MCIS BRIEFINGS

Intersubjectivity in Literary Narrative

Tomas Kubicek
Visiting Fellow
Centre for European, Russian,
and Eurasian Studies
University of Toronto

Intersubjectivity
in Literary Narrative

Tomas Kubicek
Visiting Fellow
Centre for European, Russian,
and Eurasian Studies
University of Toronto

The Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto seeks to be an internationally recognized leader in interdisciplinary academic research on global issues and to integrate research with teaching and public education. We place special emphasis on the fostering of innovative interdisciplinary knowledge through the exchange of ideas and research among academics as well as the public, private, and voluntary sectors.

CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN, RUSSIAN, AND EURASIAN STUDIES
University of Toronto
1 Devonshire Place
Toronto, Ontario
M5S 3K7
Tel: (416) 946-8938
Fax: (416) 946-8939
E-mail: ceres@utoronto.ca
Website: www.utoronto.ca/ceres

The Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CERES) at the University of Toronto is one of North America's leading academic institutes for the study of the member countries of the European Union, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe. The Centre promotes interdisciplinary scholarship and teaching in the social sciences and humanities. Each year CERES organizes several regionally focused seminar series and is host to a number of scholars in residence. Drawing upon the expertise of more than fifteen departments and dozens of faculty members, CERES also sponsors an undergraduate degree program in European Studies and a Master's degree program in European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. Through its intensive relations with the European Commission, the German Academic Exchange Service, the wider local community in Toronto, and institutions of higher learning across Europe, Ukraine, and Russia, CERES supports the exchange of ideas and scholars across the Atlantic.

MCIS Briefings

1. *Bound to Follow? US Foreign Policy, International Reactions, and the New Complexities of Sovereignty.* By Louis W. Pauly.
   September 2005 ISBN 0-7727-0825-5.

2. *The Multilateral Agenda: Moving Trade Negotiations Forward.* By Sylvia Ostry.
   November 2005 ISBN 0-7727-0822-3.

3. *The Jerusalem Old City Initiative Discussion Document: New Directions for Deliberation and Dialogue.* By Michael Bell, Michael J. Molloy, John Bell and Marketa Evans.
   December 2005 ISBN 07727-0823-1.

4. *Comparative Program on Health and Society Lupina Foundation Working Papers Series 2004–2005.* Edited by Jillian Clare Cohen and Jennifer E. Keelan.
   January 2006 ISBN 0-7727-0818-5.

5. *Comparative Program on Health and Society Lupina Foundation Working Papers Series 2005-2006.* Edited by Jillian Clare Cohen and Lisa Forman.
   October 2006 ISBN 0-7727-0829-0.

6. *Darfur and Afghanistan: Canada's Choices in Deploying Military Forces.* By Ambassador David S. Wright.
   October 2006 ISBN 0-7727-0830-4.

7. *Trade Advocacy Groups and Multilateral Trade Policy-Making of African States.* By Sylvia Ostry and Thomas Kwasi Tieku.
   April 2007 ISBN 978-0-7727-0832-8.

8. *Intersubjectivity in Literary Narrative.* By Tomas Kubicek
   October 2007 ISBN 978-0-7727-0834-2.

Intersubjectivity
in Literary Narrative

Tomas Kubicek

Tomas Kubicek, PhD, is a researcher in the Section of Narratology, Institute for Czech Literature of the Czech Academy of Sciences (he was head of the Section from 2002 to 2007). He lectures on literary theory, narratology, and literary history in the Department of Czech and Comparative Literature and Literary Theory in Charles University, Prague. Since 2004, he has been an external fellow in the Forschergruppe Narratologie Universität Hamburg on the project "Der Beitrag des slavischen Funktionalismus zur internationalen Narratologie" (which is lead by Prof. Dr. Wolf Schmid). Dr. Kubicek has published studies on narratology, literary theory, Czech literary structuralism, and post-1930 Czech prose. He is the author of Vypravec. Kategorie narativni analyzy *(The Narrator. The Category of the Analysis of the Literary Narrative), 2007; and* Vypravet pribeh. Naratologicke kapitoly k romanum Milana Kundery *(Telling a Story: Narratological Chapters on Milan Kundera's Novel), 2002; and co-author and editor-in-chief of* Literarni Morava *(Literary Moravia), 2002. He is the editor-in-chief of the series Theoretica, pubished by the Institute for Czech Literature of the Czech Academy of Sciences.*

Preface

This study, which owes much to the support of Mr. Josef Cermak and the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the Munk Centre for International Studies, is the third chapter of a book — *The Narrator* — that I worked on during my stay at the University of Toronto in the summer of 2006. The book aims to describe the narrator as a textual strategy by which the narrative intention is expressed, and to answer the question "Who is the producer of this intention?"

The study you are holding in your hands right now strives to formulate a concept of intersubjectivity that issues from viewing the narrative as a communication situation. Its basis is the theory of dialogical capacity by Mikhail Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva, the concept of context and the foundation of the subject in Prague structuralism, and cognitive semantics. We will try to determine how the narrative

formulates the receptive perspective, and we will propose what content the notion of *subject* should have in the theory of narration. In addition to the existing theoretical models that literary analysis has at its disposal, we will employ some related motifs and thoughts from the Prague school of structuralist literary analysis. The Prague school, already in the writings of Jan Mukarovsky and Felix Vodicka, refused to make a clear distinction between meaning and sense, or between semantics and pragmatics. The concept and determination of the *work*, which at the same time referred to the intention of both its originator and its reader as to certain semantic contexts, was an exceptionally poignant question for subsequent generations of Czech structuralists, who sought to define the subject of literary communication, of literary work. This study attempts to continue on this path.

Intersubjectivity

> I have come to understand that it is necessary to sense letters, and not merely read them in books, using one's eyes — that it is necessary to create an interpreter inside oneself to translate what instinct suggests wordlessly. The key must be found in that.
>
> Gustav Meyring, *Golem*

Our emphasis on the "right-hand" side of Dolezel's model of the communication situation leads to an area which to a certain extent overlaps with the aesthetics of reception (called *reader-response theory*

in the Anglo-Saxon context). When we deal with questions of perspective, point of view or narrative mode, we are operating in the area in which fictional worlds are created, from the "left-hand" side of Dolezel's model — and therefore on the author-text axis. Earlier studies of the nature of textual intention, however, have tended to subsume the author under the wider framework of the concept of *narration*. Since no idea of authorial intention can be more than conjectural, we rely entirely upon the evidence of narration (taken in a broad sense) in the process of describing it, and then perceive the fictional world we project as a process of mutual interaction between reader and narrative text. As this process is limited in space and time, its resulting form (as a unique fictional world) is also only temporary in nature, and is liable to permanent changes. In this process, we are able to perceive the literary text as a genotype, and the realization of the fictional world as a phenotype, constructed not only by the aggregate of all the signs in the text, but also by the environment in which the individual receptive activity of the reader operates. The fictional world that the reader recognizes is thus a mere subset of the fictional world of the text — no more than a component part of its complexity.

Although we are thus operating on the text-reader axis, we are still not unambiguously occupying an area delimited by the aesthetics of reception, because we deny the allocation by the latter of a central position to the reader in the process of communication. Rather, we insist upon the necessity of locating the literary text centrally within the process of communication (as a system of signs, of which the overall resultant is characterized as the structural axis producing its principal meaning). If we reject the concept of the implied author as redundant, by the same token we draw attention to a further statement by Wolfgang Iser, concerning the "implicit instance" (and following a suggestion by Felix Vodicka and the Prague structuralists): he argues that the *implicit reader* (the aggregate of the criteria that we perceive as the form of reading produced by the text, which is traditionally seen in opposition to the "implicit author" within the framework of the model of communication provided by the aesthetics of reception) is itself a part of the fictional structure, and that its role cannot therefore be pinpointed without a certain reserve. The meaning that we deduce from the text is the product of a creative tension between "the role that is expressed (offered) in the text and the reader's own disposition"

(Iser 1978, p. 37). Of course, according to Iser, the implicit reader is not a direct addressee of the narrative act on the part of the implicit author: Iser writes of a joint activity of implicit author, characters and plot, which must be drawn together by a specific reader if he is to be able to draw conclusions about the embedded textual meaning. It seems that this activity described by Iser can be transferred, without losing any of its essential quality, into the area of *narrative* as we have delineated this concept, by which we achieve not only a transparent understanding of the nature of this dynamic mode of interaction, but also a "liberation" of intentionality, from a prescriptive conception of the generation of meaning in favour of a semantic process (and therefore a confirmation of the principle that Mukarovsky termed "chance" — the element that is inherent to narrative both as a system of signs and also as an artefact expressing the unity of sign and object[1]). We would suggest that, rather than observing the way in which the reader behaves, it would be more appropriate to observe the way in which the narration behaves, in order to achieve its purpose — by which, at the same time, an answer is provided to the question how the reader behaves or reacts to the possibilities of the semantic process activated by the text.

To demonstrate the validity of our concept of intersubjectivity and interaction (between text and reader) that produces the unique fictional world, it is necessary to explore the way in which meaning is generated, and explain the principles of this intersubjectivity.

Narrative has some kind of sense — this is the assumption with which one begins to read; and the semantic structure aims at producing this sense. This simple assumption points to our relationship with the semantic process of the narrative. However, the author is most clearly not the sole source of the semantic process. On the one hand, it is possible to conceive of a literary work as a structure of constantly changing relationships — and therefore as a dynamic structure that generates the semantic process; on the other hand, a literary work relates in some way to the world in which it exists. What is the nature of this relationship, and what is its foundation? Here we are entering

---

1. Jan Mukarovsky in his essay "Zamernost a nezamernost v umeni" ("Purposefulness and Purposelessness in Art," published in 1943) calls the work a sign inviting semantic unity, and at the same time also an entity that constantly, again and again, resists any specification, since it belongs to the world of natural facts the assignation of which we do not know (Mukarovsky 2000e).

an explosive area of narrative theory, into an area where the subject is confronted by mimesis.

Mimesis and the Subject

"What are you still doing here?" Her tone wasn't harsh, but it wasn't kindly, either; Sylvie was indignant.

"Where should I be?" Irena asked.

"Home!"

"You mean this isn't my home anymore?" (Kundera 2002, p. 3)

Milan Kundera's latest novel, *Ignorance* (2002), opens with this short dialogue. We are thrust into the midst of a conversation, into the midst of a very confrontational, tense situation, into the midst of two interpretations of the word "home," determined by two different deictic pronouns and two rigid designators. We know nothing else. But as readers we must somehow comply with this entrance to the novel, if we are to read on. The operation we carry out is subconscious and automatic: from the maze of our cognitive frameworks we simply activate the one which allows us to go on reading. We try, at least in the short term, to make sense by invoking our previous experience of the word "home." But what does this concept mean? The beginning of Kundera's novel is based precisely on destabilizing it. What point is there, then, in such an operation?

One of the constantly recurring questions of literary theory is that of the role of the subject in the understanding of literary works. How complex and problematic this topic is will appear by a mere overview of the fundamental theoretical works that touch on it in one way or another. We find traces of the subject in all theoretical approaches that address literary works and the conditions of their existence, interpretation and identity; and, very significantly, the vast majority of such approaches fall into two sharply divided groups.

The first, taking the concept seriously, enquires into the role of the subject, author or reader, in the construction of meaning and plot in a literary work, and verges towards embracing psychological concepts; in an extreme form, it breaks down the identity of the work in favour of specific interpretations by empirical readers. The second group of literary theories explicitly distances itself from considering subjects existing outside literary works, restricting its enquiries completely to works as text. It also considers a certain type of subject (as is the case

in Prague structuralism), but connects its existence completely with the world that is realized fully through the text of the literary work. In this way, it is possible not only to define the semantic gesture as the central idea of Prague structuralism, and the implicit reader as the key concept of the aesthetics of reception, but also the abstract author and abstract reader as concepts specific to narratology.

The present study aims to revisit the role of the subject in the light of mimesis theory, and the urgency of the questions it raises in the theory of fictional worlds, mainly following the model that Lubomir Dolezel has "canonized," after many years' reflection, in his essential book, *Heterocosmica* (1998). He measures the shift within this theory that has occurred under the influence of the subject, sketches the complex of problems that it raises, and shows how the subject itself, conversely, demands redefinition in the light of the theory of fictional worlds. As this area is very wide, the present study is limited to that part of it defined by the pairing of subject and mimesis as literary categories.

Where Is Mimesis to Be Located?

Dolezel's criticism of mimesis proceeds from his clash with the ideas of Wolfgang Iser. In this connection, Dolezel writes: "Having escaped from the suprasubjective control of the text through the gaps, the Iserian reader reconstructs the fictional world guided by his or her life experience, that is, by his or her communion with complete objects and worlds. The filling in, which was claimed to be an exercise of imagination, is in fact an act of *Gleichschaltung*: the diversity of fictional worlds is reduced to the uniform structure of the complete, Carnapian world. Mimesis, which was jettisoned by modernist and postmodernist world makers, returns with a vengeance to normalize the reader's world reconstruction" (Dolezel 1998, p. 171).

