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Refugees and the Regional Dynamics of Peacebuilding

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REFUGEES
and the
REGIONAL DYNAMICS OF PEACEBUILDING

by
JAMES MILNER

The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 is but one example of recent developments in the concept and practice of "peacebuilding." While many of these developments have been encouraging, they share a common limitation: they are focused almost exclusively on activities within the country in question, with little or no attention paid to the regional nature of conflicts and the impact of these dynamics on peacebuilding. This paper considers the regional dynamics of peacebuilding by examining the relationship between protracted refugee situations and regional insecurity, especially in West and Central Africa. The paper argues that the presence of "spoilers" in refugee-populated areas and the potential for early and forced refugee repatriation have the potential to undermine peacebuilding efforts, while the experience of exile may enable refugees to contribute to various stages of the peacebuilding process. The paper concludes by arguing for a broadening of peacebuilding research, policy, and practice, especially in the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, to incorporate a response to these broader regional dynamics.

INTRODUCTION

A striking feature of discussions on conflict management in recent years has been an emerging consensus on the importance of "peacebuilding."[1] As illustrated by cases as diverse as Afghanistan, Burundi, Liberia, and Haiti, armed conflict has the potential to re-emerge and become more protracted if active steps are not taken to build a sustainable peace. While the importance of post-conflict reconstruction has been recognized for more than fifty years, the broader notion of peacebuilding became the focus of particular interest in the early 1990s, when it was highlighted in the UN Secretary-General's report *An Agenda for Peace* (UNSG 1992). Since then there have been numerous conceptual and institutional developments, including the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in late 2005. While debates on definitions persist, recent discussions have generally revolved around developing ways to ensure stability in countries previously affected by conflict so as to prevent a slide back into war.

Much of this debate has, however, focused exclusively on peace-building activities within the country in question, with little or no attention paid to the regional nature of conflict and the regional dynamics that should be addressed as part of a successful peace-building program. This is especially striking given the growing literature on the regional nature of conflict and insecurity in the global South. As argued by Ayoob (1995), Buzan (1992), and others, intrastate conflict in the global South has the demonstrated potential to spill over into neighbouring and equally vulnerable states, thereby regionalizing conflict. For example, civil conflict in Sierra Leone and Burundi affected not only those two countries but also other countries in the Mano River Union in West Africa and the Great Lakes region of Central Africa as a result of the proliferation of small arms and the movement of armed elements across borders. These aspects of conflict have the demonstrated ability to spread conflict to neighbouring countries and to undermine conflict management and peacebuilding activities in the country of origin.

[1] See Ali and Matthews (2004); Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2001); and Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002).

Refugee movements also have the demonstrated ability to regionalize conflict.[2] Refugees are found in some of the world's poorest and most unstable regions and originate from some of the world's most fragile states, including Afghanistan, Burundi, Liberia, Myanmar (Burma), Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Just as conflicts in the countries of origin have become protracted, some two-thirds of refugees in the world today are trapped in protracted refugee situations. Such situations – often characterized by long periods of exile, stretching to decades for some groups – constitute a growing challenge for the global refugee protection regime and the international community. Refugees trapped in these situations often face significant restrictions on a wide range of rights. The continuation of these chronic refugee problems also gives rise to a number of political and security concerns for countries of origin, host states, and other states in the region. In this way, protracted refugee situations represent a significant challenge to both human rights and security.

Despite the growing significance of the problem, protracted refugee situations have yet to feature prominently on the international political agenda. In response, humanitarian agencies such as the UNHCR (UN High Commission for Refugees) have been left to cope with caring for these forgotten populations and with attempting to mitigate the negative implications of prolonged exile. These actions do not, however, constitute a solution for protracted refugee situations. Such a response also fails to address the security implications associated with prolonged exile – implications that have the potential to undermine regional stability as well as peacebuilding efforts in the country of origin.

This paper considers the regional dynamics of peacebuilding by examining the relationship between protracted refugee situations, regional insecurity, and the regional dynamics of peacebuilding. The paper has four sections. Section 1 considers recent peacebuilding policy and research, especially as it is reflected in the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Section 2 discusses the growing significance of protracted refugee situations and their links to a broader range of peace and security concerns. Section 3 draws on

[2] See Loescher (1992); Loescher and Milner (2005); and Weiner (1993).

research in Tanzania and Guinea[3] to argue that the links between peacebuilding and refugees go beyond the repatriation of refugees. More generally, the section argues that the presence of "spoilers" in refugee-populated areas and the potential for early and forced repatriation by the country of asylum have the proven potential to undermine peacebuilding efforts, while the experience of exile may enable refugees to contribute to various stages of the peacebuilding process. Section 4 considers the importance of incorporating these broader regional dynamics into broader policy and research debates on peacebuilding.

1. PEACEBUILDING: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS

In his 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that the end of the Cold War presented new challenges and opportunities for both the international community and international institutions mandated to preserve peace and security. In considering the various tools at the disposal of the UN in responding to the new security environment, the Secretary-General added "peacebuilding" to the more established activities of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. He argued that such an innovation was required as the UN system needed to develop the capacity to "stand ready to assist in peacebuilding in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war" (UNSG 1992, para. 15).

While few of these activities were new, it became increasingly recognized that these longer-term undertakings were essential elements in preventing a return to conflict. The importance of peacebuilding was illustrated by several cases throughout the 1990s, including Liberia, Rwanda, and Sudan.[4] However, numerous gaps remained in the conceptual and practical understandings of peacebuilding. In particular, there had been significant debate on the scope of peacebuilding activities and who should undertake them.[5]

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[3] Fieldwork in Tanzania (especially in Dar es Salaam and Kibondo) was undertaken by the author in 1998 and 2004. Fieldwork in Guinea (especially in Conakry, Kissidougou and N'Zérékoré) was undertaken by the author in 2001 and 2004.
[4] See Ali and Matthews (2004).
[5] See Cutter (2005).

While there was growing empirical evidence to suggest that effective peacebuilding strategies should involve long-term activities designed to support the security, political, economic, and justice and reconciliation needs of countries emerging from conflict (Ali and Matthews 2004, 409–22), no single international organization had the mandate to undertake this full range of activities. The UN system contained a number of specialized agencies with mandates to undertake some of these activities, and these agencies had been involved in peacebuilding activities around the world for some time. It was increasingly clear, however, that stronger leadership and institutional coherence were required to ensure that peacebuilding was more effective and systematic.

