

MUNK MONITOR

VIEWS, NEWS, PEOPLE AND EVENTS FROM THE MUNK SCHOOL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS

SPRING 2010

Trinity College Site



MUNK
SCHOOL
OF
GLOBAL
AFFAIRS



VIEW FROM THE DIRECTOR

JANICE GROSS STEIN

SIGNS OF SHIFTING POWER

These are extraordinary times in the world and at the new Munk School of Global Affairs. Canada is host to unprecedented back-to-back sessions of the G8 and the G20 as world leaders struggle to cope with big security challenges and a still fragile global economy. Even more important, these two summits are graphic evidence of a shift in power from the developed world to dynamic economies in Asia, Latin America, and in Africa.

The struggle over the bank tax is a photomontage of a world reforming before our eyes. Canada has lined up with India and China, Brazil and Mexico against its traditional friends in Europe and the United States to oppose a tax on banks that would provide a cushion against future bank failures. It is not so much the substance of the debate that matters as it is the new patterns of alignment.

Much the same holds true on Prime Minister Stephen Harper's signature issue at the G8 of maternal and child health. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the U.S. position on the funding of abortion clear when she was in Canada. At one time that would have been enough. No longer. Leaders of some of the emerging economies made it clear that they too opposed funding for abortion, and a consensus quickly developed to let each country find its own solution in the context of broad support for women's reproductive health.

On core security issues such as sanctions against Iran, formally the province of the G8, Brazil and Turkey, both members of the G20, stepped outside the consensus as they put together

Continued on page 2

The New Global Security Agenda

COVER STORY BY WESLEY WARK

A strange air of nostalgia hangs over any discussion of the global security agenda. Faced with a bewildering array of challenges to security in the 21st century, we look back on the Cold War with a longing for its alleged simplicities.

The U.S. political scientist John Mearsheimer captured this emergent nostalgia early on, in a piece he wrote for the *Atlantic Monthly* in August 1990, entitled "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War." Mearsheimer, as can happen to prophets, was right for the wrong reasons. His main concern at the time was the likely return to a more violence-prone, multi-polar world order, which would make us relish the relative stability of the bipolar world that mostly described the Cold War. Mearsheimer's logic was rooted in the primacy of nation-state actors and the realist position that an



The pall lingers: A decade after the 9/11 attacks, which enveloped the Woolworth Building in smoke (above), we are still failing to come to grips with the globalization of terrorism.

international system with multiple armed states was more likely to go down the path of war than was a bipolar system with military power relatively equally distributed and with the horror of nuclear weapons making nugatory the idea of nuclear war. No fault of his that he couldn't see the coming horrors of transnational terrorism, cyber aggression, and rapid climactic change.

The 9/11 attacks spelled the end of a decade and forced new thinking about the new horrors. The process began with the famous U.S. national security strategy of September 2002. The "Bush doctrine," as it quickly came to be known, laid down a list of threats to U.S./global security, inevitably strongly flavoured by the shock of the 9/11 attacks. At the top of the U.S. list were global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the potential nexus of belligerent state and non-state actors that might fuse a nuclear-weapons proliferator and rogue state (all eyes on Iraq) with an Al-Qaedaesque terrorist group. At the heart of the U.S. response to these challenges was an overhasty abandonment of the policy of containment in favour of a more robust doctrine of preventive war, and the embrace of unilateralism as and when necessary.

Canada followed suit with its own national security policy, "Securing an Open Society," in April 2004. The Canadian policy identified no less than eight contemporary threats: terrorism, WMD proliferation, failed and failing states, foreign espionage, natural disasters, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, organized crime, and pandemics.

In doing so, Canada signaled that it was going to embrace an "all hazards" approach to understanding the security environment, rather than follow in the wake of the U.S. terrorism-centric approach. But the Canadian document was effectively left to gather dust with the end of the Liberal government, and the current Harper

Continued on page 4

THE NEW MUNK SCHOOL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Visionary thinking by philanthropists Peter and Melanie Munk has borne fruit with the creation of the Munk School of Global Affairs.