Dolezel clearly understands mimesis as a reconstruction of the totality of the fictional world following the model of the real world. He uses the concept of "concretisation," introduced into literary theory by Roman Ingarden, and exposes its limits. To understand his criticism, we can draw on a parallel: if in a mystery novel, the mystery is fully explained, if its mysterious gaps are filled, the story loses its mystery and thereby also an essential part of its identity. Through concretisation we lose a multitude of possibilities: we close the way to them. And, says Dolezel, concretisation destabilizes the identity of a literary work, because with it we fill gaps in the text (in the world of

the text) that are integral to it. But what remains in such a case? The fictional world, but by no means one resulting from a mimetic reading aimed at filling in the gaps, and therefore a hybrid construction of the fictional world against the background of the real world; but a fictional world resulting from a transposition of texture — retaining the gaps — as Dolezel attempts in *Heterocosmica*. In other words, the language of the literary work is necessary, not the metalanguage of the interpretation. Is this eminently theoretical operation at all possible in practice? And what does it offer?

In his *Temps et récit* (Time and Narrative), Paul Ricoeur also considers mimesis, and concludes that it is so complex and essential to understanding literary works that one should not only reflect on it but also make careful distinctions within it. Accordingly, he distinguishes three phases of mimesis. The first creates the conditions for understanding: as Ricoeur puts it, it is rooted in our prior understanding of the world of our actions (its intelligible structures, its symbolic elements and its temporal character). The second represents traditionally conceived Aristotelian mimesis, pleaded for so vehemently by Erich Auerbach (who attempted to reintroduce it into literary criticism after the assault by modernism), a mimesis that opens the realm of "as if." The third is the application, the rounding off of the mimetic journey in the spectator, reader or listener: it is the point of intersection between the world of the text and the world of the listener and reader — the point of intersection between the world *configured* by the poem and the world of the listener or reader. It is important to stress that for Ricoeur these are not different types, but phases, of mimesis.

Dolezel's concept of mimesis is very plainly defined in *Heterocosmica*. He bases it on the original idea that he calls Platonic-Aristotelian, that fictional entities are derived from reality, and are imitations or representations of entities existing in reality (1998, p. 21). For him, the essential step of mimetic interpretation is predicating a real prototype for a fictional entity. Where such interpretation cannot find a real particular for a fictional particular (as with Hamlet or Raskolnikov), it creates, or has recourse to, a so-called "real universal" (Dolezel sometimes terms it an "eclectic aggregate"); Dolezel criticizes such a concept of mimesis for depriving fictional particulars of their individuality, and classifies it as one of his *a priori* categories (1998, p. 23). It is precisely this *a priori* method that Dolezel finds inadmissible, because it leads to *Gleichschaltung*.

Dolezel therefore speaks of fictional individuals and of the negative influence of mimesis on understanding them, on reconstructing them. His concept limits mimesis (or the process that we activate through it) to a mere copying. A more contemporary approach, normative also for Ricoeur, would understand it rather as representation. However, Dolezel completely omits a quite different form of mimesis, which is equally important from our point of view and which allows us to reconstruct a narrative in its building up of meaning. That is the mimetic principle according to which individuals of the fictional world are transformed into a coherent whole. Here it is necessary to consider the implications of Ricoeur's words for Dolezel's concept of mimesis, upon which *de facto* his theory of fictional worlds depends.

We can clearly sense that the mimesis that Dolezel defined in *Heterocosmica* is completely different from that of Ricoeur. Each speaks of mimesis, but each perceives it in a different way, or rather, each definition captures it in a different form. Dolezel's issues from Plato's founding definition, whereas Ricoeur markedly extends the original concept. However, Aristotle had already complicated this original concept of mimesis, in considering the relation between "fictional" and "real" worlds, and in pleading for the acknowledgement of the peculiarity of this "fictional world" that sets its own rules of verisimilitude for itself.[2]

---

2. In Aristotle there occurs an evident shift from the rigid form of the imitation of reality as Plato understands it, in favour of a different reality, the reality of the work. While Plato perceives art as of lower value because it imitates reality, Aristotle abolishes this hierarchy, referring to the fact that a work of art creates its own reality, the reality of the work of art. At the same time, however, in the Aristotelian concept, beside the imitation of the acting persons, objects and effects of reality, another form of imitation is also emphasized, which is an imitation of some inner quality: rhythm, melody; and imitation appears also in connection with the plot: "[a plot,] being a mimesis of an action, should be a mimesis of one action and that a whole one" (Aristotle 1999, pp. 32–3). For Aristotle, therefore imitation is evidently no longer a question of imitating external objects in the real, empirically accessible world, but it aims at the form of the structure of comprehension, of inner mechanisms that direct man's orientation in the world. Aristotle's imitation has to be understood, then, alongside his consideration of the depiction of the impossible: "If the poem contains an impossibility, that is a fault; but it is all right if the poem thereby achieves what it aims at" (pp. 23–5) and "In answer to the charge of not being true, one can say, 'But perhaps it is as it should be'" (p. 33). And it is exactly here that the inconsistency in the ontology of a literary work understood in this way is evidently based. On the one hand the world of a fictitious work "gains its independence"; on the other hand, this world is given over to the "plunder" of mimesis, as noted and criticized by Lubomir Dolezel.

From what has been said in connection with Ricoeur's careful distinction of phases, it is evident that, in his interpretation, Aristotelian *mimesis* is not mere imitation, but representation. Such representation is not imitative, but is an organizing process, an operation creating a synthesis of deeds and facts, providing the unity of a whole: it is a creative and uniting activity. Therefore we understand a literary text because mimesis places an important tool in our hands, which is the creation of structure, and the capacity to "conjoin," including combination, contextualization and selection (substitution): these are not mental operations that are inherent to humanity, for we merely have a disposition for them, and acquire them in practice only by imitating processes going on in the world immediately touching us. At the same time, they are processes that also involve hierarchies of value and information, and are based on individual experience with tools for comprehending and the ability to use them.

However, that opens the question of the subject, one which Dolezel clearly perceives as a danger to the specific identity and ontology of a literary work. In his interpretation, a subjective understanding (one that is always limited in some way) diminishes the breadth of the fictional world, and therefore denies its potential of meaning in reality. Within the framework of Dolezel's fictional world, this criticism seems logical, but is it necessary to throw away, along with the bathwater of the subject (the unique concretisation irrevocably filling in gaps in the literary work), the baby of mimesis as well?

Let us situate Dolezel's justifiable misgivings within the wider context of the problem of concretisation. One of the most radical solutions is traditionally considered to be Barthes' declaration of the death of the author. It occurs in an article that closely preceded his extensive study, *S/Z* (1970), and in it Barthes already insisted that the reader's perspective is decisive for the production of meaning in a text. A series of studies in literary theory thereafter has taken Barthes' original article, "The Death of the Author" (Barthes 1977, written in 1967), to be the decisive moment at which the reader was born and liberated.

But if we read that essay more carefully, we find that the reader is something very non-concrete for Barthes, something which cannot be personal, which is "innumerable centres of culture," which is a non-individualized generator, and which is without history, biography or psychology. Barthes' reader therefore has features chiefly based on the principle liberating meaning from the text, activating its field of

significance, and is a matter of process and of the infinity of possibilities for realizing the meaning of the literary work. According to him, meaning becomes action. What in fact has been liberated is the text — and its semantic field. And the unique experience of the reader has been cut short. From another point of view it is possible to take this act of liberation of Barthes as a disavowal of the traditional mimetic process that unites text and author (in the co-ordinates of the theory of reflection[3]) and thus determines the competences of the reader. This disavowal, however, brings Barthes to the opposite pole of mimetic representation, and it is exactly that approach to mimesis, as formulated by Ricoeur, that allows us (however non-concrete and dissolved we become as subjects for Barthes) to grasp and therefore concretise the meaning of a literary work at all.

The questions, what or who is dead, and what or who might be the subject of a literary work, therefore gain urgency, and we can find them in different forms within the aesthetics of reception, as well as in the work of the post-structuralists, mainly Jacques Derrida[4] and the leading representative of the Yale school, Paul de Man, and in a series of other theoretical writings.[5] Moreover, they occur not only in literary theory, but also in marginal theoretical areas of science, aiming more broadly to test not only the validity of judgements in literary theory, but also questions of subject, language, cognition and mind. The issues that we shall deal with below therefore concern the transitional area between the real (actual) and the literary (fictional) mind, opened, with the help of cognitive science, by the theory of fictional worlds.

The Advantages of a Cognitive Approach

In her book *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory*, Marie-Laure Ryan deals systematically with the mimetic

3. Barthes had already initiated this line of thought in his Writing Degree Zero, first published in French in 1953 (1967).

4. Derrida shows that the "death of the author" in fact emphasizes authorial activity, and reformulates the concept of the author as an intentional principle. For Derrida too, the author becomes a mental project (projection) of the reader: "He, himself, he is dead, and yet, through the spectres of memory and of the text, he lives among us, … he looks at us … He speaks [to] us among us. He makes us or allows us to speak of us, to speak to us. He speaks [to] us" (1988, p. 593).

5. Seán Burke deals thoroughly with the development of the theory of the "death of the author" (1992).

principle, against the background of cognitive theory. Together with Nicholas Rescher (Rescher 1973), Ryan states, "If possible worlds are constructs of the mind, we can classify them according to the mental process to which they owe their existence … without commitment to their reality" (Ryan 1991, p. 19). Her claims are based on research in which she examines the theory of fictional worlds in the context of "readers' practice," and therefore rightly adduces the fact that the pseudo-reality that fictional characters bear is demonstrated by the natural tendency of readers to identify themselves with them. And consequently she asks: "Would we hope for an outcome favourable to our favourite characters, would we worry that the villain's schemes might succeed and the hero be defeated, would at least some of us be terrorized by horror stories and moved to tears by romance, if we regarded characters — as structuralists used to do — as mere collections of textually defined features?" (p. 21). And she adds: "Formal markers of fictionality admittedly exist, but they operate conventionally rather than logically — through stylistic connotations rather than through literal meaning" (p. 22).

Ryan, contrary to Dolezel, examines fictional worlds from the point of view of their "users," and therefore asks how we behave in them. It is evident that the key question for her must be that of representation. She shows how we as readers of fiction approach the game of "as if," and we behave "as if the actual world of the textual universe were the actual world." Once again, she raises the question of the relation of the fictional world to the real one in the process of re-construction. Ryan situates it within a so-called "mimetic discourse." Within a triple modal system she distinguishes AW, our "actual world," from the "Textual universe," "the sum of the worlds projected by the text." At the centre of the system is TAW, the "textual actual world," and finally TRW, the "textual reference world," which is supposed to represent TAW accurately though it may be compatible or incompatible with it (pp. 24–5).

In this way Ryan solves the question of mimesis in favour of the fictional world. Her mimetic discourse is orientated completely inwards, towards the text. In the background of her definition of the conditions of mimetic discourse, there echoes Dolezel's fear of "Gleichschaltung" and of the creation of a real universal: Ryan claims: "(1) A mimetic utterance act makes singular existential claims ('there is an x,' rather than 'for all x'); (2) it describes particular facts and

individuated entit[i]es; (3) it is proposed (really or in make-believe) as a version of a world existing independently of the discourse that describes it; (4) it is meant to be valued as either true or false in this world" (p. 25). It is a world activated by text, which sets the conditions of its own existence, in which, to quote Miroslav Cervenka, the rules of the real world apply, unless otherwise provided.

More precisely, although activated by the text, these rules are made real by the reader (as a concrete subject) on the basis of his or her own experience with the grammar of the real world (and therefore its semantics and pragmatics). Even when the rules of the real world are violated — in a fictional world a blue deer may speak — this violation occurs against the background of the valid grammar of the real world, and gains significance within its scope. The principle of the simulation (the functioning) of the grammar of the real world remains valid even in its own antithesis. Ryan, therefore, only appears to solve the problem, and in reality she has sidestepped it. Her model of mimetic discourse deals with the relationships among AW, TAW and TRW more in terms of the quality of their validation, and not at all in terms of the conditions in which they function.[6] Her model in fact offers three pairs of possibilities: the TAW can depict the AW either truly or falsely; the text can be either a representation of the AW or an image of an "absolute point of view" (APW) on which the fictional world is systematically based; and, finally, the TAW can be either compatible or incompatible with the TRW — which amounts to the question of the reliability of narration or narrator. So it could be said further that Ryan is exploring the semantic rather than the pragmatic aspect of mimesis. She investigates how the verisimilitude of the narrative is modelled as a method of representing the real world mimetically (or of activating the real world in the process of validation). Her definition is not, therefore, a question of the copying of the real world by the world actualised by the text, but mainly concerns the way in which representation and validation occur.