The establishment of a UN Peacebuilding Commission was subsequently proposed as a means to ensure better leadership and coordination of peacebuilding activities within the UN system. The initial proposal was included in the 2004 report of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. In his 2005 memo "In Larger Freedom," UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan endorsed the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body, one that would ensure long-term political support and funding for post-conflict recovery programs as well as advise on thematic issues and specific cases.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was subsequently established by the UNGA (UN General Assembly) in December 2005. In establishing the PBC, the UNGA recognized the "interlinked and mutually reinforcing" nature of peace and security, development and human rights, as well as the benefits of "a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding" (UNGA 2005). To this end, the PBC was established to serve three functions:

- To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.

- To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundations for sustainable development.

• To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN, to develop best practices, to help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities, and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery.

Important decisions were then taken in the first half of 2006 on the size and composition of the PBC. By mid-2006 the PBC comprised thirty-one member-states, including members of the Security Council, members of ECOSOC, representatives of the major donor countries, troop-contributing countries, and other members of the UNGA with experience in post-conflict reconstruction, in addition to those states directly implicated with the specific peacebuilding operations under consideration. Selections from the various pools of candidate member-states resulted in a diverse membership on the PBC's Organizational Committee for its first session (June 2006 to June 2007; see also Appendix A). Additional interested parties joined discussions on specific peacebuilding operations (see Appendix B). Finally, meetings of the PBC during its first session invited contributions from senior UN representatives in the field, representatives of other UN agencies, representatives of major development institutions (including the World Bank), and representatives of civil society. In this way, the PBC brought together a wide range of institutional stakeholders implicated in peacebuilding initiatives.

At the same time, the UNGA resolution created the Peacebuilding Support Office (PSO) to facilitate the ongoing work of the PBC, to gather expert opinion on thematic issues and country-specific plans, and to collect examples of "best practices" from previous and present-day post-conflict recovery programs that could be replicated elsewhere. In May 2006, Carolyn McAskie, a senior Canadian diplomat who previously had been the UNSG's Special Representative to Burundi, was named Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support and head of the PSO.

The first formal meeting of the PBC convened in New York on June 23, 2006. As detailed in its report to the UN General Assembly in July 2007 (UNGA 2007), the first year of the PBC's work was devoted largely to developing a clearer understanding of the scope

and nature of the commission's work and to country-specific work on Burundi and Sierra Leone. As part of its country-specific work, the PBC adopted work plans, sent several missions to Burundi and Sierra Leone, and identified key priority areas for peacebuilding in both countries. In Burundi, the PBC focused on promoting good governance, strengthening the rule of law, security sector reform, and ensuring community recovery. In Sierra Leone, the PBC focused on youth employment and empowerment, justice and security sector reforms, democracy consolidation and good governance, and capacity building – in particular, the capacity of government institutions. The PBC's engagement coincided with important developments in both countries, including parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone and the development of a Strategic Framework for Burundi.

While these were important developments for peacebuilding in both countries, it is important to note the limited scope of the PBC's early work.[6] Specifically, its early work focused exclusively on activities within the countries in question, with little or no attention to either the regional nature of those conflicts or to the significant refugee populations associated with them. The treatment of these and similar cases by the PBC, and the sustained political and donor interest the PBC hopes to generate, could provide a unique opportunity to engage the full spectrum of stakeholders required to formulate and implement comprehensive solutions, not only for peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery in the countries of origin but also for resolving the related refugee situations. The PBC's emerging approach, however, does not appear to make this link. Instead, the commission members seem to be adopting a myopic, country-specific approach. Such an approach does not allow for a full consideration of factors outside the country that could upset post-conflict recovery. Also, the PBC has a limited understanding of the links between long-term displacement and peacebuilding; that is, it has incorporated refugee issues only insofar as the return and reintegration of refugees can be viewed as a barometer of the success of peacebuilding efforts.

While this is an important dimension of the issue, such a limited approach risks missing an important opportunity to resolve protracted

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[6] This section is based on interviews conducted in New York in May 2006, December 2006, and March 2007.

refugee situations. Furthermore, it excludes from the PBC's work a range of factors that have the potential to undermine peacebuilding efforts. Refugee-populated areas in neighbouring states may harbour elements that seek to undermine peacebuilding in the region, especially when underlying political tensions still exist and reconciliation has not been fully achieved. Moreover, refugee populations may be drawn into a campaign of destabilization. It is problematic to assume that refugees in neighbouring countries passively await the opportunity to return. Indeed, large and protracted refugee situations, if left unaddressed, have the potential to undermine peace processes.

Likewise, the concerns of host countries must also be taken into account – in particular, the limits of their willingness to host refugees. The concerns of host states relating to the prolonged presence of refugees need to be addressed; if they are not, those host states may pursue early and coerced repatriation, thereby straining fragile institutions in the country of origin and further undermining peacebuilding efforts. For example, Tanzania has often maintained that the prolonged presence of Burundian refugees on its territory has a negative impact on the local economy and environment while also giving rise to a range of local and regional security concerns. In response to what it sees as a limited and unpredictable donor response to those concerns, the Tanzanian government has in recent years been pressing for the repatriation of refugees to Burundi. Many UN and NGO officials in both Dar es Salaam and Bujumbura are concerned about this coerced repatriation and feel that refugees are being returned to areas that are unable to adequately receive them. More generally, they feel that the scale of repatriation risks undermining peacebuilding efforts in Burundi.

Given these dynamics and their potential impact on peacebuilding activities, it is important to consider protracted refugee situations: their growing significance, their causes, and their links to regional security.

2. THE GROWING CHALLENGE
OF PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS
In June 2004 the UNHCR defined a protracted refugee situation as "one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their

basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance" (UNHCR ExCom 2004b, 1). In identifying the major protracted refugee situations in the world, the UNHCR used the "crude measure of refugee populations of 25,000 persons or more who have been in exile for five or more years in developing countries" (ibid., 2). These figures exclude Palestinian refugees, who fall under the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Applying this definition to UNHCR refugee statistics from the end of 2004, world-wide there were thirty-three major protracted refugee situations, with a population of 5,691,000 refugees.

