon first among 100 nominated projects from around the world.

Citizen Lab director Ron Deibert travelled to Paris in mid-February to accept the award from former French prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin. Said Deibert, “We are honoured to receive such a prestigious award. Internet censorship has become a major global problem, with dozens of governments blocking access to news, human rights, and political opposition websites.”

Psiphon works by leveraging the Internet and social networks of trust that span censored and uncensored jurisdictions. Someone in a country like Canada installs psiphon on his/her home computer and gives the unique connection information to friends, family, or colleagues living in countries that censor the Internet. Users of psiphon connect to encrypted nodes to surf the Web.

Psiphon's next challenge? Helping the world's media provide uncensored coverage of the Olympic Games in China, a country that operates one of the world's most pervasive Internet censorship regimes.

## READ MORE, SEE MORE, HEAR MORE

### Papers

Designed to showcase the research of Munk Centre scholars, this year's *Controversies in Global Politics & Societies* papers feature Oleh Havrylyshyn's *Economic Recovery in the Commonwealth of Independent States: Oil, Reforms, Rebound – or All of the Above?*, Barbara Falk's *Making Sense of Political Trials: Causes and Categories*, and James Milner's examination of the plight of refugees (forthcoming).

This year's *MCIS Briefings* cover public health issues (*Lupina Foundation Working Papers Series, 2006–2007*), water diversion and preservation (*Water Diversion, Export, and Canada-U.S. Relations; A Model Act for Preserving Canada's Waters*), meanings of narrative (*Intersubjectivity in Literary Narrative*), and the history and significance of Canadian anti-Americanism (*The World's First Anti-Americans: Canada as the Canary in the Global Mine*).


Download PDF versions of all publications on the MCIS website at [www.utoronto.ca/mcis/](http://www.utoronto.ca/mcis/) (click on “Publications”).

### Webcasts

Can't make it to see a significant speaker at the Munk Centre? Video on demand is available on the MCIS website. Visit [www.utoronto.ca/mcis/](http://www.utoronto.ca/mcis/) and click on “View our webcasts” to choose from the large and growing inventory – including many of the events you can read about in this issue of the Monitor.

### Radio

Talks from the Vivian and David Campbell Conference Facility are broadcast on “Beyond Borders,” the Munk Centre's radio show. Tune in to CIUT at 89.5FM Wednesdays at 11:00 am or Mondays at 4:30 am.



### NEED A SOURCE?

*Munk Centre scholars can be contacted for further comment on issues raised in this edition at [munk.centre@utoronto.ca](mailto:munk.centre@utoronto.ca).*

Commentators in this issue:

Emanuel Adler, *Andrea and Charles Bronfman Chair of Israeli Studies*

Randall Hansen, *Member of the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies*  
Kenneth Mills, *Director of the Latin American Studies Program*

Janice Gross Stein, *Director of the Munk Centre for International Studies*

Joseph Wong, *Director of the Asian Institute*

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# CENTRE EVENTS

## THE 2008 GELBER PRIZE WINNER

An overflow audience was on hand at the Munk Centre in early April for the presentation of the 2008 Lionel Gelber Prize. The Chair of the Lionel Gelber Prize Board, Judith Gelber, awarded the prize to Paul Collier, the author of a small book that is changing the way the world looks at poverty – *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*.

Widely considered the world's most important prize in nonfiction, the Gelber Prize recognizes the year's best book on international affairs. It is presented in partnership with the Munk Centre for International Studies and *Foreign Policy* magazine.

In accepting the award, Paul Collier, an Oxford economics professor and former director of the World Bank's Development Research Group, noted that the prize would be crucial in "spreading his message," and help build the critical mass of informed and connected citizens needed to realize political change in the world. Already, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has declared that 2008 should be "the year of the bottom billion."

The change Collier advocates in his book is nothing less than a shift in how the West fights global poverty. While poverty has been falling rapidly for about 80 percent of the world, he noted in his Munk Centre lecture, the real crisis exists in a group of about 58 failing states, the bottom billion, whose problems defy traditional approaches to alleviating poverty. Seventy percent of these people are located in Africa, with the remainder in Bolivia, Haiti, North Korea, and Yemen, and the Southeast Asian countries of Laos, Cambodia, and Burma.

Compared to the top one billion living in the rich developed countries, and next four billion living in middle-income developing countries, the bottom billion are the wretchedly poor, and they are falling further behind, he warned. In his book, Collier shines a light on this group of small countries that is largely ignored by Western aid programs and institutions like the World Bank, which focus on the bigger developing countries. Serious action is required, akin to the post-war Marshall Plan for Europe, he said, if we are to stop the growing divergence of this bottom billion from the rest



Winner Paul Collier with Judith Gelber.



and avoid "a tragedy and a social nightmare."

An economist, Collier drew on a massive amount of empirical research that cuts through ideology of the left or right to analyze the challenges and solutions for the bottom billion's plight. Using new research on failing states, he identifies four "traps" that stymie their progress: the conflict trap; the natural resources trap; being landlocked with bad neighbours; and bad governance in a small country. His solutions are based on the record of what actually works and what doesn't. He documents how aid, like surging resource revenues, tends to harm economic advancement, but


also delineates exactly how and when aid, particularly technical assistance, can be part of the solution rather than the problem. He demonstrates the importance of economic growth, foreign investment and good governance, and how they interrelate to lessen the chronic risk of repeated coups and conflict. He also makes the case for intelligent military intervention when required, and proposes international charters to achieve transparency and eliminate corruption in areas where failing states are most vulnerable, including

natural resource revenues (to harness the tremendous flow of resources more effectively), budgets (to increase accountability and effective spending), and good governance.

