

Transatlantic Identity and International Action

Rapporteur's Report

Jennifer M. Welsh

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Canada-United Kingdom Colloquium
18–21 November 2004, Château Frontenac, Quebec City

School of Policy Studies, Queen's University
British Committee, Canada-UK Colloquia

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The Canada-UK Colloquia

The Canada-UK Colloquia are annual conferences that aim to increase knowledge and to educate the public about the advantages of a close and dynamic relationship between Canada and the United Kingdom. These conferences take place alternatively in each country, bringing together British and Canadian parliamentarians, public officials, academics, representatives from the private sector, graduate students, and others. The organizers focus on issues of immediate concern to both countries. One of the main endeavours is to stimulate and publish research in each subject under discussion. The publications listed at the end of the book demonstrate the wide range of topics covered by recent Colloquia.

The Colloquia are supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Canada and by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the United Kingdom. The conferences are organized by the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University on the Canadian side; and by the Canada-UK Colloquia Committee on the British side, from which an executive board, the Council of Management, is elected annually.

The first Colloquium, attended by some sixty distinguished participants from both countries was held at Cumberland Lodge in Windsor Great Park in 1971 to examine the bilateral relationship. This theme figured in the Colloquium held at Leeds University in 1979, at Dalhousie University in 1984, and again at Queen's University in 1996. A British steering committee, later to become the British Committee, was launched in 1986. The School of Policy Studies assumed responsibility on the Canadian side in 1996, succeeding the Institute for Research on Public Policy.

At the Denver Summit in June 1997, Prime Ministers Blair and Chrétien issued a Joint Declaration to mark a program of modernization in the bilateral relationship which included a role for the Canada-United Kingdom Colloquia. The program was reaffirmed during Mr. Chrétien's visit to the UK in 1998.

Reports on past Colloquia may be found at www.Canada-UK.net.

Jennifer M. Welsh

Jennifer Mary Welsh holds a doctorate in international relations from the University of Oxford (where she studied as a Rhodes scholar). She was the Jean Monnet Fellow of the European University Institute in Florence and a Cadieux Research Fellow in the policy planning staff of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. She is currently a university lecturer in international relations at the University of Oxford and a fellow of Somerville College. In addition to her academic career, Jennifer spent five years in the private sector — first as a consultant with McKinsey and Co. and subsequently as a partner in d~Code, a research and strategy firm focused on the Nexus generation. Ms. Welsh is the author of five books and a series of articles on international relations. Her current research interests include human rights and humanitarian intervention, and the prospects for North American integration. Recent publications include *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century* (HarperCollins, 2004) and *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations* (Oxford University Press, 2004).

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Preface

This Rapporteur's Report summarizes the discussions at the recent Canada-UK Colloquium on "Transatlantic Identity and International Action." The question for this year's Colloquium was simple yet extremely important: do the states of the North Atlantic region (broadly defined to include the EU) possess a sense of shared vocation in the world, and if so, on what is it based? In this endeavour, no two countries could be better chosen than Canada and the United Kingdom, not only because they have such a unique bilateral relationship, but also because they each profess a "special relationship" with the world's most powerful country, the United States. We could also find no better place to hold this discussion. It has been some six decades since British, American, and Canadian leaders last met in Quebec City to deliberate the current state and future prospects of international order. It is therefore highly fitting that this year's Colloquium took place, for the first time ever, in this historic capital, and in the wonderful setting of the Château Frontenac where some of those wartime meetings took place.

It is a pleasure to thank Professor Jennifer Welsh, who served as Rapporteur and subsequently prepared this thoughtful and comprehensive report. We are especially grateful to Hugh Segal for chairing two days of lively debate among a distinguished group of participants. The greatest credit must go to our advisors who crafted the program, William Hopkinson on the UK side and on the Canadian side, Louis Bélanger, David Haglund, Hugh Segal and Robert Wolfe. We would also like to record our warm thanks to Baroness Janet Fookes,

Chairman of the British Committee for the last four years, who played a major part in planning the event and in ensuring its success.

The Colloquium is only possible because of the generous support of our sponsors, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs; the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office; and this year, the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), l'Institut québécois des hautes études internationals de l'Université Laval and its Programme Paix et sécurité internationales, and the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation. We are deeply appreciative of their help, and of the hospitality of the City of Québec.