Table 1. Major protracted refugee situations, January 1, 2005[7]

Country of asylum	Origin	End 2004
Algeria	Western Sahara	165,000
Armenia	Azerbaijan	235,000
Burundi	Dem. Rep. of Congo	48,000
Cameroon	Chad	39,000
China	Vietnam	299,000
Congo	Dem. Rep. of Congo	59,000
Côte d'Ivoire	Liberia	70,000
Dem. Rep. of Congo	Angola	98,000
Dem. Rep. of Congo	Sudan	45,000
Egypt	Occupied Palestinian Territory	70,000
Ethiopia	Sudan	90,000
Guinea	Liberia	127,000
India	China	94,000
India	Sri Lanka	57,000
Islamic Rep. of Iran	Afghanistan	953,000
Islamic Rep. of Iran	Iraq	93,000
Kenya	Somalia	154,000
Kenya	Sudan	68,000

[7] This table refers to refugee situations where the number of refugees of a certain origin within a particular country of asylum has been 25,000 or more for at least five consecutive years. Industrialized countries are not included. The data do not include Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Source: UNHCR (2006, 107).

Nepal	Bhutan	105,000
Pakistan	Afghanistan (UNHCR estimate)	960,000
Rwanda	Dem. Rep. of Congo	45,000
Saudi Arabia	Occupied Palestinian Territory	240,000
Serbia and Montenegro	Bosnia and Herzegovina	95,000
Serbia and Montenegro	Croatia	180,000
Sudan	Eritrea	111,000
Thailand	Myanmar	121,000
Uganda	Sudan	215,000
United Rep. of Tanzania	Burundi	444,000
United Rep. of Tanzania	Dem. Rep. of Congo	153,000
Uzbekistan	Tajikistan	39,000
Yemen	Somalia	64,000
Zambia	Angola	89,000
Zambia	Dem. Rep. of Congo	66,000
Total		**5,691,000**

Recent attention to reductions in global refugee populations has largely masked the increasing significance of protracted refugee situations. In fact, changes in the global refugee population over the past fifteen years have resulted in a significant increase in the scale and nature of the problem of protracted refugee situations. In the early 1990s a number of long-standing refugee populations that had been displaced as a result of Cold War conflicts in the developing world went home. In southern Africa, for example, huge numbers of Mozambicans, Namibians, and others repatriated. In Indochina, the Cambodians in exile in Thailand returned home and Vietnamese and Laotians were resettled to third countries. With the conclusion of conflicts in Central America, the vast majority of displaced Nicaraguans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans returned to their home countries. In 1993, in the midst of the resolution of these conflicts, there remained twenty-seven protracted refugee situations with a total population of 7.9 million refugees.

During the 1990s, while these Cold War conflicts were being resolved, and as refugee populations were being repatriated, new intrastate conflicts emerged and resulted in massive new flows. Conflict and state collapse in Somalia, the African Great Lakes, Liberia, and Sierra Leone generated millions of refugees. Millions more were displaced as a consequence of ethnic and civil conflict

in Iraq, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The global refugee population mushroomed in the early 1990s, and the pressing need was to respond to the challenges of mass influx situations and refugee emergencies in many regions of the world simultaneously.

More than a decade later, many of these conflicts and refugee situations remain unresolved. As a result, the number of protracted refugee situations is greater now than at the end of the Cold War. At the end of 2004, using the UNHCR's conservative figures, there were thirty-three protracted refugee situations with a total refugee population of nearly 6 million. While there are fewer UNHCR-recognized refugees in protracted situations today, the number of situations has increased. Of potentially greater significance is the fact that refugees are spending longer periods of time in exile. The UNHCR estimates that "the average duration of major refugee situations, protracted or not, has increased: from nine years in 1993 to 17 years at the end of 2003" (ibid., 2). At the end of 1993 the global refugee population was more than 16.3 million, and 48 percent of these people were in protracted situations. More than a decade later, at the end of 2004, the global refugee population was 9.2 million and over 64 percent were in protracted situations.

These situations are to be found in some of the most volatile regions in the world (see Table 1). East and West Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East are all plagued with protracted refugee situations. Sub-Saharan Africa is host to the largest number of protracted refugee situations; the largest host countries on the continent are Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, and Guinea. Central Asia, Southwest Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East are host to fewer major protracted situations but account for a significant number of the world's refugees in prolonged exile: some 2 million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan and Iran. While Afghan refugees are the largest protracted refugee population under the UNHCR's mandate, the scale of their situation is dwarfed by the one facing the Palestinians, more than 4 million of whom are registered as refugees under the mandate of the UNRWA.

Causes of PRSs:
Political Impasse and Lack of External Engagement
Protracted refugee populations originate from the very states whose instability lies at the heart of chronic regional insecurity. The bulk

of refugees in these regions – Somalis, Sudanese, Burundians, Liberians, Iraqis, Afghans, and Burmese – come from countries where conflict and persecution have persisted for years. In this way, the rising significance of protracted refugee situations can be linked closely to "fragile states," a phenomenon that has grown since the end of the Cold War. There is increasing recognition that international security planners must pay closer attention to these countries of origin; but it is also important to recognize that resolving refugee situations is key to any solution to long-standing regional conflicts, especially given the porous nature of these countries' borders and the tendency for internal conflicts in these regions to spill across national borders. In this way, it is important to recognize that protracted refugee situations are closely linked to the phenomenon of fragile states, have political causes, and therefore require more than simply humanitarian responses.

As argued by the UNHCR, "protracted refugee situations stem from political impasses. They are not inevitable, but are rather the result of political action and inaction, both in the country of origin (the persecution and violence that led to flight) and in the country of asylum. They endure because of ongoing problems in the country of origin, and stagnate and become protracted as a result of responses to refugee inflows, typically involving restrictions on refugee movement and employment possibilities, and confinement to camps" (ibid., 1).

This analysis illustrates how a protracted refugee situation is the result of the prevailing situation in the country of origin combined with the policy responses of the country of asylum. In addition, a protracted refugee situation is also the result of a lack of will among peace and security actors to address the conflict or human rights violations in the country of origin, combined with a lack of donor government involvement with the host country. Failure to address the situation in the country of origin means that refugees cannot return home. Failure to engage with the host country reinforces the perception that refugees are a burden and a security concern – which leads to encampment, a lack of local solutions, and sometimes early repatriation. As a result of these failures, humanitarian agencies such as the UNHCR are left to compensate for the inaction or failures of those actors responsible for maintaining international peace and security.