The odds are stacked against the bottom billion, Collier says. Economically, the key will be to develop labour-intensive manufactured goods for export. But countries like China and India have beaten them to the global market. The solution: tariffs by the West that favour African producers over China and India. Politically, a major problem is corrupt leadership. "Many of the politicians and senior public officials in countries of the bottom billion are villains," he observes. But so, too, there are "many are people of integrity and sometimes against the odds they gain the upper hand." These are "moments of reform," that the West must seize, he says. "We have to help these heroes."

As Barbara McDougall, former federal cabinet minister and this year's jury chair noted, *The Bottom Billion* is "a penetrating reassessment of why vast populations remain trapped in poverty, despite endless debate over foreign-aid policy among wealthy countries and institutions." It is also a fresh and riveting assessment of what should be done.


## THE 2008 GELBER PRIZE FINALISTS



**MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS**  
**Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity**  
 Will Kymlicka

*This gifted political philosopher provides a seminal orientation to the challenges multiculturalism poses for liberal democracy and the struggle to reconcile universal human rights with minority rights in Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa.*

Oxford University Press



**LEGACY OF ASHES**  
**The History of the CIA**  
 Tim Weiner

*This New York Times reporter sets out a deeply researched history of the CIA from its creation after WWII to its disastrous, post-9/11 involvement in Iraq. The lessons learned extend far beyond the United States.*


Doubleday



**SECURING JAPAN**  
**Tokyo's Grand Strategy And The Future of East Asia**  
 Richard J. Samuels

*A preeminent political scientist deftly examines Japan's reconsideration of its place in the world and its attempt to strike a new balance between autonomy and security in a fast-changing region.*

Cornell University Press



**THE WILSONIAN MOMENT**  
**Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism**  
 Erez Manela

*Manela takes us back to the end of WWI, the Paris Peace Conference, and Woodrow Wilson's call for "a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims." His book examines the consequences 90 years later.*


Oxford University Press



# CENTRE EVENTS

## DISTINGUISHED LECTURE SERIES

The MCIS Distinguished Lecture Series showcases global leaders in the fields of academia, diplomacy, and public service, who offer insight into topics of broad public interest. Webcasts of all the Distinguished Lectures are available on the Munk Centre's website.



Richard Gwyn:  
*insights into anti-Americanism.*

**D**rawing from his recently published biography of Sir John A. Macdonald, Richard Gwyn told the story of the making of Canada at a time when the United States loomed large and significant, particularly for Canadians. He explored the theme of anti-Americanism, as he put it, “not in a judgmental, moralistic manner” but in the sense of relations with America, “of a nation or society pushing back against America in order to gain room to breathe.” And he delivered some surprises about Canadian society along the way: Canadians in the 19th century were more religious, outwardly patriotic, and socially conservative than their neighbours to the south. How things have changed.

**T**he Rt. Honourable Paul Martin has a new mission: bringing social finance to Canada. Social enterprise, he said, “borrows from the social purposes of the charitable sector and the management principles of the private sector.” But, the former prime minister continued, social enterprise in Canada faces limits on the capital it can raise. Canada’s current system of



*The Rt. Honourable Paul Martin: a mission.*


taxation stifles social entrepreneurship and social investment. He urged leaders from across the country to engage the best financial experts, tax experts, and legislators to identify what would work best in Canada and push for change in the tax system and the framework that regulates charities and foundations.

### The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order

**C**ontroversial scholar and author Parag Khanna visited the Munk Centre in April to present a vision of the new world order that is sparking debate in capitals around the world and has gained the attention of U.S. presidential contender Barak Obama, whom Khanna advises.

Khanna, Director of the Global Governance Initiative and Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, described a new world order in which the power and influence of the United States has greatly declined and alternate “centres of gravity,”

*Empires and Influence in the New Global Order.* He contends that Europe has already emerged as a superpower based on his criterion – the ability to influence global events. “Europe is not a military power, but it has the largest common market and it’s the largest importer of goods in the world. It is a formidable diplomatic power around the world.” China is not simply a rising power; it has already emerged as a superpower. It is the centre of gravity for East Asia, where the United States is to a large extent ignored, and has a growing commercial presence in the Middle East and Africa, as well as Latin America, where U.S. dominance has waned. Meanwhile, other major powers do not qualify for new superpower status. Russia “lacks diplomatic clout” he said, and Japan is no longer a contender. “India may be there one day,” he added.



*Parag Khanna: the last century's definition of superpowers is passé.*

Europe and China, have risen to compete for influence in what Khanna terms “the Second World,” or the vast number of states that fall between the rich first world and the underdeveloped third world.

The last century’s definition of superpowers is passé, he said. The forces of globalization and geopolitics have changed the way the new empires extend their sway. Influence is exerted not with gunships, but through interactions, society to society. Europe’s presence in the Middle East is an example. It consists of grassroots projects including job centres, civil-society building, and efforts that bring about slow and steady integration in the region. “Who’s to say that this is not a better approach?” he asked.

Khanna’s comments were based on extensive world travels for his recently published book, *The Second World:*

Just as fascinating is how the new global order is playing out in the Second World, where the contest is hottest and most decisive. He provides a whirlwind tour in his book of pivotal regions in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia. Using feet-on-the-ground research he discusses the evolving geopolitics of largely ignored countries like Azerbaijan, Columbia, Vietnam, and Malaysia – countries whose resource wealth will ultimately determine the fate of the three superpowers.

Khanna’s vision of the new world order comes as a bit of a shock to Americans, he noted. “Americans say: ‘OK, U.S. power is waning, but if it’s not us that play global leader,’ they worry, ‘who will take our place?’” What they need to realize, he said, is that there is “an alternate set of global leaders, in regions where no one cares about the U.S.”



*Michael Ignatieff: a cautionary tale.*

**M**ichael Ignatieff, a former member of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, presented the story of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine as a cautionary tale. Once championed fervently by Canada, R2P has been overtaken by world events.