When Stephen Halliwell considers mimesis, he defines it in two ways; first, traditionally, as mimesis that describes and illustrates a (partly)

---

6. Dolezel also verifies the validity of mimetic approaches in exploring the distribution of the conditions of verisimilitude of the fictional world, but, again, only on the level of the fictional particular and of real particulars and universals – that is, subjects and objects from both worlds, but not on the level of the mechanisms that these worlds construct and reconstruct.

accessible and recognizable world, and secondly as the "creator of an independent artistic heterocosm, a world of its own" (2002, p. 5). Accordingly, mimesis can be world-simulating or world-creating. We can see that Dolezel's concept of mimesis corresponds to the former of these categories, and Ryan's rather to the latter. Still, there remains something unaccounted for in her version. The question whether mimesis itself influences the conditions of understanding a literary work and how it does so (not only on the level of setting the criterion of verisimilitude) remains open. Yet we find a certain form of answer in Ryan's later concept of "immersed reading" and the possibilities of its realization.

We may be brought a step further in examining the functioning of the fictional world and its relationship to the fictional mind by research carried out by Mark Turner. In his book *Death is the Mother of Beauty* (1987), drawing on the way in which metaphors function and influence human behaviour, Turner claims that a reader can assign meaning to text, owing to the fact that he or she approaches it equipped with tools in the form of subconscious conceptual structures of understanding that are automatically applied to the text. Turner's claim is close to Ricoeur's division of the mimetic process into phases, and shows that Ricoeur's mimesis has a cognitive dimension.

In another book, *The Literary Mind* (1996), Turner shows how important the parable is for the understanding of narratives. According to Turner, it exemplifies the capacity to activate a story beyond language, beyond speech, beyond story. It activates a certain cognitive structure which unfolds as a story and which is at our disposal, on the basis of our experience with stories and their attributes. It is clear that with Turner's discussion we are in the field of pragmatics. Another question arises, whether a literary work can be perceived only in the domain of semantics, as distinct from pragmatics — or, in other words, whether sense can be separated from meaning. If so, then semantic investigations attempting to reach objective readings of the functioning of literary works in the semiotic process are justifiable, and could potentially achieve complete descriptions of the functioning of the structure of literary works — descriptions that would encompass their complete content, including the meaning of the gaps in the textual world. As Dolezel correctly notes, such descriptions would in fact be Borges-like rewritings of texts.

But a literary work is a means of representation, and its basic mode is mediation, as recognised by both influential semantic perspective models — Stanzel's and Genette's. And within the scope of what is mediated stands the reader, the specific, subjective reader, with the only unique experience of parable, as Turner puts it. Therefore is it possible to use semantics as a foundation and ignore the pragmatics of the literary work? But even authors of semantic concepts are unique and specific readers. Our task is not to rewrite the literary work, but to understand it. But we can only begin by understanding it for ourselves.

So we encounter the problem of the subject of the literary work once more. Czech structuralism, which was one of the first bodies of theory to attempt to understand and describe semantics and the functioning of literary works in terms of structure, concerned itself with the question of the subject from the very beginning, especially in the research conducted by Jan Mukarovsky, its pre-eminent representative. Moreover, it was Mukarovsky, after he had reduced his concept of structuralism to a closed system, who decided to return once more to this question — a question which led him to the field of pragmatics. The result was his last large-scale study, which re-evaluated his previous research. The study is entitled "The Purposefulness and Purposelessness of Art" (1943), and its centre of gravity is his conception of the work as a co-existence of "sign" (*znak*) and "thing" (*vec*) — the *sign* challenges semantic unity, and therefore concretisation, and the *thing* again and again resists any concretisation, for as a thing it belongs to the world of natural facts, whose "specification we do not know." The decisive role, according to Mukarovsky, is played by the "recipient." Therefore it is reception (and the conditions of reception) that was accepted as the last substantial challenge by the first generation of the Prague structuralists.

The potential importance of cognitive science for investigating the field and conditions of mimesis and the theory of fictional worlds becomes evident also in a study by Alan Palmer, who writes: "Readers use cognitive frames and scripts to interpret text" (2003, p. 325); "The work that we put into constructing other real minds prepares us, as readers, for the work of constructing fictional minds" (ibid.); "Because fictional beings are necessarily incomplete, frames, scripts, and preference rules are required to supply the defaults that fill the gaps in

the discourse and provide the presuppositions that enable the reader to construct minds from the text" (ibid.). If he is right, and everything seems to confirm that, then it is the principle of understanding through mimesis, which Paul Ricoeur recognized and whose individual phases he distinguished, which is largely responsible for the fact that literary works exist in the form in which they do.

And Turner's parable principle applies here, allowing us to understand literary works (but also other means of communication) on the basis of their similarity in the activation of the frameworks within which we introduce meanings into the coordinates of our understanding. But Turner's parable principle is only a reformulation of an earlier insight of Roman Jakobson: "The spatial and often also the temporal distance between two individuals, a speaker and a recipient, is bridged with the aid of an internal relationship: there must exist a certain equivalence between the symbols used by the speaker, which the recipient knows and interprets. Without this equivalence the message would remain ineffective: even if it reaches the recipient, it cannot affect him" (Jakobson 1995, p. 60). Jakobson therefore bases the possibility of understanding on similarity — we communicate through its mediation. If such equivalence is distinguished in its primary form as a particular of the communication system, then it must exist also at higher "levels," in constructions in which these particulars are involved.

From the primary determination of mimesis as imitation we have arrived at a definition of it as a means of representation. In the process, the distinctiveness of Dolezel's concept of mimesis has emerged. According to his concept, mimesis is a certain whole, which is applied without residue to the text, so that the text (the fictional world) is carved into the shape determined for it by the mimesis. However, this is clearly a normative definition, and in this form it does not appear in the concepts under discussion here.

Dolezel's *Heterocosmica* thus gives mimesis a form no longer found in contemporary theoretical thought. But that does not diminish the importance of Dolezel's influence. On the contrary, *Heterocosmica* opens the door to the thirteenth chamber of literary theory, and points in the direction (or one of the scholarly directions) in which the theory of fictional worlds should proceed. Its key aspect is the question of the subject — that subject, or "subjectivization," which so significantly defined the direction of Dolezel's narrative modality.

From the above, it is evident that the subject will not be an easy prey. But Ruth Ronen, too, shows how important it is to consider the role of the subject — and therefore the subjective understanding — and therefore also our own understanding — of a literary text (as of standards of understanding set out before the subject). She began with the theory of fictional worlds, but her latest book, *Representing the Real* (2002), is already situated within psychoanalysis, and explores the ways in which the real is represented, and in which an object "that appears to be imposed by reality is in fact revealed to be packed with the unconscious desire of a particular subject" (Ronen 2002, p. 3).

What Dolezel rejects is the filling of gaps, automatically and also consciously, in the literary work, which in the end disrupts its identity. Gaps constitute a solid part of it, as much as characters, objects and other signs. Mimesis, it seems, was caught by the thrust of Dolezel's spear in the heat of battle: now, in shock, all the poor thing can do is watch itself bleed. Theorists who investigate the cognitive conditions of understanding, however, show us that mimesis cannot be reduced to mean a mirror image of the real world in the fictional world, but that the form in which it constructs the worlds must also be considered — perhaps as webs or syntaxes of the fictional world. The problematic formulation of mimesis within the theory of fictional worlds in *Heterocosmica* therefore does not invalidate this theory. The rigidly formulated — even pure — theory remains intact, and this is thanks to the clearly defined concept of mimesis on which it was built — or rather against which it turns. The reality that the foundation stone of the theory is itself available for us to observe once more, consider, and refer to as normative, however, allows mimesis to appear behind it, unreduced, activating significance within some "transitional area," where we realize the conditionality, but also the validity of our interpretations. Before us, there opens up a transitional, temporally and contextually limited area where we and our concretisation exist.

Mimesis in cognitive science, in comparison with Dolezel's *Heterocosmica*, offers a productive area to which the attention of the theory of fictional worlds must be directed. It can then take the mimesis on which the fictional world is based as its syntax, even where the mimetic principle is disaffirmed and where the world realized by the text constitutes an antipole to the logic of the real world — the place where blue deer speak. Mimesis itself therefore does not reduce the semantic action of the fictional world *de facto*; it

is only our own concretisation, determined subjectively and temporally, that reduces the semantic potential of the fictional world — but only in this form are fictional worlds accessible to us. Nevertheless, the process that we activate to understand them can help us understand its reductive practice and discover the principle on which the identity of the literary work is based. But it is necessary to understand the process through which we understand, so that we can conversely perceive the wide semantic potential that is hidden in the literary work. Contrary to allegations that meaning in literary works possesses unlimited, infinite potential, it is possible to assert: texts must always concretely mean something somehow. And this meaning is our subjective understanding, temporally and spatially determined. If we are able to determine the principles of construction of the fictional world and the role of mimetic processes in its reconstruction, the conditionality of a categorical limitation of the subject must necessarily also appear. It is precisely the theory of fictional worlds that can prove how ambiguous the simple dichotomy of subject versus object is.

In attempts to construct the semantics of a literary text, it is possible to banish both author and specific reader from the text, but it is necessary to deal with the cognitive frameworks which the text activates for its understanding, and which are based, because they function as parable, on a process, on an operation of representation, that we can call mimesis. However, we recognize that the text is infiltrated together with it by the subject of the recipient, thus of something specific and consciously reductive for the identity of a literary work, existing only as semantic action. This sense of reduction, however, is the most essential thing for the identity of the literary work in its reconstruction by a reader.

The destabilizing of cognitive frameworks that occurs at the beginning of Kundera's novel shows the reader, finally, that the significance of the novel's message is founded precisely upon negation. For this to happen, these frameworks must be activated. And it is so despite the fact that they will have to be denied. The term "home" for us is always connected with a concrete "here" or "there." The semantic key to Kundera's novel, however, abolishes the relevance of this concept. What remains is the term "home." And that is mainly a socio-cultural experience. But if it is neither "here" nor "there," its only possible space becomes "nowhere." And that is a tragedy which the characters

in Kundera's novel are entering already through the introductory declaration of the fictional world. It is the fictional world of a novel that in its opening has relied upon us as readers to use the correct keys (frameworks) to understand common deictic pronouns and the term "home," just as it has relied on us to recognize their invalidity. It seems that it will not be very straightforward, either with mimesis or with our unique specific subjectivity.

Where Is the Subject to Be Located?

So no definitive, final word of permanent validity exists in Dostoyevsky's works. Neither, therefore, does any stable image of a hero which might answer the question, "Who is he?" The only questions that can be asked here are "Who am I?" and "Who are you?" But these questions also resonate in one's continuous and never-ending internal dialogue. The language of the hero and the language about the hero are characterized by a relationship of open dialogue with oneself and with others.
(Bakhtin 1968, p. 148)

The nature of dialogue, as Bakhtin described it in his writings on the novel, exactly captures the tension between subject and object in a narrative utterance that has a latent capacity to exchange the positions of the two on the axis of communication in relation to their subject-matter. One of Bakhtin's most fundamental charges against the formalists seems to be that pertaining to their concept of language: in his opinion, they considered language to be a fixed code, unrelated to the context of discourse, and therefore unable even to participate in it. For Bakhtin, by contrast, this concept is fundamentally erroneous. For him, language is a living organism in which social conditions and needs — and even immediate social reality — are revealed, and into which these are transformed.[7] He regards language as having an active, rather than a passive, role, and replaces the old model of the formalists with a dialogic concept. But that has substantial consequences also for the relationship between object and subject in a linguistic utterance.

Bakhtin's concept of the aesthetics of the novel consequently proceeds from its linguistic basis, which is simultaneously both infinitely extensible and unique, in relation to the semantic process, because it

---

7. Bakhtin's point of departure is evident also in Voloshinov, who locates the word (as a real fact) within human society; according to him, it is only possible to understand the nature of a word if we do not ignore this element of it (Voloshinov 1929). This concept reflects the dialogic nature of the word.

is played out in terms of a dialogue that Bakhtin defines as an action and a change of condition, and its result is constant transformation, repeatability and returnability, but not at all in the sense of absolute identity. As a communicative act, dialogue occurs at the boundary of two contexts — speaker and addressee. Meaning in dialogue is determined by interpretation on the part of the addressee (the second of these), even though it is formulated on the part of the speaker as a potential reaction by the addressee, provoked in the latter by the dialogical word — for Bakhtin every word aims at a reply, although it cannot anticipate its actual form. However, in considering a dialogue in terms of meaning, it is necessary to perceive both contexts (as different ideologies), for the resulting product is otherwise not dialogical but monological.[8]

The subject-matter of an utterance is thus located within the scope of both sides of the communication, and is therefore a product of intersubjectivity. But in that case the question of the intentionality of the literary work deserves attention, for such a work eludes the author's control, and does not become a stable axis preceding the process of reading (and therefore reception). Intentionality here evidently gives way to an intersubjective formation of meaning in the framework of a dialogic action, in which meaning is produced by mutual negotiation, within a relationship of differing perspectives.