For example, the protracted presence of Somali refugees in East Africa and the Horn is the direct result of failed interventions in Somalia in the early 1990s and the inability or unwillingness of the international community to engage in rebuilding a failed state. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees have been in exile in the region for more than a decade, with humanitarian agencies such as the UNHCR and the World Food Program (WFP) responsible for their care and maintenance as a result of increasingly restrictive host-state policies.

Similarly, failures on the part of the international community and regional actors to consolidate peace can lead to a resurgence of conflict and displacement, which in turn can lead to a recurrence of protracted refugee situations. For example, the return of Liberians from neighbouring West African states in the aftermath of the 1997 elections in Liberia was not sustainable. A renewal of conflict in late 1999 and early 2000 led not only to a suspension of repatriation of Liberian refugees from Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and other states in the region, but also to a massive new refugee exodus. Since the departure into exile of Charles Taylor in 2003 and the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as president in November 2005, there has been a renewed emphasis on return for the hundreds of thousands of Liberian refugees in the region. Between 2004 and 2007, UNHCR helped some 100,000 Liberian refugees repatriate from neighbouring countries. It does not, however, appear as though the lessons of the late 1990s have been learned. Donor support lacks predictability: only 28 percent of the 2006 Liberia Consolidated Appeal had been met by mid-June 2006. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) cautioned that "Liberia is at a critical juncture. In order to build upon the hard-won peace and political progress, international support both financial and political, will be vital to stabilise the population by addressing the continuing urgent humanitarian needs of the population to ensure a rapid and sustainable recovery" (UN-OCHA 2006).

As illustrated by these examples, the primary causes of protracted refugee situations are to be found in the failure to engage in countries of origin and in effective and sustainable peacebuilding. These examples also demonstrate how humanitarian programs

must be underpinned by long-lasting political and security measures if they are to result in lasting solutions for refugees. Assistance to protracted refugee populations through humanitarian agencies is no substitute for sustained political and strategic action. More generally, the international donor community cannot expect humanitarian agencies to fully respond to and resolve protracted refugee situations without the sustained engagement of the peace and security and development agencies.

Declining donor engagement in programs to support long-standing refugee populations in host countries has also contributed to the rise in protracted refugee situations. A marked decrease in financial contributions to assistance and protection programs for chronic refugee groups has had not only security implications, as refugees and the local population compete for scarce resources but has also reinforced perceptions that refugees are a burden on host states. Host states are now more likely to argue that the presence of refugees on their territory results in additional burdens on the environment, local services, infrastructure, and economy and that the international donor community is less willing to share this burden. As a result, host countries are now less willing to seek local solutions to protracted refugee situations.

This trend emerged in the mid-1990s, when the UNHCR experienced budget shortfalls in the tens of millions of dollars. These shortfalls were felt most acutely in Africa, where contributions to both development assistance and humanitarian programs fell throughout the 1990s. Of greater concern was an apparent bias in the UNHCR's funding: more money was being made available for refugees in Europe than for refugees in Africa. It was reported in 1999 that the UNHCR spent about 11 cents per refugee per day in Africa, compared to $1.23 per refugee per day in the Balkans (Vidal 1999).

These concerns continued in 2000 and 2001, with most programs in Africa having to cut 10 to 20 percent of their budgets. Tanzania provides one example of the implications of these budget cuts. The UNHCR has consistently reported since 2000 that its programs in Tanzania have been "adversely affected by the unpredictability of funding and budget cuts" (UNHCR 2000b, 121). In 2001 the

UNHCR was forced to reduce its budget in Tanzania by some 20 percent; the result was a scaling back of a number of activities (UNHCR 2001, 137). In 2002 the UNHCR was forced to cut US$1 million in each of the months of June and November out of a total budget of approximately $28 million for its Tanzania program. In 2003 the UNHCR reported that it "struggled to maintain a minimum level of health care, shelter and food assistance to the refugees in the face of reduced budgets" (UNHCR 2003a, 165). Most recently, in 2005, the UNHCR reported that "not all refugees' needs were met, a consequence of UNHCR's overall funding shortage" (UNHCR 2005, 141).

Similar shortages over the past decade have also affected food distribution in the camps. Dwindling support for the WFP in Tanzania has led to a reduction in the amount of food distributed to refugees on numerous occasions in recent years. The WFP was forced to significantly reduce food distribution to refugees in November 2002 and again in February 2003, resulting in a distribution of only 50 percent of the normal ration, itself only 80 percent of the international minimum standard (UNHCR 2003b). At the end of 2004 the UNHCR and the WFP were still calling for more funds to address chronic food shortages (ibid., 141).

Sensitive to these recurring shortfalls in donor support, and in response to a range of other pressures, the Tanzanian government stated repeatedly that it would be willing to continue hosting refugees only if the international community provided the necessary support. In 2001 the Tanzanian president, Benjamin Mkapa, told a meeting of foreign diplomats in Dar es Salaam that Tanzania's "sympathy in assisting refugees should be supported by the international community because it was its responsibility" (IRIN 2001). This was especially striking, given that Tanzania was once in the vanguard of local settlement for refugees, distinguishing itself as one of only two African countries to grant mass naturalization to refugees. In stark contrast, Tanzania's national refugee policy now prohibits refugees from travelling more than 4 kilometres from the camps and identifies repatriation as the preferred solution for refugees on its territory.

Thus protracted refugee situations are the result of inaction or unsustained action both in the country of origin and in the country

of asylum. These chronic and seemingly unresolvable problems arise because of ongoing political, ethnic, and religious conflict in the countries of refugee origin; they then become protracted as a consequence of restrictions, intolerance, and confinement to camps in host countries. It follows that a truly comprehensive solution to protracted refugee situations must include sustained political, diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian engagement in both the country of origin and the various countries of asylum.

Consequences of PRSs: Human Rights and State Security

Tanzania's response to protracted refugee situations is by no means unique. In fact, an increasing number of host states are responding to protracted refugee situations by containing refugees in isolated and insecure refugee camps, typically in border regions far from the governing regime. Many host governments now require the vast majority of refugees to live in designated camps and place significant restrictions on refugees seeking to leave those camps, be it for employment or educational purposes. This trend, recently termed "refugee warehousing" (Smith 2004), has significant economic and human rights implications. As noted by the UNHCR, "most refugees in such situations live in camps where idleness, despair and, in a few cases, even violence prevail. Women and children, who form the majority of the refugee community, are often the most vulnerable, falling victim to exploitation and abuse" (UNHCR Africa Bureau 2001, 1).