What happened? In Ignatieff’s view, the problem was that the doctrine reflected a conflict just passed, the war in Bosnia and Kosovo, where ethnic cleansing was underway. First, the doctrine “got blown out of the water by events it didn’t anticipate – 9/11 and Afghanistan.” “The second thing that happened,” he continued, “was more difficult and powerful still – the case of Iraq.”





Making transatlantic waves: Bob Rae (right) with event host Markus Kaim.

## Bob Rae's Message for Berlin

Liberal MP Bob Rae, the party's foreign policy spokesman, made transatlantic waves when he spoke at the Munk Centre's Transatlantic Security Roundtable this spring. Rae's pointed remarks about Germany's mission in Afghanistan caught the attention of a German weekly. Rae was "particularly scathing in his criticism," said the weekly. "He described Germany's deployment in northern Afghanistan as 'not very successful' and said Germany's biggest failure was in its efforts to train and reorganize Afghanistan's police force, which have been described as 'disappointing.' We have to be franker in saying what has failed and why it has failed, Rae said in reference to the German mission." Message delivered.

## Fingerpointing over Iraq

What went wrong? Five years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq based on faulty intelligence, popular answers to the question are twofold. One common theory has it that "group think" among intelligence agencies led to faulty reports of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); another theory has it that the Bush administration manipulated the available information to inflate the case for war. Neither explanation is correct, according to Columbia University's Professor Robert Jervis, who recently spoke at the Munk Centre.

*"The intelligence reports were amateurish in their interpretation, suffering from methodological problems and faulty conclusions," according to Robert Jervis's research.*

Group think, Jervis said, does not appear to be the culprit here – American intelligence groups were not alone in their mistake, and the CIA did make some accurate assessments. They found no link to al-Qaeda and warned that post-war reconstruction would be fraught with difficulty. As for war-mongering motivations, Jervis points out that even American opponents of the

war did not dispute the intelligence estimates on WMDs.

The fact remains, however, that the intelligence community made a critical misstep. To find out why, Jervis examined classified and unclassified documents from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Weapons Intelligence and Non-Proliferation Arms Control Center (WINPAC), and others dealing with intelligence. He also conducted interviews with national intelligence officers and WINPAC officials. The intelligence community had evidence suggesting that Iraq did indeed have a WMD program. However, Jervis concluded that their analysis lacked "good social science," a deep understanding of the country's socio-political milieu. Jervis described the reports as "amateurish" in their interpretation, suffering from methodological problems and faulty conclusions. To some extent his views are a product of hindsight, he acknowledged. Still, it is not so much about connecting the dots, he said, since the board is full of them. Knowing which dots are important, in the moment, is a particularly hard thing to judge.

This brand of failure, Jervis suggested, is both good news and bad. It shows that U.S. intelligence is not worthless, but also illustrates the simple fact that intelligence failures can and do happen. There are no simple solutions. Nevertheless, his findings begged the uncomfortable question: have the agencies learned anything from their mistake?



Jan Zielonka sees Europe as a model power, not a superpower.

## Atlas Shrugged? A "Soft Power" Vision for Europe

Should the European Union (EU) take on the role of a super-state wielding "hard power"? Decidedly not, in the view of Oxford scholar Dr. Jan Zielonka who spoke at a Munk Centre event in February.

During the past decade, he said, there has been a rising chorus, within and without Europe, calling for the EU to act in a more unified, decisive manner abroad. In part, this has stemmed from the perceived need to better secure Europeans' own neighbourhood, especially in the wake of Balkan conflict, and for the EU to assume more of the "hard power" tasks traditionally the purview of the United States. The challenge of international terrorism, along with related conflicts beyond European borders, has added force to this argument. So, too, has the EU's creation of a rapid deployment force.

In spite of these developments, Zielonka argued against a "statist" EU, streamlined for action. He argued that the EU's disunified, plodding approach has a number of important benefits. Moreover, the capability for quick and bold action has mixed results, he contended, and "crude manipulators" on the global stage cannot act as honest brokers to forestall or settle conflict. In that regard, his comments were a variation of the view of another Munk Centre speaker Parag Khanna, (see page 4), who described Europe as a centre of gravity exerting influence through society-to-society interactions rather than military power. However, Zielonka was clearly less impressed with the EU's global influence.

The European focus on consensus makes it hard to project power, Zielonka noted, but also helps defuse conflicts between member states over foreign affairs. This was not enough to save Sarajevo, he quipped, but at least Europe did not go to war over it again.

He responded specifically to the idea that Europe should become more of a unified "pole" to balance the United States. "There is little evidence," Zielonka argued, "that if Europe tried to imitate America, it would do better."

Nevertheless, the EU does have particular strengths in the international arena, he said. Within Europe, it has helped usher in a long era of peace and prosperity, promoting an atmosphere of cooperation among members and those aspiring to membership. As well, it can project European policy through its neighbours, influencing Middle East events through Turkey, for example, and through joint security bodies such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The EU, he argued, also exerts power by setting a good example, through its "social-normative values" – by being a "model power" rather than a superpower. In Zielonka's estimation, greater foreign policy centralization is less than desirable: "if it ain't broke, don't fix it."