The Colloquium depends on the heroic efforts of small numbers of people. Special thanks go to George Edmonds-Brown, Executive Secretary of the Canada-UK British Committee, and Suzanne Lambert of the IRPP whose superb arrangements ensured a successful Colloquium. We are also grateful to the Canadian and British High Commissions for their continued assistance.

Robert Wolfe	Philip J. Peacock
School of Policy Studies	Chairman
Queen's University	British Committee

Transatlantic Identity and International Action: Moving Beyond Iraq

Jennifer M. Welsh

INTRODUCTION

"Do the states of the North Atlantic region possess a sense of shared vocation in the world? If so, on what is it based?" These two questions, central to the fate of the transatlantic community, formed the basis for the 2004 Canada-United Kingdom Colloquium in Quebec City. The location of the meeting paid homage to the sixtieth anniversary of the wartime conference at which British, American, and Canadian leaders fashioned a vision for the postwar international order. The topics chosen to tease out this potential vocation in the twenty-first century ranged from military intervention to humanitarian action, climate change, and trade and economic policy.

The organization of the discussion around notions such as "values" and "identity" suggested a working premise: that transatlantic cooperation is underpinned by something deeper than pragmatic calculations of costs and benefits. Whether this assumption is still true, particularly in the wake of the transatlantic alliance's

"near-death" experience over the 2003 Iraq War, was a recurring theme in the conversation. So, too, was the role of the United States as the leader of that alliance. In fact, as rapporteur, I found it striking how much of the discussion at a Canada-UK Colloquium was focused on Washington's policy agenda.

The report below follows the sequence of the Colloquium, and in several places cites directly from those speakers who gave formal presentations. (The papers, along with a complete list of participants, can be found online at http://www.canada-uk.net/2004.)

Five Key Themes That Stood Out

Structural and Societal Change: Despite the centrality of Iraq and its aftermath, the contextual framework for analyzing transatlantic relations must reach further back to include the structural and societal changes that have affected Europe and North America since the end of the Cold War. The most prominent include: demographic shifts, deepening integration in both Europe and North America, the solidification of US hegemony, and a growing gap in threat perception between the United States and its western allies.

Cautious Optimism: Even though tension marked transatlantic relations for much of George W. Bush's first presidency, there are grounds for cautious optimism as we enter 2005. The European and Canadian members of the transatlantic community must re-engage with a second Bush administration to ensure that the War on Terror does not continue to dominate the policy agenda at the expense of other pressing global issues. In so doing, Washington's allies must move beyond the simple dichotomy of multilateralism-unilateralism when thinking about the future direction of international action, and speak to the United States in the language of "results."

A New Lexicon for Global Issues: The price of inaction on problems such as the environment and development has become too high and demands a more radical policy approach. Canada and the United Kingdom can lead by introducing a novel way of talking about global issues, and turning international action on climate

change and poverty into a "political virtue." The recent response of the international community to the devastating tsunami in Asia could help to set the tone for this new discourse.

Innovation, Not Replication: Canada and the UK, as key members of the transatlantic community, must support the creation of new architecture to address the problems, and leverage the opportunities, of the twenty-first century. In some cases, innovation will mean reform of existing institutions, such as the United Nations, to provide for capacity in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In other cases, it will mean the creation of new arrangements and structures, whether it be new guidelines for humanitarian intervention, agreements to promote regulatory synergies in the world trading system, schemes to tax energy consumption, mechanisms to limit vulnerability to environmental disaster, or institutions to promote dialogue between developed and developing countries.

A Division of Labour: The transatlantic community remains grounded in the common values of human rights, democracy, and economic liberalism. While there is value divergence between the US and its western allies on respect for the international rule of law and on the appropriateness of military force, there remains significant room for cooperation in tackling the security challenges of the twenty-first century. Moving beyond Iraq, the members of the transatlantic community must develop a productive division of labour that leverages US power while maximizing the potential of countries like Canada and the UK to assist in development, conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction.

A NEW CONTEXT

The discussion began with reflections by Sir Andrew Burns and Paul Heinbecker upon the strained relations between the United States and its traditional Canadian and European allies during the first administration of George W. Bush. Despite the initial expressions of solidarity in the wake of the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11), a series of divisive issues quickly resurfaced in

transatlantic relations: protectionist US trade policy (particularly over steel and softwood lumber), peacekeeping arrangements in Bosnia, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and US refusal to sign on to the International Criminal Court. Added to this was the US treatment of al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees at Camp X-ray and the US-led military campaign to unseat Saddam Hussein.