According to Bakhtin, the word is intersubjective (*mezhduin-dividual'no*) in a dialogue, if the speaker, the addressee and the subject of the statement are all participants. In addition (and this went unrecognized in poststructuralist interpretations of Bakhtin) it seems that though Bakhtin perceived meaning as a process within a framework of recursiveness, at the same time, with his concept of dialogic action he defined the uniqueness and "terminability" of the process of designation, though in the framework of a permanent (latent) transformation, an unstable putting off of meaning. Let me put this in other words. Once, in discussion with Miroslav Cervenka and Milan Jankovic, I was critical of Czech structuralism for describing meaning as a constant action (in the same way that it was realized by Roland Barthes in his concept of the death of the author, or in *S/Z*), for the capitulation to the perception of a specific reader which that implies in practice, and therefore for a systematic

8. See Bakhtin (1975).

capitulation to a single description and to the meaning of this description, which might conversely verify the properties of the narrative in their relationship to the production of understanding. We eventually arrived at the idea (due, I think, to Miroslav Cervenka) that a text must always signify something concrete in some way. And Bakhtin's concept of dialogue as action (comprising unique transformations and metamorphoses) seems already to confirm this understanding of its concrete significance. But as a direct consequence it is necessary to investigate it as an act produced by intersubjectivity, however fleeting and limited a moment that may be from the standpoint of the process generating meaning. And a further important observation concerning Bakhtin's concept of the discourse of dialogue has been made by Michael Holquist: "Discourse does not reflect the situation, it is the situation." (Clark and Holquist 1984, p. 204). So dialogue, according to Bakhtin, clearly links subjectivity with temporality (or even temporal-spatiality) in the sense of social context and experience, and removes from it the attribute of abstract unendingness.

Dialogue, and the concept of narrative as dialogue, have proved productive for the literary theory often described as poststructuralist, and Julia Kristeva took Bakhtin's concept of dialogue as the foundation stone of her theory, extending it in the direction of intertextuality. In consequence, Kristeva speaks of the subject of language, through whose instrumentality there is produced a complex negotiation between author and reader. The world of a novel (as a product of interpretation) can then exchange the positions of author and addressee. Before attempting, through Kristeva, to define the subject, let us reconsider Prague structuralism, for which this was a key question.

The Subject According to the Prague School

The Prague structuralists connected the question of the subject closely with the concept of the semantic gesture, as the point of maximum meaning in the work where, according to Mukarovsky, both author and recipient participate. The subject will then be the "point from which the work's structure can be perceived in all its complexity and in its unity. It is therefore a bridge between poet and reader, who can project his own *ich* into the subject and thus identify his own situation in relation to the work with that of the poet. The subject may remain

hidden in (but in no way absent from) the work, as for example in the "objective" epic, or, on the contrary, be realized more or less strongly (through first-person narration, the emotional cast of the work, the identification of the poet with one of the characters within the work, and so on). Therefore the subject cannot be identified with the poet *a priori*, even when the work seems to express the poet's feelings, his relation to the world and to reality in a direct way" (Mukarovsky 2000a, p. 264).

"And intentionality requires a subject, from which it proceeds and which is its source; thus it presupposes a human being. The subject is in no way located outside the work of art, but within it. It is a part of it ... The person who has worked out the words and their import is the subject; the person who is addressed by them is also the subject. And these are not in essence two subjects, but one" (Mukarovsky 2000b, p. 286). "The subject is something other than a concrete individual ... As long as we remain within a work, the subject is a mere epistemological will-o'-the-wisp, an imaginary point. When it is made concrete, this point can be occupied by any individual at all, no matter whether this is the originator or the recipient. In any event, the individual is something that remains outside the scope of the work" (Mukarovsky 2000c, pp. 307–8).

The extracts above are from various studies in which Mukarovsky deals with the subject, cited here to provide a more focused idea of the form in which the subject is perceived by him, and the areas of discussion with which it is connected. But the basic features of the concept of the subject do not change: it is an entity (or point) realized by the work. At the same time, the work represents a boundary dividing the subject from its specific product or producer, author or reader — or rather a meeting-point between the intentions of reader and text. According to Mukarovsky, the subject is a mental construct uncovering the intention of the construction of meaning and the unification of all its component parts. This point is fully realized within the work, but its recognition (the fulfilment or creation of meaning) depends on the activity of concretization, and therefore on the activity of the recipient. Its result is then the *subject*, which is a product of the intention embedded in the work. Mukarovsky speaks of a "point," which is the same term that he uses also in defining the semantic gesture. Therefore, but not only for this reason, his definition of subject and semantic gesture can be apprehended

simultaneously. That is confirmed also by the similarity of their formulations and the identity of the terms used for their formation.

So if Mukarovsky perceives the subject as a point, it is possible to understand it as a kind of understanding, closed in terms of process, or a subjectivization. On the other hand, however, Mukarovsky regards this point as unattainable through any concretization whatever. So it is necessary to consider the nature of a semantic process where the task of delineating meaning lies constantly ahead of us. Here the subject is at one and the same time a unifying principle underlying the semantic structure (intention) as well as its realization in the form of a unique meaning, although it does not intersect with any *potential* unique sense. The temptation to perceive the subject univocally is caused by its delimitation as a "point," yielding a unique formation of meaning; a point from which it is possible to have a single bird's-eye view of the structure of the work. "It is a point at which the whole artistic structure of the work converges, and in relation to which it is assembled, but into which any personality may be projected, whether the perceiver or the author" (Mukarovsky 2000d, p. 15).

From the outset, Mukarovsky's "subject" overlapped in part with the narrator of a literary work (as emerges from his opening quotation), but later its definition moved fully into the area in which the strategy of the overall construction of meaning is located — into an area which is used also by the narrator as an instrument of his intention. We are then able to perceive the "subject" in an analogous area where focalization (Genette) or an implicit, implied, abstract author is defined. The semantic gesture and the subject are then quantities of a pragmatic instantiation (situation), together constituted by all the components of the work, which it unifies, and which are related to it as their source.

The problem of the subject becomes central for Mukarovsky in his later study, "Zamernost a nezamernost v umeni" ("Purposefulness and Purposelessness in Art"). In it he reopens the problem of the identity of the literary work, which now becomes for him the problematic unity of sign and object, where the *sign* tends towards unity in meaning, and therefore towards concretization, and the object constantly resists concretization because, as a thing, it belongs to the world of natural facts which we *cannot determine*. In this productive tension Mukarovsky is trying to redefine the identity of the work, and

to establish the limits of the role and identity of the subject within this never-ending debate. He concludes accordingly that "it is not only the poet and the structure he imposes on the work that are responsible for the semantic gesture that the recipient perceives in the work: a significant part is played also by the perceiver, and … the perceiver often substantially modifies the semantic gesture, in contradiction to the poet's original intention" (Mukarovsky 2000e, p. 373). In this, the semantic gesture, as a principle of semantic unity, is recognized as both intentional and unintentional.

The concept of the subject as a construct dependent on the intention underlying the work and at the same time on a unique concretization (with which it, however, does not quite overlap) on the part of the individual recipient, is indicated by the mechanism of this production, which takes place in the area of intersubjectivity that we have recognized. Thus Mukarovsky's concept of the subject has shifted from its original delimitation as the intention generating the work (the authorial intention) in favour of the intention that is fully realized in the work, and an increased focus on the act of concretization that recognises and generates the subject. A similar shift also affects the semantic gesture, originally conceived by Mukarovsky (in relation with the activity of the author) as "a significant process through which the work originates, and which is re-established in the reader by reading" (Mukarovsky 2001, p. 451). The reader therefore becomes primarily a passive solver of puzzles — the addressee of a code. But the semantic gesture later shifts entirely into the framework of the work, defined in a broad sense, in favour of its own intention — the intention which is generated in the conflict between sign and object, and in which an essential role is now played also by the recipient.

Mukarovsky's followers adopted this concept and virtually settled it in the form in which it was suggested in the essay "Intentionality and lack of intentionality in art." So to prevent the work dissolving in the multiplicity of its concretizations, Cervenka sets up the authority of the work as their original stimulus. He then defines the work as an organization of linguistic signs, and at the same time as a structure of *stimuli* for further linguistic and extra-linguistic activities on the part of the perceiving subject (within the field of concretization). Cervenka realizes that in the process of concretization the work enters a broad context that has an essential influence on the form of its unique concretization, and for this reason he also considers sociological

problems, which are reflected in his concept of norms. (These norms help us understand the work, and are used by the work in order that it may be understood; they are a product of the work and themselves produce it.) For him, the norms are beyond man's reach but reflect human interests and values. So these norms are produced by history and develop in time. Cervenka here develops Vodicka's ideas, and his conception of the significance of context for the character of the work and for its semantic development.

Similarly, Milan Jankovic considers the relationship between a unique concretization and the intention of the work, and concludes that semantic motion in a work is *not* given and does *not* achieve closure. For this reason, the signified can never be definitively established in a work. This non-closure and non-givenness mean that the work constantly changes its meaning while still maintaining its identity — because possible meanings at the same time intersect in it. So for Jankovic the work is situated at the focal point of its interpretations (concretizations), behind which we identify its source, although this cannot be unambiguously designated, and it therefore becomes abstract, a mere procedural motion. Like Barthes, Jankovic in consequence inclines to dismissing a unique interpretation (concretization) as unimportant — he recognizes a specific message as irrelevant, even if it is the only possible one.[9]

From the above there emerge two important general questions: the social grounding of the work, and the connection between its semantic process and time, including its attachment to time. Let us try to set out these two notions in connection with that of the context, as defined (following Mukarovsky) by Felix Vodicka, and so open up the wider question of the mechanism that produces meaning.

The Determining Role of Context

Vodicka distinguishes two basic types of context, internal and external (1948). The *internal* context is one that must be followed within the scope of the construction of a literary text, and within the framework of the interplay and detail of its individual levels. All elements within the literary text are mutually related and interconnected. In literary analysis it is possible to deal with individual elements, but it is necessary to go on to refer to their relationships to other elements in

9. See Dilo jako deni smyslu (The Work as a Semantic Process) in Jankovic (1992).

the literary text, for it is only then, on the basis of such relationships, that we will grasp the import of the elements. Their semantic validity is verified and given only by their context (here the internal context of the text). But the given phenomenon does not merely appear in its immediate context, but in the context of the whole text in which it is located.

Vodicka's theory of the *external* context is highly important for our own research. As a literary historian, he seeks to reconstruct the process of literary development, and uses his observations to formulate a wide concept of context, of which the text is a "mere" part.

At this stage it is necessary to explain Vodicka's notion of the work. The work is a semantically superior concept to his notion of the text: it comprises not only the text, but also the whole structural complex of relations that contribute to its origin and reception. These also form the relationships into which the literary text enters and which it helps to form. (The text here represents an intentionally understood utterance and also the result of the interplay of the powers and tendencies that contribute to its origin.) In this connection, the text becomes the guarantee of the identity of a literary work.

Vodicka consequently refers to period style, which influences the configuration of the narrative method, of the external world and of the entire field of thematic schemes, but even of the configuration of vocabulary and intonation. And at this level every phenomenon from any level carries far-reaching significance. To understand this significance, it is necessary to activate the context within which a given work originates and into which it enters. But according to Vodicka's definition, this is always the context that is invoked by the activity of the text itself, except that the context that the work invokes is the context of a literary work. In this way Vodicka sets criteria for safeguarding the identity of a literary work, and excludes concretizations that would seek to explain the work in a context that is not proper to it. The text is the central authority. In parallel studies, especially later ones, Vodicka advances further terminological distinctions: the context of *literary concretizations*, the *national* context and the *historical* context. As a literary historian, Vodicka refers to the active role of the context in forming developmental tendencies. He then emphasizes that relationships between the observed phenomenon and the context, and relationships within the context, are not unidirectional but mutual.

The suggestion made by Vodicka that attention needs to be paid to a work's context has often been interpreted in terms of its original historical context. To understand the sense of a historical phenomenon, we must locate it in the network of period relationships of which it is a product. But this interpretation is rather one-sided, and in fact it implies a capitulation to reductionist causalism — which had been opposed even by Mukarovsky. We must also take into account that the context activated as the original context of any observed phenomenon is *de facto* only a subset of our current context, and that our current knowledge, expertise, interests and experiences are reflected in it. So to understand a work we do not really activate its original context, but a context that is accessible to us, one that encompasses our ideas and experiences, our knowledge and competence (which form component parts of our own context) in relation to the original context. Taken in this sense, the context again appears indissolubly connected to time, as a semantic process, and at the same time there appears the necessity to explore the mechanisms we use for understanding a work, that is, for our own interpretation and unique concretization of it. It is only a recognition of these mechanisms that can help us understand the potentiality of a work.