More generally, the prolonged encampment of refugee populations has led to the violation of a number of rights contained in the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, including freedom of movement and the right to seek wage-earning employment. Restrictions on employment and on the right to move beyond the confines of the camps deprive long-staying refugees of the freedom to pursue normal lives and to become productive members of their new societies. Faced with these restrictions, refugees come to depend on subsistence-level assistance, or less, and lead lives of poverty, frustration, and unrealized potential.

The UNHCR has noted that "the prolongation of refugees' dependence on external assistance also squanders precious resources of host countries, donors and refugees … Limited funds and waning donor

commitment lead to stop-gap solutions … Spending on care and maintenance … is a recurring expense and not an investment in the future" (UNHCR ExCom 2004b, 3). Containing refugees within camps prevents their presence from contributing to regional development and state building (Jacobsen 2002). It has been found that where refugees have been allowed to engage in the local economy, they can "have a positive impact on the [local] economy by contributing to agricultural production, providing cheap labour and increasing local vendors' income from the sale of essential food-stuffs" (UNHCR ExCom 2004a, 3). When prohibited from working outside the camps, refugees cannot make such contributions.

Unresolved refugee situations represent a significant political phenomenon as well as a humanitarian problem. Protracted refugee situations often lead to a number of political and security concerns for host countries, the countries of origin, regional actors, and the international community. One of the most significant political implications of long-standing refugee populations relates to the strain they often place on diplomatic relations between host states and the refugees' country of origin. The prolonged presence of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, coupled with allegations that antigovernment rebels were based in the refugee camps, led to a significant breakdown in relations between the two African neighbours between 2000 and 2002, including the shelling of Tanzanian territory by the Burundian army. The prolonged presence of Burmese refugees on the Thai border has been a frequent source of tension between the governments in Bangkok and Rangoon. In a similar way, the elusiveness of a solution for the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal has been a source of regional tensions, drawing in not only the host state and the country of origin but also regional powers such as India.

Host states and states in regions of refugee origin often argue that protracted refugee situations result in a wide range of direct and indirect security concerns.[8] The *direct threats* faced by the host state, posed by the spillover of conflict and the presence of "refugee warriors," are by far the strongest links between refugees and

[8] For a more detailed discussion of direct and indirect security concerns related to refugee movements, see Milner (2008) and Loescher and Milner (2005).

conflict. Here, there are no intervening variables between forced migration and violence: the migrants themselves are actively engaged in armed campaigns – typically but not exclusively against the country of origin. Such campaigns threaten to regionalize conflict and drag the host state into what had been an intrastate conflict. These campaigns played a significant role in regionalization of conflict in Africa and Asia during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, the logic has changed, but the relevance of refugee warriors remains. This relevance was brought home with particular force in the maelstrom of violence that gripped the Great Lakes region of Central Africa between 1994 and 1996.

The outbreak of conflict and genocide in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa in the early 1990s serves as a clear example of the potential implications of not finding solutions for long-standing refugee populations. Tutsi refugees who fled Rwanda between 1959 and 1962, and their descendants, filled the ranks of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which invaded Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990. Many of these refugees had been living in the subregion for more than thirty years. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide it was widely recognized that the failure of the international community to find a lasting solution for the Rwandan refugees from the 1960s was a key factor behind the events that led to the genocide of 1994. According to the UNHCR, "the failure to address the problems of the Rwandan refugees in the 1960s contributed substantially to the cataclysmic violence of the 1990s" (UNHCR 2000a, 49). More than ten years after the 1994 genocide, it seems that this lesson has yet to be learned, as dozens of protracted refugee situations remain unresolved in highly volatile and conflict-prone regions.

This lesson has not, however, been lost on a number of states that host prolonged refugee populations. In the wake of events in Central Africa, many host states, especially in Africa, increasingly view long-standing refugee populations as a security risk and as synonymous with the spillover of conflict and the spread of small arms. Refugee populations are increasingly being viewed by host states not as victims of persecution and conflict, but as potential sources of regional instability on a scale similar to that witnessed in Central Africa in the 1990s.

The direct causes of insecurity to both host states and regional and extraregional actors stemming from chronic refugee populations can also be understood in the context of "failed states," as in Somalia, and in the context of warlordism, as in Liberia. In such situations, refugee camps can serve as bases for guerrilla, insurgent, or terrorist activities. Armed groups hide behind the humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and recruit among the disaffected displaced populations. In these situations there is the risk that humanitarian aid, including food and medical assistance, might be expropriated to support armed elements. Some refugees continue from within the camps the activities and networks that supported armed conflicts in their home country. Similar security concerns may arise among urban refugee populations, with gangs and criminal networks emerging within displaced and disenfranchised populations. These groups take advantage of the transnational nature of refugee populations, of remittances from abroad and the marginal existence of urban refugees, to further their goals. In both urban and camp contexts, refugee movements have been known to provide cover for illicit activities, ranging from prostitution and human smuggling to the trade in small arms, narcotics, and diamonds. For example, such activities have been linked to long-term Burmese refugees in Thailand and Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees throughout West Africa (Loescher and Milner 2005).

The security consequences of such activities for host states and regional actors are real. They include cross-border attacks on both host states and countries of origin as well as attacks on humanitarian personnel, refugees, and civilian populations. Direct security concerns can also lead to serious bilateral and regional political and diplomatic tensions. Cross-border flows are perceived by host states as infringing on their sovereignty, especially given the tenuous control that many central governments in the developing world have over their border regions. Finally, the activities of armed elements among refugee populations not only violate refugee protection and human rights principles, but also can constitute threats to international peace and security. The training and arming of the *mujahideen* in the refugee camps in Pakistan (including by the United States and others) over past decades underscores the potential threat to regional and international security posed by refugee warriors.

In East Africa, both Kenya and Tanzania have raised significant concerns about the direct security threat posed by long-standing refugee populations fleeing from neighbouring countries at war. In particular, Kenya feels vulnerable to the spillover of conflict from neighbouring states and from terrorist activities. Kenya's porous borders and its position as a regional diplomatic and commercial centre made it a target of international terrorist attacks in 1998 and 2002. Kenya is also concerned about the flow of small arms into its territory, and especially into its urban areas, mainly from Somalia. As a result of Islamic fundamentalism, the lack of central authority in Somalia, and a long history of irredentism within its own ethnic Somali population, the government in Nairobi now views Somali refugees on its territory almost exclusively through a security prism.