# STUDENT EVENTS

## CLASSROOMS WITHOUT BORDERS



### Strictly Business? New Trends in International Investment and the Challenges to Development Strategies

*A conference hosted by the World Bank and the Munk Centre for International Studies Graduate Students*

THURSDAY, APRIL 17TH 2008  
Opening reception & keynote speech

VIVIAN AND DAVID CAMPBELL  
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FRIDAY, APRIL 18TH 2008  
Conference

Munk Centre for International Studies  
University of Toronto

*Presented by graduate students from the Collaborative M.A. in International Relations, the Collaborative M.A. in Asia-Pacific Studies and the Master's of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies programs at the Munk Centre*



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Dean's Student Initiative  
Graduate Students' Union

### Letter from Kosovo

*The Munk Centre's Robert Austin led a group of his political science students on an educational trip to Kosovo this year, which coincided with Kosovo's controversial declaration of independence on February 17, 2008. Below, a letter from two of the students, Nedko Petkov and Zinejda Rita, on their experience.*

**W**aking up on February 17 in downtown Prishtina's Hotel Ora, at breakfast we could already feel the palpable joy as dozens of international observers and journalists joined local Albanians in a toast to Kosovo's to-be-declared independence. Our first day was a far cry from what we envisioned when we first joined the project in November last year. The events of the day put us in the inner circle of people who had worked their whole lives for an independent Kosovo. Our very first meeting was with the family of the late president Ibrahim Rugova – a leader the world came to know as the symbol of the Albanian struggle.

When independence was finally declared by Kosovo's leaders, we found ourselves in a classic small tavern – about 80 of us in a room better suited for 15. We experienced the emotional reaction and unbelievable hospitality of the Albanians. After a week of meetings with people ranging from university students to the country's president, we were left wondering whether the optimism we felt was sustainable given the problems Kosovo still faces. As Veton Surroi, Kosovo's best-known analyst and civil society leader, noted, Kosovo now straddles the fine line between being a failed and a stable state.

Our group had a rare and insightful look into the problems and uncertain future for the last state to emerge out of what was once Yugoslavia.



*Birth of a nation: revelers in Prishtina celebrate Kosovo's independence.*

### Canada's Lacklustre G8 Report Card

**T**he mid-term report card is in and Canada scored its lowest marks ever, although it managed to rank in the middle of the class. The test in question: Canada's compliance with the economic and political commitments made with other G8 member-countries at the 2007 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany. The results were announced at the G8 Research Group Student Executive press conference at the Munk Centre in mid-February. More than 150 undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Toronto and abroad participate in the G8 Research Group — a global network of scholars, students, and professionals interested in the activities and institutions of the G8.

Canada scored poorly on energy diversification, such as funding renewable energy projects, and is struggling to meet its commitments on non-proliferation, international corporate social responsibility, and intellectual property protection. By contrast, it scored well on promoting freedom of foreign investment, progressive trade liberalization, and assisting developing countries with their integration into the multilateral trading system. Canada still has a chance to pull up its marks by the final report before the Japan summit in June, to keep a good track record intact. Looking at the broad sweep of G8 summitry, Professor John Kirton, director of the G8 Research Group, noted: "Canada has been a good global citizen over the past 33 years," coming second only to Britain in overall compliance. "The legacy should continue," he insisted.

### Sovereign Wealth Funds: Assessing the Threats

**G**raduate students gathered at the Munk Centre in April to debate one of the most pressing issues in global affairs: the role of sovereign wealth funds – and the motivations of their political masters – in foreign investment flows around the world.

Entitled "Strictly Business? New Trends in International Investment and Challenges to Development Strategies," the conference was hosted by the Munk Centre and the World Bank. Keynote speaker Michael Trebilcock, from the University of Toronto's Faculty of Law, posed the question, can there be order in the jungle? and explored the challenges that sovereign wealth funds pose to domestic and international order.

The topic was timely. State-run investment by countries with massive foreign currency reserves, such as China and Russia, is establishing a new trend. The world is witnessing a headstrong urge by these countries to invest in resource-rich states such as Nigeria and Sudan. The stated goals of these state-affiliated sovereign investment funds are "strictly business": to earn higher returns from stocks, corporate bonds, real estate, and commodities. However, there is a rising concern that patterns of investing will become politically strategic, and will be used to monopolize natural resources or to gain political allegiance from a recipient state.

The Munk Centre Graduate Student Conference explored these patterns and examined their implications for both state sovereignty and economic development. While the morning session of the conference covered the major issues raised by sovereign wealth funds, the afternoon session focused on China's recent investments in Africa. The sessions also featured a spectrum of experts from the World Bank, academia, journalism, and business.



## CHINA'S CONFUSING RISE

*Continued from page 1*

firms have increasingly bypassed safer investments in the Koreas and Singapores of the region in favour of China's export markets and the distant promise of its massive domestic consumer market. The average manufacturing wage there is 77 cents per hour, cheap to be sure, but all the more significant when one considers wages in Vietnam are just 35 cents an hour. Economic diversification and industrial upgrading, therefore, have become critical for China's sustained development. Being the world's factory, or "sweatshop" as critics would put it, is definitely not China's ultimate goal. Its auto sector is growing rapidly. Science-based industries, such as pharmaceuticals, are on the rise. National champions in the state-owned sector are preparing for global competition. Financial markets are cautiously and gradually opening up, with Shanghai challenging Hong Kong as the region's financial centre. Regulatory regimes are being put into place, with the expectation that, over time, they will be harmonized to international standards.

China's rise is not solely economic in nature. China's post-Mao development has become an alternative authoritarian pathway for achieving modernity, challenging modernization theory and the Western preoccupation with capitalism and liberal democracy. Chinese leaders scoff at the Western idea that we have reached the end of history. China reads Confucian harmony to mean paternalistic authority rather than a moral philosophy based on principles of individual regard for others. China has ably appropriated the Asian Values rhetoric, re-legitimizing an idea that had lost its earlier lustre in authoritarian Southeast Asia. It has scored major diplomatic victories, as its example inspires late developing countries in Asia and beyond. American foreign policy has had to acquiesce on Taiwan, which China sees as a renegade province, even as the U.S. 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet remains the guarantor of regional stability in Asia. Recent increases in Chinese military spending have sounded alarm bells in Washington and the European Union. China has become a major player in international relations as it shifts the balance of power globally.