For the Prague structuralists the literary work is therefore the result of interactive forces exerted by the context in which it originates and into which it at the same time enters — they affect its transformation or form. To understand the semantic process that underlies a literary work also means to understand this broadly-based activity of the context.

The result of the conception of the Prague school is then to see the work as a structure that is the product of intentions realized within its framework. Of course, its sense is at the same time the product of potentialities that are part of the dynamic structure of the work. A unique concretization is a component part of this structure, as a dynamic element capable of reconfiguring the mutual relationships in favour of a possible meaning, which thus moves from the potential category to the actual. The relationships that produce meaning move from the category of singularities to a category of general tendencies, without the loss of the individual character of the meaning, which is reflected in its unique realization as its variant. In this conception, the meaning does not lie anywhere outside the structure that is developing and proceeding, but as potentiality it is also a consistent component of it. That enabled the Prague structuralists to maintain

the identity of the work (however constantly variable this may be) as an identity of sense (meaning) — and of sensuality. To understand this process, through which the sense of structure is also realized, we may use the term "transduction," which has been introduced into structural semiotics by Lubomir Dolezel to explain the transformation of the reception for which the original intention is unrecoverable. The content of the meaning constantly develops in connection with the relationships into which it enters. The original intention of the sense is transformed, depending on the context as this too is transformed. In this way, Dolezel's theory of transduction integrates miscellaneous cultural activities into a single complex model.

For our recognition of the activity that produces meaning in a literary work, the essential finding from the investigations of the Prague school is the location of the activity which takes place within the area of the action accomplished in the tension between sign and object, and which is a result of reciprocal formation by the work (in the dynamic constellation of its elements) and its unique concretization; it is therefore a product of interaction, within a complicated contextual framework, whose components include the norms that produce values that in turn determine meaning. As was noted by the philosopher Jan Patocka, who influenced the thinking of the third generation of the Prague structuralists, an attempt to deduce meaning from purpose and purposefulness implies subordinating it to the category of causality, and for this reason he asserted that meaning must be explored in a mutual relation with value. In his formulation, values show "that the being is meaningful and they [the values] designate what makes sense of it" (Patocka 2002, p. 63). These (sense-projected) values "that attract and repel us," then cause "a being not to be an indifferent presence to us, but to address us, say something to us and to be subject of positive or negative interest." What does it imply for us: "Things do not make sense to themselves, but their sense requires that someone have sense for them: therefore the sense is not originally in the being, but in this openness, in this appreciation for them; the comprehension, which, however, is a process" (p. 64). At the same time, nevertheless, the sense "is not itself perfectly clear, but we must win it by a construction that will discover what originally prevents us from seeing, what shields it, distorts it, eclipses it" (p. 62).

For Mukarovsky, the problem of the construction of meaning is connected with the question of the construction of an aesthetic object

which, though it is an act from an individual aesthetic position, is co-formed with the collective consciousness. The question of value is thus its inherent component. As with Patocka, for the Prague structuralists meaning was simultaneously intentionality and potentiality — but both of these were delimited by the text of the literary work, as a dynamic structure. Meaning must then be *acquired*, distinguished and denominated. Therefore this activity is both constructive and reconstructive at the same time.

The context, as Vodicka conceives it, helps to determine the meaning of the narrative and its component parts. If one takes the functional foundation of the theory into account, as this was realized by the Prague structuralists in terms of Mukarovsky's determination of functions,[10] it shows that meaning is a pragmatic question in a literary text, and therefore also that the semantic gesture and the subject, as these are defined, have pragmatic features and refer to the semantic intention (which is bound with the functional concept) realized in the work. But the context is something that must be considered and activated within the framework of the operation of understanding, and as such it can never be exactly and precisely determined. It is closely connected with what Vodicka calls the semantic dominant.

The semantic dominant, to which the individual elements of the work are subordinated, is a product of the context (both internal and

---

10. Within the framework of this concept, several factors constitute every event; these may intrude into the foreground or recede into the background. In every human act, there is present a threefold attitude to reality, practical, theoretical and aesthetic, though the basic function is practical, expressing the relation of human beings to material objects (in this, the subject projects its will in the world of material things as the goal of its behaviour); this is an attitude that simplifies reality. The theoretical attitude similarly tends to simplify, since it excludes the subject and concentrates on the mutual relations of material things, in order to describe general relationships between phenomena. But the aesthetic attitude excludes the "thing" from reality: it is a type of "luxury," as Mukarovsky puts it, "which does not relate to basic human interests in life." At the same time, according to the Prague structuralists, this attitude of luxury accompanies every human operation during every act of perception or creation, and the border separating the aesthetic function from the others is not fixed. (See also, for example, Jakobson's statement concerning the mobility of the borderline between a poetic work and a diary.) Mukarovsky says that the aesthetic function is expressed only under certain conditions and in a certain social context, and that its relationship to the other functions changes as these conditions change. Its stabilization is, according to him, accomplished by a collective, and it is an issue of the relation of this collective and the world on the one hand, and an individual that uses the aesthetic object for his own goal, with his own purpose on the other, and therefore determines it.

external) that is activated in order to set it off, but individual meanings, as Prague structuralism holds, can be regrouped in the work (as in a dynamic unity) at any time to produce a new meaning, even as a consequence of an active transformation of the context. Therefore a number of contexts are "embedded" in the structure of the work. The agent who transfers them from the area of potential meaning into the area of actual meaning is the reader, who participates actively in this way in the semantic action of the work. Vodicka's interest in context consequently leads him, as a literary historian, to an interest in the transformation of reception within the framework of a historical process, and the influence of this variable reception upon the production of the semantic dominant of the work. Different readings then become at the same time the product of conventions or norms (which can be described) and individual encroachments upon these conventions, which render them "special," which also must become objects of analysis, and which then pass from the position of singularities into the position of general tendencies by setting new standards (conventions) by regrouping or abolishing the original ones.

So the subject represents a unique point for the Prague structuralists: merely "provisional" and temporary, it is a product of a dialogue between an individual concretization and the intention of the work. It is inherent to the work and simultaneously also the potentiality of its dynamic structure — as an option, not as a given. Although it does not overlap with any of its concretizations, it is accessible only within their scope. Therefore it is possible to see it in terms of a coexistence between work and recipient, restricted in time (and space). So the subject is located close to the notion of action.

How Narrative Models the Perspective

Our central question is the manner in which the perspective with which we attribute meanings to the work is modelled. If we define this perspective as an intersubjective space where the intention of the work meets a unique concretization, it will be necessary to observe two phenomena in succession: the activity of the text and our reaction to this activity in this context. Cognitive semantics can be invoked here.

Let us now briefly return to one specific type of narration that we were observing in our chapter on the unreliable narrator. Through entering

a fictional world modelled in Capek's *Stin kapradiny* (Shadow of a Fern), we were observing the way in which an omniscient narrator is announced and authorized in a text. Let us now examine the same text to discover the manner in which the perspective of reception is modelled.

> Rudolf Aksamit and Vaclav Kala, comrades through thick and thin, bent over the prey. You blue, black and green forest; you, forest brown and misty! Wild joy runs through their poachers' nerves; under their fingertips they had the carcase of an animal, that beautiful carcase of a roebuck. He was theirs.
>
> "Vasek — Vasek!" hissed Aksamit. "Rudy, oh Rudy!" breathed Vaclav Kala. They were trembling, spellbound, an ecstatic passion seething within them, a drunken giddiness coursing through their veins. Oh, my goodness, what luck we had today! There are no words to describe it.
>
> Vasek and Rudy were bending over the roebuck, under their fingers there was the carcase of the animal, yielding, still warm, still marvellously tense; and then a gamekeeper burst in from the thicket and roared: "Don't move!" Those were old unsettled accounts, the gamekeeper's voice was choking with fury. You generous, wild forest! That roebuck carcase, still warm and tense. The joy of the poachers was cut short in an instant, and in a sudden eruption it boiled over in the red lava of anger. Rudy crouched behind the roebuck, an enraged beast raising its hackles within him; Vasek found himself being flung at the gamekeeper's throat. And now the fire of revenge has blazed up: a gun has gone off, and that is Rudy shooting the gamekeeper. "Bastards!" screams the enemy, and topples into the grass, head on one side. (…)
>
> You gave me one — the body gasps, but there is no stopping the boiling lava, it blazes volcanically and runs everywhere — beneath the fingernails, up to the hot earlobes, full to the height of the eyes.
>
> He's had enough, wail Rudolf Aksamit and Vaclav Kala, it's had enough, that corpse, still warm, still tense, that yielding corpse that will never be a gamekeeper again. He won't take away that roebuck from us again, he'll never strut about the woods again, he'll never go out to get his tobacco! (Capek 1930, p. 5)

The first view is presented from the perspective of an outside observer who at the same time confirms his knowledge of a wider context (*comrades through thick and thin*). Accordingly, we adopt an external perspective, at the centre of which there appear two characters (identified by rigid designators). But we are quickly invited to amplify this view: the immediate surroundings of the scene are introduced, in

the form of an expressive invocation (*you blue, black and green forest*). In the next section, we are encouraged by the text to alter our perspective or to unify it with the perspective of the poachers (see the evaluative term *beautiful*, which is subsequently confirmed also by the tactile implications of *warm*). And in the section immediately following, the perspective moves through the space that is described (and represents it at the same time); it is amplified by the perspective of the gamekeeper, from which we perceive the scene once more (with identical motives — *roebuck, warm, tense carcase*), and as the internal perspective changes, its value criteria also change. Clearly, thus, the space is modelled before us through a shifting perspective, which allows access to a great deal of information about the fictional world. Within an operation of consolidation, we can then create the complex perspective of the narrative scene. Conversely, we can then check the relevance of the expressive statement addressing the forest and judge it from the standpoint of any of the possible internal perspectives. Then we note that in this sentence, which represents a transition between the two internal perspectives, observed reality is strongly subjectivized, and we are invited to perceive it through the eyes of another, without being able definitively to refer the statement either to the poachers' perspective, or to an overall narrative perspective. The characterization of the two main characters (rigid designators), by means of the relationship between part and whole in the form of the expression "poachers' nerves," together with the unstable perspective, then suggests the form of the cognitive processes that we are to use for our operation of understanding. In this way, we are returned to the area of our own experience, with a similar type of literature and narrative style.

The unstable perspective that we encounter here guarantees that the mediation will involve a large number of elements, from which the fictional world is constructed, and at the same time the proximity of the point of view that we adopt in relation to this world (according to the demands of the text), giving the fictional world a strong "granularity." As we have suggested above, the perspective of the two poachers becomes the central axis of the narrative, and determines the selection of the elements of the action and the manner in which they are ordered. At the same time, however, it is continuously controlled by the authority of the superior narrator, one which therefore generates a perspective. The presence of this authority also confirms its

interpretative activity in relation to the object of its observation, and therefore in relation to the perspective of the two poachers. It then uses linguistic means to establish the receptive perspective of the addressee.

The narrative world thus has located within itself a dialogue between both perspectives. It does not encompass merely a reciprocal confrontation of these two frameworks of knowledge and experience, even though, from the standpoint of the modelling of the reader's perspective as a cognitive action, it is precisely this confrontation that is its most important property. The framework that we identify as belonging to the two poachers conversely reveals the framework of the superior narrative authority as insufficient or incomplete, or breaches it (for example, it reveals the reluctance of the superior narrator to provide some information, or even reveals gaps in this superior framework). The reader then brings this dialogue up to date in the co-ordinates of the dialogue between the textual situation and his own, during this cognitive unifying operation he activates his experience with similar frameworks, and on the basis of them he creates the specific characteristics of the updated frameworks.

As for the modelling of the reader's perspective, the entry into the narrative space mentioned above also uncovers three further processes: (1) it shows that a high capacity to combine narrative elements will be necessary for the cognitive processes controlling the understanding and construction of the fictional world, in which (2) it will be necessary to refer to our cultural encyclopedia (to interpret the notions of poacher, gamekeeper, forest, roebuck and prey, as well as their mutual combinations), which also contains knowledge about sociál roles and possible relationships between individual elements within the narrative (for example, poacher and gamekeeper) and which shows us that the lexis that we use emerges from an environment of social interaction, in which is reflected not only the capacity to use it, but also more generally (3) its capacity for cognitive evaluation of our knowledge of the real world and our experience of it, as well as of the problem of the context to which the narrative refers. These three processes then control and determine the meaning which we assign to the narrative as its possible framework, and under the influence of which, during the course of the narrative, we decode both the partial and the more complex messages.

The perspective that is modelled in the narrative is totally dependent on the grammatical resources of language. With their aid, it

determines its (and our) location in the narrative space, its distance from the object depicted, the manner in which it is represented (whether the perspective is stable or unstable) and at the same time, the logic of this representation (the subsequent move to a close perspective and a local space of observation[11]) and its direction in time (its concentration on the present temporal moment[12]). The intensity of the perspective is also established (not only through the expressive diction, but also in a number of the observed details) and the levels of the perspective are established hierarchically, together with the areas in which the fictional world is mapped (and their density) from the point of view of narrative strategy, and the manner in which this mapping is accomplished (the character of the information).