The presence of armed elements in western Tanzania and allegations that the refugee camps there are serving as political and military bases for Burundian rebel groups have been the source of significant security concerns for the government in Dar es Salaam. Tensions arising from these allegations have led to open hostilities between Tanzania and Burundi, including the exchange of mortar fire across the border. Concerns have also been raised by politicians and police about the perceived rise in gun crime in urban areas resulting from the flow of small arms from Burundi. Consequently, the Tanzanian government has tightened restrictions on the Burundian refugees and pushed for early repatriation.

More difficult to identify, but of equal concern, are the *indirect threats* that refugee movements can pose to host states. Indirect threats may arise when the presence of refugees exacerbates previously existing intercommunal tensions in the host country, shifts the balance of power between communities, or causes grievances among local populations. At the root of such security concerns is the failure of international solidarity and burden sharing with host countries. Local and national grievances are especially heightened when refugees compete with local populations for resources, jobs, and social services, including health care, education, and housing. Refugees are sometimes viewed as a privileged group in terms of services and welfare provisions or as the cause of low wages in the local economy and inflation in local markets. Refugees are also often scapegoats for breakdowns in law and order in both rural and urban refugee-populated areas.

Furthermore, it has been argued that "in countries which are divided into antagonistic racial, ethnic, religious or other group-ings, a major influx can place precariously balanced multi-ethnic societies under great strain and may even threaten the political balance of power" (Loescher 1992, 42). In this way, the presence of refugees has been shown to exacerbate "existing internal conflicts in the host country" (Weiner 1993, 16). This concern was made most explicit in Macedonia's reluctance to accept Kosovar Albanian refugees in March 1999, citing the concern that the mass of Kosovar Albanian refugees "threatened to destabilise Macedonia's ethnic balance."[9] Other examples include the arrival of Iraqi Kurds in Turkey, of Afghan Sunni Muslims in Shia-dominated Pakistan, and of Pashtun Afghans in Baluchi-dominated Baluchistan (Stepputat 2004, 4).

But not all refugees are viewed as threats. Which refugees are seen as threats, and why, is partly a function of whether the local community perceives them as outsiders or as members of the local political community. Indeed, "in the Third World, the remarkable receptivity provided to millions of Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, to ethnic kin from Bulgaria in Turkey, to Ethiopians in the Sudan, to Ogadeni Ethiopians in Somalia, to southern Sudanese in Uganda, to Issaq Somali in Djibouti and to Mozambicans in Malawi has been facilitated by the ethnic and linguistic characteristics they share with their hosts" (Loescher 1992, 42). The importance of affinity and shared group identity cannot be overstated. If a host community perceives the incoming refugee as "one of us," positive and generous conceptions of distributive justice will apply.

Conversely, refugees who are seen as members of an "out-group" are likely to receive a hostile reception. When there are divisions along ethnic, linguistic, or religious lines, "a major population influx can place precariously balanced multi-ethnic societies under great strain and may even threaten the political balance of power" (ibid.). Indeed, refugees, "as an out-group, can be blamed for all untoward activities" (Maluwa 1995, 657). While levels of crime may rise by

[9] Comments by the Macedonian Deputy Foreign Minister at the Emergency Meeting on the Kosovo Refugee Crisis, Geneva, April 6, 1999.

no more than expected with a comparable rise in population, refugees increasingly are seen as the cause. As Maluwa argues, the "presence of massive numbers of refugees [can] create feelings of resentment and suspicion, as the refugee population increasingly, and often wrongly, gets blamed for the economic conditions that may arise within the domestic population" (ibid.). This can lead to a point where "poverty, unemployment, scarcity of resources, and even crime and disease, are suddenly attributed to the presence of these refugees and other foreigners" (ibid.).

The indirect threat to security that long-staying refugees can pose to host states is a key issue, and one that has not been sufficiently addressed in research and policy making on refugee movements. In these cases, the presence of refugees is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of host state insecurity. Put another way, it is not refugees that are a threat to the host state; rather, it is the context in which those refugees exist that results in the securitization of the asylum question for many states. Lacking policy alternatives, many host governments now present refugee populations as security threats in order to justify actions that would not otherwise be permissible, especially when the state is confronted with the pressures of externally imposed democratization and economic liberalization. More generally, the presence of refugees can exacerbate previously existing tensions and can change the balance of power between groups in the country of asylum. In such circumstances, refugees place a significant but indirect role in the causes of insecurity and violence, but with consequences potentially of the same scale as the direct threats.

This dynamic has been evident in the dramatic restrictions on asylum that have been imposed by host states in Africa since the mid-1990s (Milner 2008). Numerous reports have pointed to the absence of meaningful burden sharing and to the growing xenophobia in many African countries as driving restrictive asylum policies (Crisp 2000; Rutinwa 1999). There is significant evidence that as international assistance to refugees is cut, refugees are forced to seek alternative means to survive. This often places refugees in conflict with local populations and can even draw them into illegal activities.

Rather ironically, xenophobic sentiments among African populations against refugees "have emerged at a time when most of Africa is democratizing and governments are compelled to take into account public opinion in formulating various policies. The result has been the adoption of anti-refugee platforms by political parties which result in anti-refugee policies and actions by governments" (Rutinwa 1999, 2). Just as politicians in Western Europe faced increasing pressure to restrict entry as asylum became a significant issue in domestic politics, "the rise of multiparty democracy in Africa … has arguably diminished the autonomy of state elites in determining the security agenda" (Gibney 2002, 2). A common response to such pressure has been for host states to push for the repatriation of refugees as quickly as possible.

3. REFUGEES AND THE
REGIONAL DYNAMICS OF PEACEBUILDING

Given these diverse links between protracted refugee situations and regional instability, it is striking that the question of refugees has been largely absent from recent debates on peacebuilding. Contemporary policy and research debates on peacebuilding have generally addressed refugees as a matter of secondary concern, focusing instead on programs in the country of origin to consolidate peace and prevent a return to conflict. By this approach, the relationship between peacebuilding and refugees is unidirectional, with the return of refugees seen as a barometer of the extent to which peacebuilding has succeeded.