Yet, to conceive of China's rise as cautious and even fragile is not baseless. The Chinese understand there to be "two Chinas." The post-modern architecture that forms Shanghai's skyline contrasts with the

increasingly desolate conditions experienced by China's 800 million peasants in the countryside. The level of inequality in China is staggering and growing. Poor peasants mean that China's potentially huge consumer market remains unrealized. As levels of inequality continue to widen, the social, economic, and political costs of redistribution will become increasingly insurmountable.

Despite a positive trade balance and a huge foreign exchange reserve, estimated at US\$1.6 trillion, the performance of China's fiscal system is undercut by corruption at local



*A fragile state? China is divided by an economic boom, as seen in Shanghai's busy port, and the poverty of 800 million peasants.*

levels. Government resources earmarked for infrastructure projects in China's hinterland have been used to line the pockets of cadres and contractors. Credit is not available to those who need it. The provision of important social services, such as health, education, and welfare, is underfunded because of China's leaky fiscal system.

Not surprisingly, social unrest is common in China. The riots in Tibet are only the most recent domestic flashpoint for the Chinese leadership. Industrial workers have sporadically mobilized, particularly as state-owned enterprises are privatized. Peasants have protested, aiming their rancour at local corruption. Rather than serve as an opening for political reform, however, unrest has only strengthened the Chinese state's authoritarian resolve. Democracy is seen as the institutional basis for political chaos. For instance, Chinese propaganda portrayed American democracy in the wake of Hurricane Katrina as the seed of racism,

anarchy, and an uncaring state. The Chinese leadership sees the heavy hand of authoritarian rule as necessary to rapid development and some hardliners insist that it is a superior form of government. It is China, not Russia, which has emerged as the centre of the new "authoritarian international."

We are constantly reminded by Chinese commentators that theirs is a developing country. This view has shaped China's entry into the international system, including debates about its role in enforcing international agreements in intellectual property,

1930s, and Mao's anti-foreign nationalism – continues to resonate. So does the view that China's rise, while celebrated with the sort of arrogance expected of the world's fastest growing economy over the past two decades, is nevertheless fragile.

These dualisms make it difficult to forecast how China will continue to grow into its role as a global leader. China is seen and imagines itself to be a challenger to U.S. global leadership, yet the Chinese cling to a nationalist narrative in which they are modern history's victim. The Chinese Communist Party believes, on the one hand, that its rule has facilitated China's meteoric economic rise, yet it lacks, on the other hand, the confidence to subject the party to meaningful political competition.

These contradictions confuse the rest of the world as we wait to see how China positions itself within the international community. Such confusion is potentially dangerous; history has taught us that mixed signals and



environmental standards, human rights, security alliances, and monetary policy cooperation. The Chinese see the international rules of the game as unfair. When asked how China would react to a reconstituted international system, one where the centre of gravity shifted towards Asia, where the balance of voting power within international institutions reflected China's prominent position, and where leadership was shared collectively, a serious Chinese scholar replied: *That would never happen.*

Indeed, a narrative of victimization based on the memories of historical injustices – the Qing dynasty Manchu invasion, the Opium War, the unfair treaties of the First World War, Japanese aggression during the

confused perceptions can have disastrous consequences. We need think back no further than interwar Germany for an example. The global challenge, therefore, is to reassure a rising power of the mutual benefits of global peace and prosperity, while ensuring that its entry into a multi-lateral international system helps reform China's internal and external policies. The world will need clarity of purpose and imaginative statecraft as it deals with the contradictory and confused China of today.

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## WHAT KIND OF ENGAGEMENT FROM WASHINGTON IN LATIN AMERICA?



**Kenneth Mills**  
 Professor of History and  
 Director of Latin American Studies  
 at the Munk Centre

**C**ampaign words on campaign trails are ... well ... campaign words on campaign trails. Yet they can be harbingers of transformation in the frayed or purely pragmatic relationships many Latin American and Caribbean countries currently have with the United States. The diverse nations across these broad regions are operating with a new sense of collective confidence and vision that is not limited to simple anti-Americanism. But will the next president respond with a new, constructive approach?

The sorry state of relations has caused much hand-wringing. Media commentators, citing a rise of anti-Americanism in the hemisphere fuelled by leftist governments in Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Cuba, have raised the question: Has the U.S. lost its way in dealing with Latin America? And U.S. presidential contenders have debated what to do about it on the campaign trail. Senators McCain, Clinton, and Obama have all lamented the Bush administration's neglect of relations with Latin America, while it has focused, post-9/11, on the war on terror.

A window of opportunity awaits the

between regional, cultural, and linguistic blocs and alliances. What are the signs that a new American leader might actually notice and respond constructively?

On the campaign trail, Senators McCain and Clinton have so far focused primarily on threats to U.S. interests. In a June 2007 speech, McCain warned, "Anti-Americanism is on the rise in much of the region" and "China has launched a diplomatic and economic offensive in the region, with uncertain intentions and outcomes." In a *Foreign Affairs* essay in December, Senator Clinton asserted, "We have witnessed the rollback of democratic development and economic openness in parts of Latin America," and called for a "return to a policy of vigorous engagement: this is too critical a region for the United States to stand idly by." However, neither senator has matched the call to engagement with a significantly fresh approach.

In contrast, Senator Obama has struck a different tone. In a statement before the Senate in March 2007, Obama praised democratic presidential elections across the region as "a testament to the tremendous democratic

Mexico and Cuba. Questioned about the scale of illegal immigration from Mexico into the United States, he has shown empathy and talked about measures the U.S. could implement to assist the Mexican economy. In his Senate speech, Obama talked of an immigration system that is "broken" and of bipartisan solutions that would "deal fairly with the illegal immigrants already living and working in our country." Furthermore, Obama has spoken of trade agreements that would respect "the interests of workers and not just corporate profits," and of enforced standards of labour and environmental safety. "We ignore Latin America at our own peril," he has insisted more broadly, calling for relationships of "mutual respect and dignity."