Within the framework of a cognitive operation of understanding, the conceptual connections are then made, which is a process in which a variety of otherwise disconnected conceptual material is brought together. This process draws on two basic overall forms of realization: connecting above the scene and connecting in time. In it, we determine which elements specify the structure of cognitive representation evoked by the given narrative. Leonard Talmy (2000) speaks in this case of a "scaffolding" or an "axis" around which linguistic material can be distributed or folded. But as it is a proposal (although we have established the manner in which the perspective is modelled by the narrative text), it is a subjective act, in which there occurs a preference for possible frameworks and in consequence a preference for the possible elements producing this meaning. The individual elements are then judged from the point of view of their capacity to be "inserted" in some meaningful way into this framework as a unifying complex. Without this operation, which is a parallel structuring of the fictional world, we would, in the case of the narrative, be dealing merely with an assemblage of individual juxtaposed elements and not with a universe that is being united as a meaningful complex of ideas.

To achieve this complex, it is necessary to supplement (concretize) it with certain actions or conceptual networks at the same time. The narrative challenges us to adopt this behaviour, whose consequence is an individual realization of the supplementation which is the basis of

11. The opposite would be a summary or synoptic perspective.

12. Alternatives would be retrospection and anticipation.

our interpretative activity. Within the framework of this operation of supplementation, we can distinguish between the elements (relationships and phenomena) that are obligatory, which must be supplemented, those which are optional, which it is possible to supplement, and those that are redundant. In the brief extract here quoted, trespassing can be seen as an obligatory element, the situating of the scene in the morning, for instance, can be seen as optional, and the question of animal rights is redundant. Whereas the former two operations of supplementation aid an understanding of the narrative or the scene of the narrative, and its possible meanings, the third leads us astray into misinterpretation. But supplementation is an operation that is evaluated during the course of time, and for this reason elements that have been considered obligatory can become less important during a subsequent reading, or vice versa — optional elements can become obligatory. It is also one of the ways through which unreliability is constructed. In such a case, the text challenges the reader to undertake a certain operation of supplementation in the framework of the obligatory area which will be recognized later as redundant, or vice versa. To make the unreliability a recognizable textual strategy and dominant within the semantic construction, it is of course necessary that this operation, intended by the text, be carried out.

But the reader does not undertake only this operation of supplementation, broadly conceived, when challenged to do so by such textual signals, but also a number of other operations, such as comparison (see above, a mutual comparison of perspectives formed in the text of narrators or reflectors), categorization (again determined in terms of the relationship between one perspective and another), abstraction or schematization, summarization, and so forth — in other words, operations that bear on the basic conditions of reading depend on the individual capacity of the recipient to carry out these operations, and on his widely based experience. Every lexical unit contains or evokes a series of cognitive domains (foundations of its meaning) — as an invitation to produce certain conceptualizations, which should lead to a certain level of understanding, and therefore to a certain form of the cognitive complex (but not, of course, its totality). In this process, the flexibility of lexical units, in the sense of their potential for incorporation in various complexes, is large, and the literary narrative of this capacity of theirs is often used also in dependence on the level of their literary or experimental qualities.

Interpretation is the basis of this operation, as is stressed for instance by Ronald W. Langacker, and is central to both semantic and grammatical structures.[13] Langacker further states that linguistic significance resides not only in the content of a lexical unit, but is a multidimensional phenomenon, whose individual aspects reflect some basic cognitive capacities, which can be summarized under five general headings: specificity, background, perspective, scope and prominence. In narrative, *specificity* refers to our capacity to denominate the narrative entity which evokes meaning on the basis of the information in the text, as well as our capacity to distinguish variant meanings of this entity. The *background* can be seen as the wide context (as well as the intertext) to which the given expression refers. We have already discussed the meaning and form of *perspective*, which bears closely on the value arrangement of the fictional world discussed above. The *scope* has a similar character, as well as the location of a narrative element within the scope or the distribution of the narrative scope, which then significantly models the hierarchy of values of the unit of meaning. So this might be constituted by a repetition of a certain expression at the beginning of the article, or its positioning in some key location in the text. For example, in Jan Cep's story *Do mesta* we encounter three colours (gold, blue and red) that are individually varied in the text (for example, as corn, sky and poppies), but always in the same order and therefore constituting a hierarchy, so that these can be combined in the course of the text to construct an interpretation parallel to the three main characters of the story (father, mother and son), and also a parallel to a more complex cultural interpretation in which the colours are combined with the hierarchy of the family (God, Mary and Christ). The beginning and the end of the narrative are framed by the combination of father, mother and son (maintaining this order) and the colours (which acquire the character of symbols in relation to the above expressions) then appear in the same order in the centre of the text. In this manner, the given terms emphasize their key semantic position. *Prominence* is a question of the denomination of the given element, for example on the basis of social experience or class structure (for example, king, father, man, lad, human being). It is clear that the above categories refer

13. "Although long overlooked in traditional semantics, it is crucial to interpret (construct) for both semantic and grammatical structure" (Langacker 1999, p. 5).

immediately to the formation of value within the cognitive space of the statement (see below).

Something substantial can now be said. The operations that we have mentioned enable us to understand narrative, indeed to read in the first place. But we should constantly be conscious of the general nature and indeed the production of these operations — only thus can we guarantee that during our reception of the narrative we will not be tempted by mimesis to replace the complex narrative structure with a unique ideological interpretation of our own. As we shall assert further below, but as we have already done in part in the introduction to this chapter, our interpretation must also be perceived as part of a productive dialogue between the potential capacities of the meaning and its realization in practice. This dialogue should lead to the communicative situation which the narrative makes possible, initiates and controls at the same time.

Within the scope of the narrative, the causal (and temporally determined) perspective in this operation of connection is recognized and realized; it is not only questions of purpose but also questions of value that come into play here in relation to the meaning. Value, and evaluation, are relevant not only to the result of a narrativized process (poacher — prey — gamekeeper — carcase/corpse), but also to the perspectivization of this space, to each of its individual parts — and therefore also to the determination of the hierarchy of values through the allocation of perspective to it. In the opening quoted above, three perspectives are encountered (those of the poachers, of the gamekeeper and of the overall narrator), which impose a dialogue on this space and impart to it a threefold set of values that the reader must unify. Boris Uspensky earlier noted that value (the question of value as a structural and structuring element) is one of the basic properties or qualities of perspective.

Although, as we have established, the narrative text plays a considerable role in achieving unification by issuing a challenge to undertake this cognitive operation, it is the recipient, the addressee of the narrative text, who realizes it definitively, by selecting a specific framework — "scaffolding" or "axis," and the individual operation he carries out includes processes of combination and selection that happen in time and individually vary and combine

the general scopes or frameworks. Here we are already in the area of the unique semiotic process, and the text holds controlling authority. This reciprocal activity points to the relevance to the process of intersubjectivity, and thus to an intersubjective construction of the fictional world. Hilary Putnam writes: "The elements of what we call 'language' or 'mind' penetrate so deeply into what we call 'reality', that the very project of presentation of ourselves 'mapping' something 'independent on the language' is fatally half-hearted" (Putnam 1997, p. 57). This observation, together with what has been said above, can be regarded as defining our position as the subject of reception.

Intersubjectivity

Julia Kristeva adopts Bakhtin's dialogic model, but defines it more broadly. She considers the conditions of the communication between the author, the literary work and the reader, and the production of this dialogue by the literary text as identificative. Bakhtin's concept of a dialogue that dynamizes the text and also locates it within a certain social situation is thus transformed into her conception of intertextuality: any text has absorbed and transformed some other text. For her, "intertextuality" partly replaces the term "intersubjectivity," and thus the term is part of a space consisting of three dimensions, subject, addressee and context. She perceives them as a set of "semic elements leading a dialogue together, or as a set of ambivalent elements" (Kristeva and Fulka 1999, p. 9). According to her, whenever language is dialogized it must be examined not merely through current linguistic means, or through linguistic logic, but in terms of a new "translinguistics" that will understand a literary genre as an *impure semiological system* that "designates under the surface of the language, but never without it." Kristeva writes that if we wish to describe the language of a literary work, it is necessary to abolish the common linguistic model based on the logical procedure 0-1, in favour of a 0-2 model which reflects the ambivalence of every linguistic unit, and then it is necessary to omit position 1. (0 denotes and 1 is implicitly passed over.) *"The religious epic and theological and realistic narratives that conform to 0-1 logic are dogmatic"* (Kristeva and Fulka 1999, p. 14).

Kristeva therefore links intentionality with a purely monological capacity (or with theological discourse), and replaces it with the

notion of agency, which reveals the dialogical capacity of the discourse.

> By the very act of narration, the subject of the narration turns to another, and it is precisely in the relation to this other that the narration is structured … Therefore we can study narration outside the relationship of the signifying and the signified as a dialogue between the subject of the narration (S) and the addressee (A). This addressee, who is no one other than the subject of reading, represents an entity with a twofold orientation: the signifying, in relation to the text, and the signified, in relation to the subject of the narration. Therefore it is a dyad (A1, A2), whose two members, which communicate with each other, constitute a definite system underlying the code. The subject of the narration (S) is drawn into this system and is reduced to a certain code, to an anonymous non-person (the author, the originator of the statement) mediated by the pronoun 'he' (the character, the subject of the statement). The author is therefore a subject of the narration, and is variable when including himself in the system of the narration; he is nothing and no-one but an interchange between S and A, of history as discourse and of discourse as history. (Kristeva and Fulka 1999, p. 17)

Like the Prague structuralists, Kristeva also absorbs the subject fully into the work and denominates it as a textual category. The subject of the originator (author) in Kristeva is consequently divided into the subject originating statements and the subject of the statements. According to her, the entire narration is structured around a dialogue between subject (as a signifier) and recipient. On the one hand this excludes single-directional or single-dimensional intentionality, because intentionality appears in the environment of the narrative in the discursive space of language, which only recognizes the positions 0 and 2, and on the other hand, it confirms intentionality at the level of mediation, where it is left reliant on dialogical activity, or rather on the nature of the signifying in relation to the reader. In this sense the subject of the originator is lost in favour of an *ambivalence of writing*. The reader thus clearly becomes a co-originator of the intention (in the sense of its denomination). The text as signifier produces this intention (as intention i^1 - i^n), and at the same time the reader's activity decides in favour of one possible variant, and designates it in collaboration with the text.

Uspensky's broadly-based structural perspective has shown how narrative uses the individual levels of structure to express a unifying

perspective. Against the background of his ideas, we see how perspective is formed as a strategy of the semantic structure, the individual elements of which aim to construct the fictional world. The ideas of Bakhtin, Kristeva and the Prague school then reveal the role of the reader in producing the intention of this perspective, although the reader is not a passive addressee of the narrative, but participates in its action within the framework of the position which is designated for him in the very essence of the narrative as dialogue and as discursive action. Then the perspective can be perceived at the same time as a distributor (a cause) and as a realization (a consequence) of the narrative act. At the same time it is a perspective that is controlled by a certain semantic dominant (which it concurrently produces), a semantic dominant which arises in the intersubjective creative act of constructing the fictional world.

The theory of speech acts recognizes three institutions of communication that are the foundations of meaning: speaker, word and addressee. Our discussion so far has shown that there are only two qualities present in a literary narrative, the text and its recipient. So in investigating the intention of a narrative work, we are searching for the nature and the mechanisms of the intersubjective activity between text and recipient. In this respect, the operation in which a unique sense is revealed as the consequence of semantic action in the narrative is governed by a presumption that the message contains meaning. In analysing this meaning, we explore or attempt to adopt a perspective from which it is possible to discern the meaning. As this is the perspective adopted by a unique reader, even if in an attempt to follow the textual directions, this perspective also contains aspects that are not inherent to the object we are observing. Nevertheless, it issues at the same time from the convention or presumption that Verhagen terms a constructional relation in his *Constructions of Intersubjectivity*.

> Even in the absence of an actual speaker (for instance during reading), the addressee always perceives the linguistic expression, as if it were intentionally produced as a tool for the communication by communication by someone else with the same basic cognitive capacity as the addressee … The addressee is always involved in the cognitive coordination with a certain subject of conceptualisation, on which the responsibility is imposed for the production of a statement. But also the other way round, in the absence of an actual addressee, the speaker (e.g. the author of a note in a diary) is led by a

presumption that the statement is, in principle, interpretable by somebody who shares the knowledge of certain conventions. (Verhagen 2005, p. 8)

A similar direction in research into the principles and conditions of communication was followed also by Jürgen Habermas, to whom philosophy owes a more precise formulation of the concept of intersubjectivity in speech acts. Habermas dealt with questions of communicative behaviour in his *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (1981), where he followed a path initiated in the thought of Wittgenstein, Austin and Searle, and he introduced the concept of the requirement of validity (*Geltungsanspruch*), through which he created his intersubjectivity in communicative situations. Habermas here distinguishes three worlds: the *objective world*, an aggregate of all the entities through which statements are made possible (that is, objects and events, with whose aid meaningful social experiences are accomplished); the social world, an aggregate of all legitimate interpersonal relations, that is, relations to other people, if they are orientated to standards; and finally the *subjective world*, an aggregate of the preferred experiences accessible to the speaker. The success of a communication that concentrates on understanding then depends on the success of the introduction of a reciprocal relationship or understanding among these three worlds. According to Habermas, linguistic behaviour is acceptable to recipients, if it offers them the possibility to observe their own intentions in the behaviour of a speaker who follows his or her intention through such behaviour.