Current thinking stresses that effective peacebuilding activities must address the needs of refugees by ensuring that the preconditions for successful return and reintegration are present in the refugees' home country (Chimni 2002). This is often a significant challenge, especially after a protracted conflict during which homes, physical infrastructure, and social services have been destroyed (Ogata 1997). As the lessons of the past decade make clear, effective peacebuilding in such contexts should also address a wider range of issues affecting returnees, from justice and reconciliation, housing and property rights, and human rights monitoring, to the provision of livelihoods in war-torn economies. Clearly, the reintegration of displaced populations poses a wide range of peacebuilding challenges, many of which fall outside the mandate of humanitarian agencies such as the UNHCR.

Addressing such challenges should not, however, obscure the fact that the prolonged presence of refugees in neighbouring countries cannot be treated as an isolated factor, to be addressed at the end of the peacebuilding process. In fact, a number of the political and security challenges associated with the prolonged presence of refugees have the proven ability to undermine peacebuilding efforts. These challenges include the presence of "spoilers" in refugee populations and pressure exerted by the host country for early and unsustainable return. A failure to engage with such regional dynamics has the real potential to undermine peacebuilding efforts in the country of origin.

Challenges to Peacebuilding: Refugee "Spoilers"

The most significant challenge to peacebuilding posed by protracted refugee situations is the presence of "spoilers" in refugee camps and in refugee-populated border areas. Spoilers, understood as "groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict settlement" (Newman and Richmond 2006, 1), are akin to the "refugee warriors" discussed earlier.[10]

During the 1970s and 1980s, refugee warrior communities included Afghan *mujahideen* in Pakistan, Khmer Rouge in Thailand, and Nicaraguan *contras* in Central America. In Africa, refugee warrior communities were the product of proxy wars in the Horn of Africa and in Southern Africa, wars of national liberation (especially in southern Africa), and post-colonial conflicts, especially in the African Great Lakes. Similar dynamics exist in many contemporary conflicts, in Africa and elsewhere, and constitute a serious challenge to peacebuilding activities. In fact, the presence of spoilers in the refugee-populated areas of neighbouring states has frustrated peacebuilding efforts in conflicts as diverse as Burundi, Liberia, Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Sudan.

In the African Great Lakes, the alleged presence of Burundian armed elements in refugee-populated areas of western Tanzania has had a significant impact on prospects for peace in Burundi. Indeed, two of the earliest Burundian rebel groups, Palipehutu and Frolina, were formed from refugees who had fled Burundi in 1972. Burundian

[10] See Stedman (1997).

refugee warrior communities continued to play a role until early 2005. Refugee camps in Tanzania were widely understood to play a key role in recruitment, fundraising, and other activities for the *Conseil national pour la défense de la democratie–Forces pour la défense de la democratie* (CNDD–FDD), which sought to undermine the peace process in Burundi.

It is widely maintained that the best response to the presence of armed elements within a refugee population is to physically separate them and legally exclude them from refugee status. However, humanitarian actors such as the UNHCR lack the capacity to enforce such a policy.[11] For example, in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and the militarization of refugee camps in the region, the UNHCR called for closer cooperation with regional and international security actors to more effectively address the challenges posed by refugee warriors. More than a decade later, however, broader cooperation within the UN system to deal with the problem of refugee warriors remains problematic, and the militarization of refugee camps and settlements continues to undermine refugee protection, regional security, and peacebuilding efforts in countries of origin.

Push for Early and Unsustainable Repatriation

A second challenge to peacebuilding posed by protracted refugee situations is the potential for the large-scale repatriation of refugees before the necessary conditions of safety and sustainable return exist in the country of origin. Likewise, if the concerns of host states relating to the potentially negative impact of the prolonged presence of refugees on their territory are not addressed, host states may pursue early and coerced repatriation, placing fragile institutions in the country of origin under significant strain and further undermining peacebuilding efforts. The potential for forced and premature return is heightened as donor interest shifts from the host country to the country of origin following the outbreak of peace. Given that many host states feel they are unfairly burdened with the great majority of the world's refugees, failure to consider the needs and interests of host states as part of broader peacebuilding efforts could exacerbate the problems faced by countries of asylum, leading to additional restrictions on asylum and a push for early forced repatriation.

[11] See O'Neill (2000); and LCHR (2002).

Such concerns have been clearly visible in Tanzania in recent years. With the early signs of peace in Burundi, coupled with a significant shift in donor engagement away from the refugee program in Tanzania in early 2002, the Tanzanian government began to push for a tripling of the number of refugees repatriating to Burundi. The UNHCR did not agree to promote repatriation; yet despite the prevailing insecurity in many regions of Burundi, some 85,000 Burundian refugees repatriated from Tanzania in 2003. The scale of these returns placed significant strain on the fragile peace in Burundi. Given that these returns coincided with sustained crime and insecurity, additional reductions in food rations, and increased restrictions on refugees' freedom of movement and economic activity in Tanzania, a number of refugee advocates questioned whether the repatriations were in fact voluntary, suggesting that conditions in the camps had become so unbearable that many Burundian refugees felt compelled to repatriate, notwithstanding the continuing insecurity in Burundi.

Similar dynamics have been experienced elsewhere in Africa and Asia: donors and host countries all see an interest in pursuing refugee repatriation at the earliest possible opportunity. In many instances, these repatriations do not solve protracted refugee situations; indeed, they can result in a reoccurrence of conflict and future refugee movements, because the root causes of flight have been left unaddressed and the preconditions for sustainable return have not been established. In cases as diverse as Liberian refugees in Guinea, Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, and Afghan refugees in Pakistan, early and unsustainable repatriation did not lead to a durable solution, but instead formed the foundation renewed refugee movements.

Part of the solution to this dynamic is to ensure that the preconditions for repatriation are in place, as outlined above. But it is also important to ensure that donor interest does not rapidly shift to peacebuilding in the country of origin at the expense of refugee assistance programs in neighbouring countries. Instead, the interests and concerns of host countries need to be more fully considered as part of the regional dynamics of peacebuilding. Such an approach would ensure that host states do not pursue early and unsustainable repatriation; it would also contribute to the rehabilitation of refugee-

populated areas in host countries. While the majority of peacebuild-ing activities must necessarily focus on the country of origin, any approach to peacebuilding that is not mindful of broader regional dynamics, including the presence of refugees, risks overlooking factors that could undermine peacebuilding efforts. At the same time, it is important to consider how early engagement with refugee populations in neighbouring countries may contribute to peace-building in the country of origin.