Mere words again? Perhaps. But the deepest contrast to his rivals (and his predecessors) is how Obama greeted the resignation of Cuba's Fidel Castro and what an Obama presidency might mean for U.S. policies that are widely acknowledged as failures. Obama's apparent willingness to hold talks with Cuba's new leader Raúl Castro without "preconditions" would be a major foreign policy change that his rivals have condemned. In debate with him in February, Hillary Clinton was left to play predictable guardian of the status quo, chastising her opponent for saying he would consider talks with Raúl Castro, and lashing out at Chávez for good measure. "I disagree with his [Obama's] continuing to say he would meet with some of the worst dictators in the world without preconditions and without a real ... understanding of what we would get from it." Senator McCain, likewise, has taken a status quo approach to Cuba, citing a list of preconditions that must be met before the embargo is lifted.

Yet, Cuba would be an excellent place to start on a new, more nuanced approach to Latin America, especially given what Harvard political science professor Jorge Domínguez has called the current "moment of creative aperture" in the island's political affairs. Raúl Castro, he noted in a recent lecture sponsored by Latin American Studies in the Munk Centre, has nurtured a new culture of frank discussions that, while not reported in the press, have involved everyone from citizens who suffer from petty rules and bad service in state-run stores to economists facing up to cases of agricultural mismanagement.

However complex the task might be in domestic circles, a new leadership in the United States that engages thoughtfully with such openings on the ground in Cuba and elsewhere across Latin America holds the best hope for restored relationships.



*A rebuff for Bush: Chávez (left) visits new Cuban leader Raúl Castro.*

next U.S. administration. While news headlines focus on the latest anti-Bush outbursts by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, they obscure more encouraging aspects of Latin America's growing sense of confidence and collective vision. Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's work towards a more unified South America, for instance, has become an intriguing call for a more multilateral world in which power would not be dispensed from this or that putative centre (Washington, Brussels, Tokyo), but shared equitably within and

strides made throughout the Americas during the past two decades" that "saw governments elected to power that span the ideological spectrum." He added: "If we pay careful attention to developments throughout the region, and respond to them in a thoughtful and respectful way, then we can advance our many and varied national interests at stake in the Americas."

In the face of criticism that his calls for renewed and constructive engagement in the hemisphere are naïve and vague, Obama has begun to fill in some blanks, starting with



## ISRAEL AT 60: THE ABNORMALLY NORMAL COUNTRY



Emanuel Adler  
 Andrea and Charles Bronfman  
 Chair of Israeli Studies  
 at the University of Toronto and  
 Resident Fellow of the Centre  
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 the Munk Centre

In two of his prophetic novels, Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, envisioned a state of the Jews that was uncharacteristically normal: with normal life and normal borders, and an industrious, normal society. Nothing really fancy, which would be an oxymoron in the Middle East, just a normal country. In this future country, Jewish milkmen deliver the milk to Jewish households, Jewish houses are built by Jewish draftsmen, Jewish policemen guard the streets, and Jewish teachers teach their Jewish pupils. Even Arabs live a normal life in this state, for they are either subservient to this reality or they are just not there.

Israel, the country that resulted from this vision, via the Holocaust, actually resembles Herzl's vision, but only superficially. Most policemen are indeed Jewish, and some milk is distributed by Jews. Most houses, however, are built by cheap Arab labour, and Arabs, who make up 19 percent of Israel's population, overwhelmingly object to the Jewish character of the state. Israel has known no peace since it was created. Six or seven wars, and countless acts of terrorism, have made life for Israeli Jews normally abnormal. Death by war has visited almost every household; people see a cloudy horizon, perhaps a nuclear bomb, others see no horizon at all. Curiously, however, most Israelis like life in Israel and would not replace their country for any other in the world. Arab Israelis cannot live a normal life either, being neither Palestinians who see themselves as part of a future Palestinian state nor Jews. They are neither this nor that; they just are.

Israel is an abnormal country, then, because of the weight of history, because it is the child of the Holocaust and the answer to anti-Semitism, old and new. Israel is also different because its obsession with security makes it not only one of the most insecure, but also one of the most hated, countries in the world, and because Israelis happen to be in a region neighbours say is not theirs. Israel's soul is divided between its biblical past and its globalizing future. Israel is both "Jerusalem" and "Tel Aviv"; the former prays for the return to a glorious past, while the latter lives intensively the present, hoping the future will materialize. These are also two metaphysical Israels, which cannot reconnect, an abnormality Herzl did not dream about.

Israel is an atypical country because it carries in its midst the seeds of its own destruction, a messianic vision of Greater Israel. That vision – with the help of demographic pressures,

technology, changes in the nature of warfare, and world public opinion – promises to lead to the one-state solution, which, de facto, would put an end to the Jewish state. Israel will never be fully normal as long as it occupies land of other states. Many Israelis persuasively retort, however, that Israel will never be normal because its Arab neighbours will not allow it to be so; thus, why blame oneself? In the end, abnormality becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, a fact of daily life. Israel has one of the highest, if not the highest, per capita number of car accidents, its biblical environment is threatened by rubbish and greed, higher education is going down the tubes – 20 percent of its academicians have left – and the problem of poverty

and excel in most of what they do. In only 60 years, Israelis have developed a society that has produced a vibrant culture, that thrives with social invention, such as the kibbutz, and scientific and technological development, the fruits of which are spread around the world. If religion is normal, then Jerusalem, the holiest site for Judaism, Christianity, and the Muslim world, is a touchstone of normalcy. And if liberal values are the modern norm, one may find them in Tel Aviv, caressed by the Mediterranean Sea and enlivened by its never-ending night life and entertainment. Israel's economy is highly entangled with the global economy in a normal kind of way; its high-tech industry is a leader in the world, and Israel attracts millions of



*Dreaming of normalcy: a passerby at Jerusalem's Wailing Wall. (The flag is superimposed on the Wall.)*

is one of the worst in the developed world.