The Munks have donated \$35 million, the largest gift in the University's history, for the School. This gift, combined with two landmark gifts from the Ontario and federal governments, will help establish the Munk School as a leading voice in the global conversation about the forces that are reshaping the international landscape.

The Ontario government has announced a \$25 million gift for the School and the federal government has announced a further \$25 million gift to create the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies at the Munk School.

"To become global leaders today, students need more than the core functional disciplines. They also need a deep understanding of the broader architecture and forces that shape the global system," noted Professor Janice Gross Stein, Director of the Munk School.

As Peter Munk told the *Globe and Mail*: "We're not in a bipolar world anymore. The world has come to question more and more American values and the American way of doing things. Canada has a unique opportunity to step into the shoes that America has vacated, and I think that requires an elite group of highly educated, globalized Canadians who can be the spokespersons of every aspect of globalization."

Noting the previous generosity of the Munks over many years, University of Toronto President David Naylor said: "Their latest gift — a truly remarkable benefaction — will lift the Munk School to global significance. It also reinforces Canada's new position as a confident interlocutor in the conversation between the current and emerging world powers."

The Munk School incorporates the existing centres of academic excellence at the former Munk Centre for International Studies. It will accept its first 40 students into the new Master of Global Affairs degree program in September 2010 and later add doctoral and undergraduate programs. Students will be required to go outside the country for four months to work with a global corporation, an international institution, or a global foundation or nongovernmental organization. "The school will produce Canadians who will have thought about global society and can come back to Canada and build global bridges," noted Professor Stein. "I am excited by the unprecedented opportunities the Munk School creates and look forward to working with new students and faculty until the University completes its search for my successor, a worldwide search which the generous benefaction from Peter and Melanie Munk has made possible."

MUNK SCHOOL EVENTS

THE NEW GLOBAL SECURITY AGENDA

Continued from page 1

government, in office since 2006, has not seen fit to issue its own version. Agenda-setting and strategic thinking about the global security environment have been left to others.

The Obama administration has now come forward with its own iteration of the U.S. national security doctrine. Not surprisingly, it is different in tone and substance from its Bush-era predecessor. Its emphasis is on the need to restore U.S. leadership in the global community, to begin to fix a broken international system, and to achieve both these aims by shoring up the prerequisites of American power at home in terms of economic security. The Obama doctrine pays less attention to a listing of threats and more attention to the primacy of American values, conveyed with the same high-minded rhetoric that has marked the new Democratic administration in Washington since the inauguration.

Yet the new Obama administration is mindful of the threat environment that it faces, now and in the foreseeable future. This was made clear in the threat assessment prepared by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and delivered to Congress in February 2010. The DNI Director told Congress that the “strategic landscape” had changed considerably for the U.S., even over the past year. His report highlighted a wide range of security concerns, including global economic weaknesses, terrorism, and proliferation. It profiled the political environment in troubled regions (Afghanistan-Pakistan and the Middle East), surveyed key countries (China, Russia, India), and even gave broad-brush treatment to continents where ongoing instability was a concern (Africa and Latin America). But what was most interesting, and most forward looking, in the document were its bookends.

The DNI placed the cyber threat at the head of the list of national security threats, reflecting a growing consciousness about both the scale and diversity of attacks on the U.S. communications network and a heightened awareness of the depth of U.S. public- and private-sector vulnerabilities. The other bookend in the U.S. threat assessment concerns a basket of equally “new” (or newly appreciated) security threats, including climate change, global health challenges, aggressive intelligence efforts by foreign state and non-state actors, and the increasing virus of international organized crime.

The DNI’s threat assessment is a powerful reminder of how new threats, including cyber warfare and climate change, have been layered on top of old

ones, of how old or long-established threats, such as espionage and organized crime have mutated, and of how attention has shifted in relative terms from state actors and war to more diffuse dangers emanating from non-state actors. Indeed, the 21st-century environment is being shaped even by threats that exist, at least in part, outside human agency altogether, such as climate change, pandemics, and natural disasters.

The cyber security threat is postulated on an appreciation that those who engage in cyber aggression — the offence — have the upper hand over those who engage in cyber protection — the defence. No state has yet managed to come up with a convincing cyber

have to decide how to deploy state resources to measure and monitor the threat. No state, so far as I am aware, has yet reached the logical conclusion that climate change will become a top priority problem for 21st-century intelligence services.