The pragmatic function of integrating the requirement for validity (of a communication) rests upon three presumptions which become amalgamated. It first implies that to accomplish a speech action, norms are required, and these are norms with whose aid similar expressions generally hold true. A further requirement is that these norms remain valid for the current case. And the activation of the requirement for the validity of the norms further implies a guarantee of the speaker that the requirement in the given case, concerning the conditions of the communication situation will be fulfilled. The requirement for validity concerns speaker and listener equally. According to Habermas, the addressee is integrated into the communicative situation in having the option to participate in the action through what is said.

> If the listener accepts the offer of a speech act [*Sprechaktangebot*], consent [*Einverständnis*] is accomplished (at least) between two subjects capable of speech and action. But that does not rest only upon an intersubjective acknowledgement of a single, topically accentuated requirement for validity. Rather, such consent is concentrated at three levels at the same time … [The consent] rests on the communicative intention of the speaker to: (a) make, with respect to the given normative context, a correct action of speech, and thus accomplish it as a legitimate interpersonal relation between speaker and listener; (b) make a true statement [*wahre Aussage*] (or a correct existential presumption [*zutreffende Existenzvoraussetzung*]), by which the listener adopts and shares the knowledge of the speaker; and (c) truly [*wahrhaftig*] express ideas, intentions, feelings, wishes etc., through which the listener believes in what has been said. (Habermas 1981, p. 412)

The intersubjectivity recognized by Habermas depends on integrating the acting intentions of various objects of the act of speech within a single identical intention. These identical meanings, however, remain valid as individual, and differ from the meanings belonging to other people. Their individuality dwells in the difference of the contexts (*Gründe*), used by the participants in the communication to justify the requirement for validity with respect to their own subjective perspectives and individual dispositions, and to guarantee their acceptance of the validity. [14]

Therefore there is a presumption underlying a speech situation that the listener will participate actively in the semantic intention of what is said. A complex system of units combining to create meaning brings us also to a further statement. If we consider narrative as a communicative situation, it is necessary to envisage the smallest possible unit of this communicative situation. This is certainly not a

14. The presumption of validity and the intersubjectivity deduced from this pre-sumption is, in our opinion, a great achievement of Habermas, although we think that Habermas's recognition of three worlds itself raises a number of questions. Habermas asserts that these worlds are distinguishable from each other only within the framework of a speech situation. They occur, in principle, as a mass (*Masse*). But as Prague structuralism shows, norms do not stand beyond the reach of a human being and therefore beyond the reach of the subject; and in the same way the objec-tive always enters into the framework of an experience (and therefore also of the communication) of the world in contact with the subjective. All this attests to the fact that it would be best to perceive Habermas's suggestion of three worlds rather as a theoretical construct.

word, but only the wider context of a word.[15] Lock's theory of speech acts considers a sentence to be the smallest possible unit of communication, and he asserts that the meanings are abstractions and are defined with reference to the designated. But that means that the word reveals its intention and its meaning in contact with the context in which it appears, which is the context to which it is subordinated as part of the act of communication. Only in this context does it become the vehicle of the signs that define its meaning. Against the background of this insight, it is necessary to place the decisive impulse that was provided for literary theory by the Prague structuralists, in their treatment of the notions of *internal* and *external* context.[16] Context thus understood, and the unifying communicative situation into which the text enters, then cause meaning to be something not merely indifferent, divorced from context, but something that is contained and defined in the concept of the narrative as a communicative situation established by the text. The dynamic nature of the context in the production of a semantic dominant means, at the same time, that a passive principle of decoding or, on the contrary, an arbitrary concept of designation (created by the reader) proves unproductive, subordinating the meaning to unidirectional causality.

15. It is important to recall the meaning of the context of the "word" as determined by Mukarovsky in the context of his studies about Vancura: "The most beautiful, rather confined formation of context is the sentence, but it is a sentence in the sense of a semantic unit, not merely as a grammatical structure. It is possible to state generally and in advance that the principles which govern the semantic construction of a sentence in a given author apply in his work also to the organization of higher semantic dynamic units, such as articles, chapters and entire texts. This unity of semantic gesture (i.e. the unified semantic intention) governing the construction of text establishes a fluent transition from linguistic elements to thematic ones, and allows the unifying theoretical view into the construction of the work" (Mukarovsky 1966, p. 234). And: "However, do not let us forget that the word is indeed a static unit only to the extent to which it features in a dictionary, and that the usage of the word has the nature of an (though nonrecurring) act through which a suitable word is sought, for: "the inventory from which it is chosen is the whole vocabulary of the given language with all its mutual joints and stratifications of words that interlace them" (Mukarovsky 1948, p. 110). "The latent dynamics of the word therefore consists in being capable of evoking entire clusters of other words" (Mukarovsky 1966, p. 252).

16. The problem of context (internal context) was developed by Mukarovsky in two essays: "Vancurovska prolegomena" ("Prolegomena to Vancura," manuscript from the second half of the 1940s) and "Prislovi jako soucast kontextu" ("The Proverb as a Component of Context," 1942–43). Both were published in *Cestami poetiky a estetiky* (1971). Vodicka focused also on this topic in his *Pocatky krasne prozy novoceske* (1948).

In opposition to that, the context helps us perceive the communicative situation, into which we enter by the act of designation, as a modelling of reciprocal relations, as a question of distance and relation, analogy and non-singularity. This also makes it possible to reject concepts which locate the reader, as a producer of textual meaning, in the centre of the communicative situation.

Bakhtin linked his dialogical concept with action, and the Prague structuralists referred to the dynamic nature of semantic action. Kristeva, following Bakhtin, cast doubt upon causal intentionality. Against the background of these propositions, an understanding of the unique act of understanding crystallizes, as an act of the intersubjectively "controlled" production of meaning. In this concept, the subject retains the meaning of a unique action: this is a temporally limited moment of transition which determines the meaning through interpretation and thus alters the semantic action. Within the scope of this action, potential meaning becomes actual (although not final) meaning.

The narrator and the narrative strategies permit us to recognize the intention of the textual action. Through the narrator, the text becomes a unit of the communicative situation which addresses and *claims* us. Narrative theory has shown that the narrator, as a textual strategy, and as a component of a code of signs with which the narration's intention is expressed, is an ontological condition of narration, and that we can fully rely on it (even when it is unreliable) in our participation in denominating a unique, singular meaning. By preserving the notion of a unique action in which meaning is determined in intersubjective contact between text and addressee, we have also attempted to reinforce the significance and importance of this unique event and to refer to its temporality, provisionality and nonexclusiveness.

The narrator as a narrative code or a strategy of semantic construction is the controlling element, subordinating to its activity other levels or planes, which by comparison with it have their functions altered as the recipient of the narrative act identifies them. Whether or not we are concerned with a relationship between the narrator's speech and the speech of the characters, with the temporal or spatial characteristics of the narrative, with the distribution of motifs and topics, with a relationship between what is called the story (as an abstraction of the "unidirectional" causal and temporal order of events) and the plot (the realization of the story in the form of

narration), these individual "elements" of narrative are perceived within the scope of the narrator's strategy, and at the same time they reveal and define it as the strategy. The narrator's activity and its analysis aim toward the understanding of the construction of perspective which represents the resource of the action of understanding. This analysis draws on a system of conventions and rules for the formation of the semantic action within the framework of the communicative situation. It issues from a prior presumption that the content of the message is the meaning, and within the framework of the literary narrative it activates our aesthetic attitude, and together with it the "literary" character of the rules for producing meaning. These rules, however, do not exceed similar rules accessible to us in our actual world. On the contrary, by referring to breaches of these rules, literary narratives can found ontologies of fictional worlds (Kafka's narrator can easily move mountains at will, but in doing so he activates the nature of the fictional world in relation to the world we have in our grasp). The narrator defines the narrative as a ludic space in which the question of meaning is closely connected with the question of the ambivalence of the signs by means of which meaning is designated.

The nature of the signs implies that the "subject" of the work, definable as a (multiple) intention inserted into the work, does not have them under control, and this impairs its role as producer of meaning. And so the reader as the "subject" of understanding is also left only with these ambivalent signs, though this on the contrary strengthens the subjectivity of his action in denominating meaning, of semantic action. The question which is most pressing in this situation, and which opens up space for intersubjective activity between the work and the addressee, would then be: what do the signs designate and what do they mean? As Frege has shown, the expression "Venus" denotes a celestial body, but in particular contexts it can also mean Lucifer (the morning star) or Hesperus (the evening star). To understand the semantic construction and the role of the narrator in its formation, it is necessary to activate the whole complex of the literary work, in which broad intertextual relations are involved, as well as relationships to the current context of reception and to ideas of the context of the origin of the given "communicational act," that is, the foundation of intention. In such an action, the subject of the work is formed as an intersubjective interpenetration of the intentions

of the text and the addressee. The nature of this action, as implied by its designation, is dependent on time, and within its framework it strives to denominate the comprehensive complexity of the narrative meaning as a unique sense, but not its totality.

The Prague structuralists achieved the concept of the semantic detachment from intention mainly under the influence of Jan Mukarovsky, who connected the question of intention with the theory of functions. He begins by stating that the intention of a work can be completely different from, or even in direct contradiction with, the intention with which the author conceived the work, but he suggests that the work is constructed so as to *"produce some kind of effect and influence the mental lives of its readers"* and, at the same time, that the work *"fulfils this task only by being able to take effect on the whole personality, that is, in multiple ways, so it can have a completely different meaning for the same person in various situations in life etc."* (Mukarovsky 1982, p. 796[17]). Mukarovsky thus justifies a search for the semantic intention of the literary work, while at the same time showing the impossibility of its "complete" accomplishment. All the same, it seems that behind his words the importance of a specific understanding, a unique sense, is being confirmed. If, together with Habermas, we see the essence of this denomination of intention associated with the reciprocal determination and agreement of three "worlds," then Mukarovsky and Czech structuralism point at the permanency and usefulness of this motion with its identical invocation of "human integrity" — which liberates meaning from the potential and brings it up to date with regard to its situation.

Our text has followed a path in the course of which a narrativised object has become a means of communication, and through that also part of a communicative act, and it has tried to discern the signals of this activity that can be described with the term "perspectivization." We have proceeded from a historical survey of the efforts of literary theory to deal with the manner by which perspective is structured as a question of the simultaneous construction and evaluation of the fictional world. As well as defining perspective as a set of means for grounding the communicative situation of narration, we have mainly aimed at accentuating the evaluative nature of these means; an important role in their evaluation is played by the reader's capacity to

---

17. From an interview with Jan Mukarovsky by M. Kacer in 1971.

recognize them. With the aid of perspectivization, textual meaning is formed and therefore the reader can use its signals to denominate meaning and to set important criteria for the fictional world, such as the question of the reliability or unreliability of his "informants," the question of setting up a fictional truth, or the question of attitude. Although it is quite incontrovertible that the selection of a perspective or narrative manner is fully in the competence of the author, through its realization in the form of a literary text it becomes a sign that bears all the features of a sign, and the immediate link between a perspective and intention which could be identified as authorial or original, is complicated.

By studying the situation of narrative unreliability, and the means through which narrative models perspective, we have attempted not only to lay out the nature of this complication, but also to confirm the textual determination of perspective. But as the problem of recognizing the perspective is closely connected with problems of evaluation and interpretation, it appears in the area that we have determined as action, which is produced by the given text together with the situation of the reader and a complex system of interactions that we have termed the context. At the same time we have rejected attempts to locate the reader in a central position within the communicative situation, and we have shown the decisive role of the text of the literary work, which also predetermines the unique sense. We have also proved that not only interpretation, but also the recognition of the signals with which perspective is generated, is an individual act, within whose framework we locate the individual signals in reciprocal relationships, which also involve their hierarchization.