One of the most disturbing features of the prelude to war in March 2003 was the misunderstanding and miscalculation that plagued the US and its western allies, despite the dense web of contacts and networks that has built up within the transatlantic community.[1] For example, it is clear that Washington and London on the one hand, and Paris on the other, misread the other side's intentions as the diplomatic crisis unfolded. France only became convinced in mid-January 2003 of the Bush-Blair determination to go to war. Yet, the UK wrongly assumed that Paris would "come around" as it had in the first Gulf War in 1991. But the first Gulf War was a flawed precedent to invoke: this had been a military campaign to *restore* a broken order. What Paris saw in 2003 was a war to destabilize the Middle East, and it was not keen to endorse such an enterprise given its attachment to stability in that region.

The rift over Iraq gave rise to unprecedented levels of name-calling from both sides of the Atlantic. While France and Germany accused Washington of recklessness, the US began an active campaign after the war to "punish" those states that refused to join its coalition of the willing in Iraq. Anti-Europeanism[2] joined anti-Americanism as a feature of international discourse. Indeed, before, during and after the war in Iraq, the Bush administration

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[1]This is one of the themes of Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro's recent book, *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis Over Iraq* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004).

[2]Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: Why a Crisis in the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2004), pp. 10-11.

abandoned the 50-year commitment by the US to a united Europe, and pursued a conscious strategy of divide and rule.

Post-Cold War Transformations

Despite the centrality of Iraq and its aftermath, the contextual framework for discussing transatlantic identity and international action must reach further back in time to include the changes that have affected Europe and North America since the end of the Cold War. One of the most profound transformations has been in the nature of populations: the growth of non-Europeans in North America (in the case of the US, predominantly Hispanic; in the case of Canada, predominantly Asian) and the growth of the Muslims in Europe. Moreover, as University of Michigan demographer Bill Frey noted, an age imbalance is developing between the US and Europe. A combination of higher birth rates and more immigration into the US means that by 2050, the median age in America will be 36, compared with 53 in the European Union (EU). These changes not only have profound social and economic consequences but also affect the historical "amity" between Europe and North America, although the foreign policy implications are still difficult to foresee.

In Europe, the past 15 years have been dominated by the deepening of economic and political integration — the most visible manifestations being the new common currency (the euro) and a newly enlarged EU of 25 member states. The EU's peaceful process of enlargement has arguably been its greatest foreign policy success. One of its greatest failures, the bloody breakdown of the former Yugoslavia, has been the other major foreign policy preoccupation for Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In Bosnia, the EU is not only serving as the head of the international administration, but is taking charge of peacekeeping operations.

For the United Kingdom in particular, the requirements (and benefits) of EU membership have added complexity to its global identity. It cannot ride solely on the wings of its "special relationship" with the US when it conducts half its trade with a European

market that is now 450 million people strong. Despite occasional attempts to redefine Britain's destiny as lying either with the US or with Europe, UK governments since the end of the Cold War have continued the delicate balancing act established by former Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1961 — the first British application to join the European Community. Under the leadership of New Labour, this balancing act has been captured by the metaphor of the bridge, or what Timothy Garton Ash cleverly calls the "Blair Bridge Project." Rather than "choosing America," or "choosing Europe," Blair's strategy has been to convince both sides of the Atlantic that they must work *together,* not only for their own advantage but also for the advantage of those in unstable societies around the world. Most voices at the Colloquium supported this broad direction, even if some wondered whether the engineering underpinning the bridge is sufficiently robust to withstand current strains.

Turning to North America, we see another experiment in common market making. The past 15 years of economic integration have outstripped all expectations in terms of growth in regional trade and investment. The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and subsequent North American Free Trade Agreement (1993) have created a new geo-economic space, which is already having spillover effects on environmental and labour policy. Since 9/11, the security dimension of the integration agenda has moved to the forefront, leading to unprecedented levels of cooperation between Canada and the United States (and to a lesser extent Mexico) on border management, asylum and refugee policy, and counter-terrorism efforts. While it is a stretch to call North America a "community" — given the asymmetry of power among Canada, Mexico and the United States and the lack of a common project akin to that of the Europeans — the levels of cooperation in certain areas are denser than those that exist among EU states.