Contributions to Peacebuilding

It is increasingly recognized that refugees can make a significant contribution to peacebuilding in their country of origin. In a state-ment to the UN Security Council on January 24, 2006, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, noted that "refugees return with schooling and new skills … Over and over, we see that their participation is necessary for the consolidation of both peace and post-conflict economic recovery." Refugee contributions may result from particular skills they acquire in exile that may directly contribute to post-conflict reconstruction, from the direct involve-ment of refugees in the negotiation of the peace agreement, and through peace education and reconciliation activities that can be conducted prior to repatriation. For example, special teacher training programs have been implemented in Kenya to train Sudanese refugees to meet the educational needs in the Kakuma refugee camps as well as in Southern Sudan.

A wide range of training opportunities can be extended to refugees in prolonged exile that would contribute to durable solutions, be it repatriation, local integration, or resettlement in a third country. Language training, vocational training, professional development, and peace education could all form part of a broader, solutions-oriented approach and contribute both to peacebuilding and to refugees' self-reliance. Notwithstanding the clear benefits of such programs, they remain difficult to fund. Moreover, host states are generally wary of these programs, viewing them as a backdoor to local integration.

Given the potential benefits of such programs to both peacebuilding and the livelihood of refugees, it is important to address donor and host-country concerns and to ensure that such programs become

standard for protracted refugee situations. Programs to enhance the self-reliance of refugees do not, however, constitute a solution to those situations. Rather, they are short-term interventions that can only help manage the situation until a resolution can be found. In the long term, the implications of protracted refugee situations can only be fully addressed through comprehensive solutions.

4. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A MORE PREDICTABLE RESPONSE TO REFUGEES AND PEACEBUILDING

Given the links between protracted refugee situations, fragile states, and peacebuilding, it is clear that without the support of peace and security and development actors, actions by humanitarian agencies (such as the UNHCR) will lead to neither comprehensive solutions for protracted refugee situations nor to effective responses to the peacebuilding implications of prolonged exile. So long as discussions on protracted refugee situations remain exclusively within the humanitarian community, and do not engage the broader peace and security and development communities, they will be limited in their impact.

Despite the need for a multifaceted approach to protracted refugee situations, the overall response of policy-makers remains compart-mentalized, with security, development, and humanitarian issues mostly being discussed in different forums, each with its own theoretical frameworks, institutional arrangements, and independent policy approaches. Meaningful comprehensive solutions for pro-tracted refugee situations must overcome these divisions and adopt a new approach that incorporates recent policy initiatives by a wide range of actors. While there remains a significant role for the UNHCR to play as a catalyst for bringing together key stakeholders and for ensuring that the process is sustained, this type of broader engagement cannot occur without the sustained engagement of all branches of the UN system. In this regard, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) provides both a timely opportunity and a possi-ble institutional context for this type of cross-sectoral approach.

The composition and mandate of the PBC places it in a unique position to address a number of these concerns. In fact, the UNGA has specifically provided that country-specific meetings of the PBC shall include as additional members the country under consideration

(i.e., the country of origin), countries in the region (i.e., host countries), senior UN representatives in the field, and other relevant UN representatives (including the UNHCR). In this way the PBC represents a unique forum for coordinating peace and security, development, and humanitarian activities to address both protracted refugee situations and the regional dynamics of peacebuilding.

There is a risk that the PBC will not engage with these broader issues. Indeed, the commission seems to be adopting a country-specific approach that excludes consideration of factors outside the country that could upset post-conflict recovery. It also seems to be adopting a limited understanding of the links between long-term displacement and peacebuilding.

A broader recognition of the role of refugees and the regional dynamics of peacebuilding will be an important precondition for the success of the PBC, especially as it undertakes its country-specific deliberations on Burundi and Sierra Leone. Conflict in both those countries resulted in significant refugee movements into neighbouring countries, which in turn played a significant role in the course of conflict. More generally, conflict in both countries is largely tied to broader regional dynamics and neighbouring conflicts – the African Great Lakes (for Burundi) and the Mano River Union (for Sierra Leone). Given the regional dynamics of conflict and the role that refugee populations play not only as a consequence of conflict but as a source of its perpetuation (in both cases), the importance of situating peacebuilding efforts in Burundi and Sierra Leone in a broader regional context would seem evident. The PBC has not, however, adopted such an approach, and its discussions have remained country-specific, with no discussion of the regional dynamics.

A closer consideration of the links between protracted refugee situations and peacebuilding will be important to ensure effective international response to both issues. The PBC draws together the full range of actors required to formulate and implement truly comprehensive solutions for protracted refugee situations; thus it represents a unique opportunity to articulate a system-wide response to a long-standing challenge to the international community. At the same time, effective peacebuilding initiatives must consider in full

the potential role that refugees and regional dynamics can play both in undermining and supporting peacebuilding activities in the country of origin.

Appendix A

**Membership of the UN Peacebuilding Commission's
Organizational Committee (June 23, 2006, to June 27, 2007)**

Angola (Chair of the Commission for the First Session)
Brazil
Bangladesh
Belgium (until December 31, 2006 – succeeded by Luxembourg)
Burundi
South Africa
Chile
China
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark (until December 31, 2006 – succeeded by Panama)
Egypt
El Salvador (Vice Chair)
Fiji
France
Germany
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
India
Indonesia
Italy
Jamaica
Luxembourg
Netherlands (Chair of the country-specific meeting on Sierra Leone)
Nigeria
Norway (Chair of the country-specific meeting on Burundi)
Pakistan
Panama
Poland (until December 31, 2006 – succeeded by Czech Republic)
Russian Federation
South Africa
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United Republic of Tanzania (until December 31, 2006 – succeeded
    by South Africa)
United States of America

Appendix B

Additional Members of the Country-Specific Configurations on Burundi and Sierra Leone

Additional Members of the Burundi Country-Specific Configuration
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Economic Community of Central African States
European Community
Kenya
Nepal
Rwanda
Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania
African Development Bank
African Union
East African Economic Community
Executive Representative of the Secretary-General
Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie
International Monetary Fund
Inter-Parliamentary Union
Economic Commission for Africa
World Bank
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes
    Region

Additional Members of the Sierra Leone Country-Specific Configuration
Sierra Leone
Guinea
Ireland
Liberia
Sweden
African Development Bank
African Union
Central Bank of West African States
Commonwealth
Economic Community of West African States

European Community
Executive Representative of the Secretary-General
International Monetary Fund
Mano River Union
Organization of the Islamic Conference
World Bank
Economic Commission for Africa
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa

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