And yet, in many other senses, Israel is paradoxically the most normal country in the world. Such as most people on earth, the overwhelming majority of Israelis long for peace. They will be glad to exchange the occupied territories and the creation of a viable Palestinian state for Palestinian reconciliation with Israel's existence. Israelis have also built an imperfect democracy, which is what most other democratic nations really have, and Israeli liberal institutions, such as the Supreme Court and the press, are comparable to those in Canada and most other democratic states.

Israelis intensively live their lives

tourists who seek not only a glimpse of past monuments and ghosts, but also the quiet normalcy of an evening swim in the Red Sea.

Most important, Israel is normal because, not unlike most other nations, it sins, commits mistakes, treats others with contempt, and wavers between its ideals and intellectual and moral failure. It learns from its mistakes infrequently and only when the going gets tough.

After the Six Day War and Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson asked Israeli Prime Minister Levy Eshkol: "What kind of Israel do you want?" I know what I would reply today to that rhetorical question: a normal country.



## CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN, RUSSIAN, AND EURASIAN STUDIES

*The CERES Insights page provides analysis by scholars from the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies on issues of concern to the region. In this issue, Randall Hansen considers what kinds of borders make good neighbours.*



**Randall Hansen**

Canada Research Chair in Immigration and Governance in the Department of Political Science and Member of the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the Munk Centre

### **Thick where they should be thin, thin where they should be thick: Borders in Canada and Europe**

**O**n Sunday, March 16, four stowaways landed at Halifax on a container ship from Liverpool. They sprinted past the only port commissioner on duty, took a taxi to Truro, and bought a train ticket to Montreal. A suspicious Via Rail agent in Halifax was able – apparently after being brushed off by the Canada Border Services Agency – to alert the police.

Four months earlier, on November 12, 2007, Canadian firefighters were answering a call for help from a firefighter in Rouses Point, New York. Suspicious American border guards delayed them to check their identity documents, and by the time they arrived the heritage building they were meant to save had burned to the ground.

As Janice Stein argued in the Spring 2006 issue of the Monitor, borders between Canada and the United States are thickening. But this, as the Halifax incident makes clear, is only part of the story. In North America, borders are thick (between the United States and Canada) where they should be thin, and thin (between Canada and the rest of the world) where they should be thick.

To be sure, Canada and the United States are hardly the only countries grappling with the basic dilemma behind border controls: keeping out those you want to keep out, letting in those you want to let in, while pretending you are giving everyone the same treatment in order to avoid accusations of nationality-based discrimination. It is just that other countries are approaching these issues in a manner that avoids the blinding effects of the irrational nationalism and hysteria that too often colour discussions of border control in North America. The paranoia of American “minutemen” and Canadian nationalists has prevented a rational debate on what needs to be done to keep the Canada-U.S. border open while keeping North Americans safe.

The European example is both timely and instructive. At precisely the same moment that travel between

the United States and Canada is becoming more difficult, travel between European countries is becoming easier. In late 2007, eight Central and Eastern European countries – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia – and Malta joined the Schengen zone, removing border controls between themselves and 15 other European Union (EU) member states. All 24 Schengen member states have removed checks at their shared borders, reinforced the common border for the entire Schengen zone, greatly expanded cooperation over illegal immigration and crime, including terrorism, and increased checks within each country to identify unwanted interlopers. They have also sharply increased cooperation in policing the reinforced external border: Germany has spent large amounts of money on training and technology that helps Poland and Romania police the external EU border. The result is that tourists and business travelers are able to pass through countries in the same

fly to Germany and then take a train to Paris. A similar situation would arise if Austria refused to hear asylum applications from, say, South Africans, but Italy chose to do so. Recognizing this, Schengen members therefore maintain a common visa list of countries whose citizens require a Schengen visa before entering the zone, and they have harmonized their asylum policies, along with some non-Schengen countries, such as Britain. They maintain common safe-country-of-origin policies (countries from whom asylum applications are not accepted) and safe-third-country policies (countries in which asylum seekers are expected to lodge their application if they pass through them). As well, they offer similar welfare and other entitlements to asylum seekers, and maintain common expedited procedures, through which obviously false asylum applications are quickly rejected. This high degree of harmonization has been achieved while leaving other immigration policies intact: each member state decides the conditions under which non-EU nationals gain access to the labour market, apply for permanent residence, and acquire national citizenship.

The lesson in all of this for Canada is clear. Canada and the United States are culturally closer than any two members of the Schengen zone, with the exception of Austria and Germany. Their economies are perfectly interlinked, and both, but above all Canada, depend on the easy movement of people and goods

between the two countries. Following the highly successfully European example, they should seek to harmonize their visa requirements, harmonize their asylum policies, sharply reduce border checks at land crossings, and transfer the saved resources to patrol the entire North American perimeter. Nationalists on the right in the United States (Lou Dobbs) and the left in Canada (Maude Barlow) will rage; the rest of us can relax. If the Germans and the Poles, with a long common history of war, genocide, expulsion, and deep mutual hatred, can overcome their differences; if they, and above all the Poles, can stare down irrational nationalism; and if they can remove border controls while remaining confident that Germans remain Germans and Poles remain Poles, there is no good reason why Canadians and Americans cannot do the same.




*Getting rid of the stop sign: a Polish policeman (left) and his German counterpart put away the stop signs at their countries' border when Poland entered the Schengen zone.*

way that Canadians and Americans pass through provinces or states. The German government and German public, to use one example, can be confident that their country faces no greater risk of illegal immigration, migration-imported crime, or terrorism than it did pre-Schengen. A “borderless” Europe is one of the most tangible signs of European integration, one that brings enormous benefits in terms of increased trade and tourism.