In Canada, the post-Cold War era has witnessed the federal government tackling its two biggest demons of the 1990s: the deficit and the sovereignty movement in Quebec. Ottawa now presides over a sizeable budget surplus and high-performing economy, and enjoys cordial (if still difficult) relations with the Liberal

government in Quebec City. But this inward focus of the past 15 years has come at a price, in terms of Canada's activism and reputation on the international stage. Over the past two years, a number of commentators have pointed to the deterioration of Canada's military and the dwindling of its international aid budget as symptoms of a deeper crisis in Canadian foreign policy.[3] The gulf between Canada's internationalist rhetoric and its actual capacity for international action is becoming dangerously wide.

For the United States, the period since the end of the Cold War has been largely about settling into the role of the world's only superpower. The gap in power resources between the United States and its nearest rivals has become so wide that we have entered into a structure unprecedented in the history of the modern states system — what is commonly referred to as unipolarity. While some were bold enough to herald unipolarity as early as 1990,[4] most eschewed such depictions of the world as overly triumphalist. With the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath, this reluctance has been overcome. The ability of the US to recover quickly from the attacks, launch a bold military strike against Afghanistan, and lure lukewarm powers such as China, Russia, and Pakistan into its orbit all confirmed the reality of US dominance of the international system.

Different Threat Perceptions

What gives this power configuration added complexity is the security imperative that now drives US action. The al-Qaeda attacks of 2001, in the words of the new Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, "crystallized America's vulnerability" and put the idea of threat, even more than power, at the forefront of the Bush

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[3]See, for example, Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003).

[4]Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1990/91), pp. 23-33.

administration's foreign policy. It is this new imperative — what one participant called a "paradigm shift" — that has created the most serious division within the transatlantic alliance since its inception. The US perceives itself to be engaged in a war with opponents who cannot be placated, and who are fundamentally opposed to the American way of life. In the words of one Colloquium participant, this view "makes pre-9/11 debates about the uses of 'soft' and 'hard' power look touchingly innocent."

The problem, however, is that many Europeans and Canadians saw the terrorist attacks as an intensification of existing threats, provoked by decades of misguided US foreign policy, US insensitivity to other parts of the world, and the spread of the worst excesses of US consumerism. They thus deserved a thoughtful diplomatic and political response, directed at addressing root causes and legitimate grievances. The US, convinced that the military, political, and legal frameworks that have governed the international system must now be adapted, interpreted this approach as a sign that old friends could no longer be fully relied on.

For the transatlantic community, particularly in its institutionalized NATO form, these differences in threat perception pose a serious challenge. Alliances are most effective when there is a pressing need to respond, in a timely and collaborative way, to a common threat. Canada, Europe, and the United States faced this during the Second World War and during the Cold War. Despite rocky moments — Suez, Vietnam, and Nixon's monetary policy come to mind — Europe and North America found ways of managing their tensions and disagreements. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, we let our guard down. As Sir Andrew Burns put it: "We tired of the discipline of unity and the costs of eternal vigilance; we were seduced by the siren call of a peace dividend and by the new gods of globalization and interdependence."

Mars versus Venus?

These broader contextual factors help to explain why, in this first decade of the twenty-first century, the various members of the

transatlantic community appear to be pursuing different policy agendas. As US soldiers continue trying to flush out the remnants of the Taliban from the mountains of Afghanistan, Canadians and Europeans (including the Germans) manage the International Stabilisation Force in Kabul and draw up plans for nation-building. While the United States finishes its war against Baghdad, Europeans debate admitting Iraq's Muslim neighbour, Turkey, to their club. As the US withdraws its troops from Bosnia, the EU-led peacekeeping mission there becomes operational. At the same time that Washington supplies Israel with loans and sophisticated weaponry, the European Union underwrites the Palestine authority, and pays the salaries of its police force.

For some, this is a tale of US power and European (and Canadian) weakness. US commentator Robert Kagan provocatively articulated what many in the United States have felt for some time: When it comes to international politics, "America cooks while Europe does the dishes."[5] Kagan asserts that the alleged transatlantic divide is a result of different strategic cultures, which in turn stem from the massive asymmetry of power between the US and its traditional western allies. Because America is powerful, it can dominate the other actors and institutions in international society and enforce peace and justice much like a "global sheriff." Allies in Europe and Canada, on the other hand, because they are weak, have largely rejected military force as a means of influence in world politics. Even more infuriating for those such as Kagan is that these US "friends" are attempting to make a virtue out of necessity. Rather than acknowledging that their Kantian paradise can only survive in a Hobbesian world by relying on American military strength, Europeans (and Canadians) are propounding their own, alternative view of international affairs — based on the centrality of international institutions, the rule of law, and the role of military force as the last resort of international diplomacy.