WMD proliferation is a perennial priority on the threat assessment list. In its starkest form — the dreaded use of one or more nuclear weapons — it presents an existential threat to human society. Concerned states are putting renewed effort into locking down the source material for nuclear weapons and into trying to shore up non-proliferation treaties. Where we lack sufficient effort and knowledge is in building an under-

that a handful of terrorist groups can develop a global strike capacity, but that Al Qaeda has been a pioneer in applying an age-old doctrine of statecraft — alliance building — to the international projection of terrorism and the conservation of terrorist resources and security. We also continue to struggle with the phenomenon of home-grown terrorism, by failing to realize that it is yet another offshoot of the globalization phenomenon, in which Al Qaeda has managed to generate a model and example of jihad as ideology and warfare that is infinitely exportable. Terrorism in the 21st century is genuinely new and will persist until that far-off time when the idea of global jihad no longer has leaders or followers.

States are paying renewed attention in national security doctrines to the threat of espionage. This may seem strangely old-fashioned. But the reality is that 21st-century espionage has found its own path to the new. States are forced to rely more and more on their intelligence systems for an understanding of the complex security environment at home and abroad. The espionage players are also changing. Non-state actors are increasingly coming to the fore in international espionage — terrorist groups, organized crime, and private-sector companies all have a stake in developing espionage or intelligence-gathering capabilities. Counter-intelligence is also being transformed as the need to protect state secrets and societal infrastructure grows, just as the ability to detect agents from without or within lessens. Indeed, a good deal of foreign intelligence, and likely more to come, is being conducted by machines remotely targeted to siphon up valuable information through a variety of sensors. Treason, man-made or machine-made, will become increasingly hard to spot.

A security agenda that features such diverse, top-tier threats as cyber aggression, climate change, WMD proliferation, transnational terrorism, and espionage reminds us that the times have truly changed. The common denominator may be the newness of these threats, but it is also the shallowness of knowledge about them. The former CIA Director, James Woolsey’s oft-quoted and colourful remark about the post Cold War world — “we have slain the dragon, but there remain many snakes in the jungle” — still looks on the money. No one wants the dragon back, but we haven’t yet invested the time required to know our snakes. Slaying them will be no romance.

Wesley Wark is a Professor in the International Relations Program and the Master of Global Affairs Program at the Munk School.



New threats layered on old ones: In April this year, Greek police cordoned off a neighbourhood in central Athens where they discovered a terrorist arms cache.

strategy, nor have we begun to think seriously about maintaining societal resiliency in the face of attack. This requires sustaining a critical backbone of communications infrastructure, in the event of a crisis of some kind or another, sufficient to let people get on with their lives in a slightly, if temporarily, less connected world. As for an international regime, or any movement towards international norms, we are nowhere.

The climate security threat, which requires a wrenching turn towards thinking about how climate change could impact on human security, is beginning to make a large impact on national security thinking, as indicated in the DNI’s threat assessment. But the leading Cassandra on this topic has been the United Kingdom, which boldly proclaimed climate change as the number one security threat in a 2008 national security paper. As we start to think about climate change more and more in security terms, we will also

standing in detail of the specific motivations that drive proliferators like Iran, North Korea, and — briefly and unsuccessfully — Syria. Nor have we really been willing to grasp the nettle of terrorism and WMD. What would it take for a terrorist group to acquire WMD? What early warning system needs to be developed to monitor and prevent this? What would terrorists do with WMD if they acquired such weapons, and what defences might we need?

On the terrorism front, we are beguiled by the spectre, as the Bush doctrine originally put it, of “terrorists of global reach.” Much of the doctrine behind the war on terror was designed not to eradicate terrorism, but to put it back in its regional or local box, and thus turn back the clock to a day (pre-9/11, pre-1998 maybe) when terrorism could safely be pigeonholed as a lesser national security threat. A decade after the 9/11 attacks, we are still failing to come to grips with the true face of the globalization of terrorism. It is not just