Even in non-neo-liberal Europe, there is no such thing as a free lunch. The removal of internal border checks across most of the EU has come at a price: namely, the harmonization of visa and certain immigration policies, above all in the area of asylum. A borderless Europe would be nonsensical if France required a visa from, for instance, Kenyans, but Germany did not. A Kenyan citizen would simply




## RECENT BOOKS BY MUNK CENTRE SCHOLARS




John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*  
Thomas Nelson, 2007

*Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* highlights the descriptive record of Canadian foreign policy, especially in the period since 1945. This current and up-to-date text concentrates on the record of, and reasons behind, Canadian foreign policy during the contemporary period. It situates the subject of Canadian foreign policy directly in the field of international politics, and outlines, develops, and applies the major competing intellectual schools of thought on how Canadian foreign policy has changed over the past 60 years.




Anne-Emanuelle Birn, *Marriage of Convenience: Rockefeller International Health and Revolutionary Mexico*  
University of Rochester Press, 2006

In January 1921, after a decade of bloody warfare, Mexico's new government found an unlikely partner in its struggle to fulfill the Revolution's promises to the populace. An ambitious philanthropy made its way into Mexico by offering money and expertise to counter a looming public health crisis. Why did the Rockefeller Foundation and Revolutionary Mexico get together, and how did their relationship last for 30-plus years amidst binational tensions, domestic turmoil, and institutional soul-searching?




Markus Kornprobst, Vincent Pouliot, Nisha Shah, and Ruben Zaiotti, eds., *Metaphors of Globalization: Mirrors, Magicians and Mutinies*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008

*Metaphors of Globalization* inquires into the power and politics of metaphors in the making of our globalizing era. The approach is multi-disciplinary, with case studies in global finance, global governance, literary theory, political theory, anthropology, and sociology. By revisiting globalization through the analysis of metaphors, this volume sheds new light on usually overlooked dimensions of global politics, improves on many outdated conceptualizations, and undertakes a critical analysis of existing approaches to the study of globalization.



Ronald Deibert et al., eds., *Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering*, MIT Press, 2008

Many countries around the world block or filter Internet content, denying access to information – often about politics, but also relating to sexuality, culture, or religion. Filtering takes place in at least 40 states worldwide, including many countries in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. Related Internet content control mechanisms are also in place in Canada, the United States, and some countries in Europe. *Access Denied* documents and analyzes Internet filtering practices, offering the first rigorously conducted study of this accelerating trend.




John Zilcosky, ed., *Writing Travel: The Poetics and Politics of the Modern Journey*, University of Toronto Press, 2008

Interest in travel writing has grown rapidly within the disciplines of postcolonial and cultural studies; however, recent scholarship has failed to place it within the larger literary tradition. *Writing Travel* assembles a collection of essays that demonstrate travel's literary attempt to reconfigure the world. Examining a broad range of texts and travellers from across the world, the contributors discuss canonical authors such as Homer, Vergil, Goethe, and Baudelaire, alongside lesser known authors such as Theodor Herzl, Hans Erich Nossack, and William Gibson.




Jeffrey Kopstein and Sven Steinmo, eds., *Growing Apart? America and Europe in the Twenty-First Century*  
Cambridge University Press, 2007

This book explores the forces pushing America away from its democratic friends and neighbours. Individual chapters pose questions such as: Why is religion so powerful in America? How will the flow of immigration shape politics across the West? Why is Europe rejecting America's version of capitalism? How is the media changing in Europe and America? Why are "Conservatives" so different on each side of the Atlantic? What do these competing forces portend for the future of the transatlantic relationship?



James Milner, Gil Loescher, and Alexander Betts, *The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection into the Twenty-First Century*, Routledge, 2008

Written by experts in the field, this is one of the very few books to trace the relationship between state interests, global politics, and the work of the UNHCR. The authors outline the changing nature of conflict and displacement that poses the UNHCR with a new array of challenges, and the fundamental tension between the UN's human rights agenda of protecting refugees fleeing conflict and persecution and the security, political, and economic interests of states around the world.



Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, *China's Great Economic Transformation*  
Cambridge University Press, 2008

This landmark study provides an integrated analysis of China's unexpected economic boom of the past three decades. The authors combine deep China expertise with broad disciplinary knowledge to explain China's remarkable combination of high-speed growth and deeply flawed institutions. The book shows how an intricate minuet combining China's political system with sectoral development, globalization, resource transfers across geographic and economic space, and partial system reform delivered an astonishing and unprecedented growth spurt.



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## THE MUNK CENTRE FILM FESTIVAL: REELPOLITIK


Exceptional films from around the world were showcased this winter at the Munk Centre's inaugural *ReelPolitik: Understanding the World Through Film*. The cinematic offerings illuminated political issues through the lenses of inspired filmmakers determined to bring their stories to the world. Experts on film and global issues helped put the stories in perspective. The headliners were:

*No End in Sight*, a look at the American invasion of Iraq that was nominated for the 2007 Academy Award Best Documentary Feature and won the Special Jury Prize for a Documentary at the 2007 Sundance Film Festival.

*The Mosquito Problem and Other Stories* — winner of the Human Rights Award for Best Regional Documentary at the 2007 Sarajevo Film Festival — an examination of how a small town in post-communist Bulgaria is coming to grips with its future and its past.

*Blessed by Fire* (2005), an award-winning Argentinean feature film in which the main character is a veteran of the Malvinas/Falklands War. His memories of the war are triggered when a friend and comrade-in-arms tries to take his own life, one of hundreds of suicide attempts in the aftermath of the 1982 conflict.

With thought-provoking films, expert analysis, and avid audiences, the 2008 film festival set a benchmark of success for future years. Visit [www.utoronto.ca/mcis/reel](http://www.utoronto.ca/mcis/reel).



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