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[5]Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power* (New York: Knopf, 2003).

The Colloquium participants shied away from black-and-white paradigms such as Kagan's. Instead, they acknowledged that Europe remains a heterogeneous group of autonomous nation-states with their own, sometimes contradictory, policy preferences. Contrary to the stereotypes in the US media, Europe is far from being a continent of pacifists. Rather, it is a space in which the just causes for war are actively debated and where different opinions as to the appropriate place for military force within the wider spectrum of foreign policy tools coexist.[6] Furthermore, there are a great many in Europe who think in terms of military power. Britain and France, the dominant motors behind the EU's attempt to create a meaningful defence capability, fully appreciate the importance of military strength and proactively deploy their armed forces abroad in places as far as Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, though on different sides of the Iraq debate, both think and breathe "hard power." This is reflected in their attachments to their countries' status as nuclear powers and as permanent members of the Security Council, neither of which are to be shared with their EU partners. The new EU members from central and eastern Europe could in fact strengthen this hard-power wing of the EU, albeit in ways still difficult to predict. Germany, meanwhile, sits somewhere in the middle, torn between its pacifist commitments and its desire not to be seen as free-riding.

All of these factors make it hard to generalize about "the Europeans," and raise questions about whether Europe actually can mobilize to create a coherent foreign policy. In the short term, there remain very practical challenges to a Common Foreign and Security Policy — most notably the impact of enlargement and the current obstacles to ratification of the new European Constitution. As one participant mused, perhaps French President

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[6]Anand Menon, Kalypso Nicolaidis and Jennifer Welsh, "In Defence Of Europe: A Response to Kagan," *Journal of European Affairs* (EU Policy Network) 2(August 2004).

Chirac's recent references to multipolarity should be seen not as a worrying expression of policy intention, but as a "rhetorical flourish" meant to encourage Europeans to think of themselves as having a common destiny.

INTERPRETING THE US ELECTION

Similar pitfalls confront those who try to generalize about the United States and its recent presidential election. As Sir Andrew Burns argued, the November 2004 result "should have put paid to any illusion that the first Bush victory was in some sense an aberration." While the US remains a divided country in several respects, the margin of victory for President Bush was significant and has accelerated the shift in the political centre of gravity in the US, westward and southward. Domestically, Bush's re-election will be followed by a series of Supreme Court appointments that could transform the social fabric of the United States. Internationally, we can expect a continuation of the Republican program of democratization and counter-terrorism (the latter through preemptive action, if necessary).

Good News or Bad News?

For some, such as former Canadian Ambassador to the UN Paul Heinbecker, this continuity legitimizes anti-Americanism around the world and dims the prospects for warmer relations within the transatlantic community. Before the election, Canadians and Europeans who were wary of US policy could focus their critique on the Bush administration. The outcome of the November election suggests that the American people also approve of the Bush mission. Matters are made even trickier by the issues that President Bush is likely to choose to test the commitment of America's erstwhile friends: Iraq and missile defence. The former remains complex for countries such as France and Germany, whose reluctance to send troops today stems not only from fear of losing lives but also from an unwillingness to lend *ex post facto* legitimacy to a

controversial intervention. For its part, missile defence remains dubious — in terms of its technological feasibility and its likely impact on proliferation. Canada in particular is reluctant to sign on to a scheme that it believes does not address the main threats to North American security.

Others, however, expressed greater optimism about the future of the transatlantic community. This can be further broken into two categories. The "minimalist optimists" (whose proponents are most often found in France, Germany, and some pockets of Canada) take the view that US allies should be largely reactive under the second George W. Bush administration and let the neo-conservatives self-destruct. As one participant put it: "The US will eventually come around, make the "right" decisions, and become more multilateral — whether we do anything or not." In the mean-time, Canada and Europe should focus on more technical and non-controversial areas of cooperation, such as trade and investment.