Narrative, as the product and expression of a communicative situation, depends on the rules by which communication functions, just as they do in everyday communication. When these rules are adopted in literature, however, they are controlled by the aesthetic function to which our understanding of narrative is subordinated, with which we construct the fictional world as an aesthetic object and which activates our knowledge of similar objects. The reader then moves through the narrative as through a territory of semantic action, on the basis of his unique creative capabilities to participate in the creation of the fictional world, and also with the help of his previous experience of narratives and communicative processes, including

strategies that generalize meaning. In the model of literary communication, the narration itself, as a dynamic structural entity, becomes the speaker, and the addressee, by observing the way in which this entity models meaning, projects intention on to it, while participating decisively. Nevertheless, the central position of the semantic action is fully retained by the work in its textual form — as a source and as the controlling authority of the potential meanings which are part of its structure and which can be brought up to date in the form of a unique action of denotation, in the form of a specific meaning.

References

Abbott, H. Porter. 2002. *The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Abel, Günter. 1999. *Sprache, Zeichen, Interpretation*. Frankfurt am/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Abrams, Meyer Howard. 1953. *The Mirror and the Lamp. Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Aristotle. 1999. *Retorika-poetika*. Prague: Rezek.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1968. *Poetika, rytmus*, vers. Prague: Svet sovetu.

———. 1975. Slovo v romanu (The Word in the Novel). In *Slovo v poezii a v romanu* (The Word in Poetry and in the Novel), published in *Voprosy literatury i estetiki*. Moscow.

———. 1979. *Die Ästhetik des Wortes*. Frankfurt am/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Bal, Mieke. 1985. *Narratology. Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

———. 1991. *On Story-Telling. Essays in Narratology*. Sonoma: Polebridge Press.

Barthes, Roland. 1967. *Nulovy stupen rukopisu; Zaklady semiologie*. Prague: Cs. spisovatel.

———. 1970. *S/Z*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

———. 1977. The Death of the Author. In *Image, Music, Text*, trans. Stephen Heath. London: Fontana.

Bromman, Eva. 2004. Narratological Fovalization Models — A Critical Survey. In *Essays on Fiction and Perspective*, edited by Göran Rossholm. Bern; New York: P. Lang.

Burke, Seán. 1992. *The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Camus, Albert. 1988. *Cizinec*. Prague: Odeon.

Capek, Josef. 1930. *Stin kapradiny*. Prague: Aventinum.

Cervenka, Miroslav. 1992. *Vyznamova vystavba literarniho dila*. Prague: Karolinum.

Chamberlain, Daniel Frank. 1990. *Narrative Perspektive in Fiction: A Phenomenological Mediation of Reader, Text, and World*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Chatman, Seymour (ed.). 1971. *Literary Style. A Symposium*. London; New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1987. The Circle of Narrative. *Comparative Literature* 39: 162–68.

———. 1990. *Coming to Terms. The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film*. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.

Christensen, Carleton B. 1991. *Language and Intentionality*. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann.

Clark, Katerina and Michael Holquist. 1994. *Mikhail Bakhtin*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Culler, Jonathan. 1981. *The Pursuit of Signs. Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

———. 1988. *Framing the Sign. Criticism and its Institutions*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Currie, Gregory. 1995. Unreliability Refigured: Narrative in Literature and Film. *Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism* 53 (1): 19–29.

Derrida, Jacques. 1988. Like the Sound of the Sea Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man's War. *Critical Inquiry* 12 (3): 590–652.

Dolezel, Lubomir. 1960. *O stylu moderni ceske prozy*. Prague: Nakl. Cs. akademie ved.

———. 1973. *Narativni zpusoby v ceske literature*. Prague: Cs. spisovatel.

———. 1998. *Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

———. 2003. *Heterocosmica* (in Czech). Prague: Karolinum.

Foucault, Michel. 1994. *Diskurs, autor, genealogie*. Prague: Svoboda.

Freund, Elizabeth. 1987. *The Return of the Reader. Reader-Response Criticism*. London; New York: Metheuen.

Füger, Wilhelm. 1972. Zur Tiefenstruktur des Narrativen. Prolegomena zu einer generativen Grammatik des Erzählens. In *Poetika* 5: 268–92.

Geis, Michael L. 1995. *Speech Acts and Conversational Interaction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Genette, Gérard. 1998. *Die Erzählung*, edited by Jochen Voght. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1981. *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*. Volume 2. Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft. Frankfurt am/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Halliwell, Stephen. 2002. *The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hamburger, Käte. 1957. *Die Logik der Dichtung*. Stuttgart: Klett.

———. 1965. Noch einmal vom Erzählen. *Euphorion* 59.

Hamon, Philippe. 1981. *Introduction à l'analyse du descriptif*. Paris: Hachette.

Herman, David. 1995. *Universal Grammar and Narrative Form*. Durham; London: Duke University Press.

——— (ed.). 1999. *Narratologies. New Perspectives on Narrative Analysis*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Husserl, Edmund. 1900–1901. *Logische Untersuchungen von Edmund Husserl*. 2 volumes. Halle: M. Niemeyer.

———. 2004. *Ideje k ciste fenomenologii a fenomenologicke filosofii*. Prague: Oikoymenh.

Ingarden, Roman. 1967. *O poznavani literarniho dila*. Prague: Cs. spisovatel.

———. 1989. *Umelecke dilo literarni*. Prague: Odeon.

Iser, Wolfgang. 1978. *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Jakobson, Roman. 1995. Dva aspekty jazyka a dva typy afatickych poruch. In *Poeticka funkce*, edited by Miroslav Cervenka. Prague: H&H.

Jankovic, Milan. 1992. *Dilo jako deni smyslu*. Prague: Prazska imaginace.

Kristeva, Julia and Josef Fulka. 1999. *Slovo, dialog a roman. Texty o semiotice*. Prague: SOFIS.

Kubicek, Tomas. 2001. *Vypravet pribeh. Naratologicke kapitoly k romanum Milana Kundery*. Brno: Host.

———. 2004. Perioda jako zrcadlo vyvoje. Dusledky rozboru jedne stylisticke figury. In *Felix Vodicka 2004*. Prague: AVCR.

Kundera, Milan. 1997. *Valcik na rozloucenou*. Brno: Atlantis.

———. 2001. *Die Unwissenheit*. Munich; Vienna: Hanser.

———. 2002. *Ignorance*, trans. Linda Asher. London: Faber.

Lamarque, Peter. 1996. *Fictional Points of View*. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.

Langacker, Ronald W. 1999. *Grammar and Conceptualization*. Berlin; New York: Mounton de Gruyter.

Lanser, Susane Sniader. 1981. *The Narrative Act. Point of View in Prose Fiction*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lotman, Jurij (ed.). 1968. *Poetika, rytmus, vers*. Prague: Svet sovetu.

Martin, Wallace. 1986. *Recent Theories of Narrative*. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.

Meggle, Georg (ed.). 1979. *Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung*. Frankfurt am/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Mühl, Martin. 1997. *Die Handlungsrelativität der Sinne*. Bodenheim: Philo Verlag.

Mukarovsky, Jan. 1948. O jazyce basnickem (On Poetic Language). In *Kapitoly z ceske poetika*. Volume I. Prague: Nakl. Svobody.

———. 1966. *Studie z estetiky*, edited by Kvetoslav Chvatík. Prague: Odeon.

———. 1971. *Cestami poetiky a estetiky*. Prague: Cs. spisovatel.

———. 1982. *Studie z poetiky*, edited by Hana Mukarovska. Prague: Odeon.

———. 2000a. Basnik (The Poet, published in 1940–41). In *Studie*. Volume I. Brno: Host.

———. 2000b. Osobnost v umeni (Personality in Art, published in 1944). In *Studie*. Volume I. Brno: Host.

———. 2000c. Problemy individua v umeni (Problems of the Individual in Art, published in 1946). In *Studie*. Volume I. Brno: Host.

———. 2000d. Strukturalismus v estetice a ve vede o literature (Structuralism in Aesthetics and in Literary Theory, published in 1940–41). In *Studie*. Volume I. Brno: Host.

———. 2000e. Zamernost a nezamernost v umeni (Purposefulness and Purposelessness in Art, published in 1943). In *Studie*. Volume I. Brno: Host.

———. 2001. Vyznamova vystavba a kompozicni osnova epiky Karla Capka (The Construction of Meaning and the Compositional Programme of Karel Capek's Epic Verse, published in 1933). In *Studie*. Volume II. Brno: Host.

Müller, Günther. 1947. *Die Bedeutung der Zeit in der Erzählkunst*. Bonn: Universitäts Verlag.

Nünning, Ansgar. 2000. Multiperspektivität aus narratologischer Sicht. In *Multiperspektivisches Erzählen*. Trier: Wissenschaftliche Verlag.

Olson, Greta. 2003. Reconsidering Unreliability: Fallible and Untrustworthy Narrators. *Narrative* 11: 93–109.

O'Neill, Patrick. 1994. *Fictions of Discourse: Reading Narrative Theory*. Toronto: University of Toronto.

Palmer, Alan. 2003. The Mind Beyond the Skin. In *Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences*, edited by David Herman. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information.

Patocka, Jan. 2002. Maji dejiny smysl? In *Pece o dusi*. Volume III. Prague: Oikoymenh.

Petersen, Jürgen H. 1993. *Erzählsysteme. Eine Poetik epischer Texte*. Stuttgart; Weimar: Verlag J. B. Metzler.

Petsch, Robert. 1934. *Wesen und Formen der Erzählkunst*. Halle: Niermayer.

Phelan, James. 1981. *Worlds from Worlds. A Theory of Language in Fiction*. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press.

———. 1989. *Reading People, Reading Plots. Character, Progression, and the Interpretation of Narrative*. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press.

———. 1996. *Narrative as Rhetoric. Technique, Audience, Ethics, Ideology*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

——— and Peter Rabinowitz (eds.). 1994. *Understanding Narrative*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Prince, Gerald. 1987. *A Dictionary of Narratology*. Lincoln; London: University of Nebraska.

Putnam, Hilary and Richard Rorty. 1997. *Co je po metafyzice?* Bratislava: Archa. (Originally published in English in 1990 as *Realism with a Human Face*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.)

Rabinowitz, Peter J. 1987. *Before Reading. Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation*. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.

Rescher, Nicholas. 1973. The Ontology of the Possible. In *Logic and Ontology*, edited by Milton K. Munitz. New York: New York University Press.

Richardson, Brian (ed.). 2002. *Narrative Dynamics, Essay on Time, Plot, Closure and Frames*. Columbus: Ohio State University.

Ricoeur, Paul. 1983–85. *Temps et récit*. Paris: Seuil.

———. 2000. *Cas a vypraveni 1*. Prague: Oikoymenh.

———. 2002. *Cas a vypraveni 2*. Prague: Oikoymenh.

Ronen, Ruth. 2002. *Representing the Real*. Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi.

Ryan, Marie-Laure. 1991. *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ryle, Gilbert. 1949. *The Concept of Mind*. London; New York: Hutchinson's University Library.

Schmid, Wolf. 2005. *Elemente der Narratologie*. Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Shibatani, Masayoshi and Sandra A. Thompson (eds.). 1996. *Grammatical Constructions. Their Form and Meaning*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Singer, Alan. 1993. *The Subject as Action. Transformative and Totality in Narrative Aesthetics*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Sklovskij, Viktor. 2000. *Teorie prozy* (3rd ed.). Prague: Akropolis.

Sladek, Ondrej. 2004. Fiktivni a fikcni svety. In *Felix Vodicka 2004*. Prague: AVCR.

Stanzel, Franz. 1955. *Die typischen Erzählsituationen im Roman, dargest. an Tom Jones, Moby Dick, The Ambassadors, Ulysses u. a.* Vienna; Stuttgart: Braumüller.

———. 1988. *Teorie vypraveni*. Prague: Odeon.

———. 1993. *Typische Formen des Roman*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Sternberg, Meir. 1978. *Expositional Modes and Temporal Ordering in Fiction*. Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Striedter, Jurij. 1989. *Literary Structure, Evolution, and Value*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sturgess, Philip J.M. 1992. *Narrativity. Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Talmy, Leonard. 2000. *Toward a Cognitive Semantic*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Todorov, Tzvetan. 2000. *Poetika prozy*. Prague: Triada.

Turner, Mark. 1987. *Death is the Mother of Beauty: Mind, Metaphor, Criticism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

———. 1996. *The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language*. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Uspenkij, Boris. 1975. *Poetik der Komposition. Struktur des künstlerischen Textes ud Typologie der Kompositionsform*. Frankfurt am/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Verhagen, Arie. 2005. *Construction of Intersubjectivity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vodicka, Felix. 1948. *Pocatky krasne prozy novoceske*. Prague: Melantrich.

Voght, Jochen. 1998. *Aspekte erzählender Prosa. Eine Einführung in Erzähltechnik und Romantheorie*. Wiesbaen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Voloshinov, V.N. 1929. *Marksizm i filosofiia iazyka*. Leningrad.

Wenzel, Peter (ed.). 2004. *Einführung id der Erzähltextanalyse. Kategorien, Modelle, Probleme*. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.

Yacobi, Tamar. 2001. Package Deals in Fictional Narrative: The Case of the Narrator's (Un)Reliability. *Narrative* 9 (2): 223–9.