"Maximalist optimists," by contrast, believe allies should actively engage with the United States as soon as possible. Prime Minister Tony Blair is an ardent proponent of this view, illustrated by his early phone call to President Bush when the final results of the November vote had yet to come in. There are two factors urging engagement. The first is that America's so-called War on Terror is not as successful as it could be. The US, despite its power, is operating within a narrower spectrum of choices as a result of the campaign in Iraq, its military overstretch, and its triple deficits. The second reason that US allies must re-engage is that the War on Terror is taking up too much space on the international agenda. Other pressing issues — most notably climate change, poverty and public health in Africa, and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute — need some of Washington's precious political capital. For these optimists, Iraq cannot continue to be the litmus test for improved relations. We must move on.

This second strand of optimism is tenable only if one accepts a more benign view of US foreign policy. In this regard, it is worth asking just how radical the Bush international agenda really is. The president's much-discussed 2002 National Security Strategy

(NSS) — which, until it is superseded, will remain the key intellectual framework for US foreign policy — paid more homage to traditional concepts and principles than its opponents admitted. There was almost as much Woodrow Wilson in the document as there was George W. Bush.

More significantly, the Democratic challenger, John Kerry, adhered to a similar vision of America's role in the world throughout the presidential campaign. Not once did he challenge the four main tenets of the NSS:

1. that the US will remain the world's pre-eminent military power;
2. that the US will hold governments accountable for what happens — with their consent — within their borders;
3. that the nexus between weapons of mass destruction and terrorism is the biggest threat to the security of the United States today, and that it may justify preventive action; and
4. that the best way to secure peace and security for the US is to extend freedom and democracy around the world.

It is perhaps the greatest irony of the 2004 US election that Senator Kerry lost because he failed to convince US voters that he would pursue these tenets as well and as vigorously as President Bush.

"Tactical Multilateralism"

It has often been said that the key difference between Bush and Kerry was not in the "what" but in the "how." In other words, Kerry would have executed the National Security Strategy differently, by becoming more multilateralist. Several Colloquium participants challenged this view. More specifically, they questioned whether the distinction between multilateralism and unilateralism is useful, or accurate, in the current environment. As one participant noted, we need to beware of "ideological elephant traps." A deeper look at American foreign policy reveals that the US has oscillated between "going it alone" and working with allies and through multilateral institutions for most of the post-1945 period, and is continuing to do so today.

It is worth remembering that that in the four cases in which the United States has used military force against terrorism — once by Ronald Reagan, twice by Bill Clinton, and once by George W. Bush — only the latter bothered to take his case (against Afghanistan) to the United Nations. Moreover, the presidency of George W. Bush has not been all that revolutionary in its scepticism about international institutions. The US has frequently shown ambivalence about submitting to rules made "outside America" (we need only think back to the Senate's rejection of the League of Nations despite Wilson's heroic efforts at the Paris Peace Conference). In the US view, not only sovereignty, but also democracy and local interests can be compromised when decision-making occurs in a multilateral forum. What *is* different today is the lack of any obvious power that can challenge US aspirations and the sharp tenor of Republican rhetoric. The main theme of this rhetoric, as seen in the 2004 presidential debates, is American resistance to enforced obedience with international treaties and institutions, which are portrayed as a constraint on sovereignty and a potential danger to the major US concern — national security.

Neo-conservative strategists such as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz have continued to assert that, given the extensive nature of US power, the only options for the rest of the world are to "bandwagon" with the US or be cowered into submission. But this assumption has been proved wanting, as other countries have proved willing and able to refuse to collaborate — whether over concrete assets, such as Turkish territory as an invasion route into Iraq, or over political support, such as Mexican and Chilean opposition to the US in the Security Council. Similarly, while former Secretary of State Colin Powell was crucial to convincing the president about the advantages of gaining broad backing for US actions, the rationale was already understood by key members of Bush's administration and, more significantly, the US public.

In sum, the United States, in contrast to its European and Canadian allies, does not view multilateralism as a good in itself, but rather as one of a variety of means of achieving US objectives. Far from being ideologically wedded to either unilateralism or multilateralism, the US is taking a results-based approach to its

foreign policy. If it can achieve its aims through collaborative means, it will embrace multilateralism. If it cannot, it will act independently or with a smaller "coalition of the willing."

We can see this "tactical multilateralism"[7] at work by examining the US attitude toward the United Nations over the past two years. During the build-up to the Iraq War, President Bush and other members of his administration warned that the UN risked fading into irrelevance if it did not act to enforce its Resolutions against Saddam Hussein. Yet, after the end of major combat operations in Iraq in May 2003, it slowly became clear to the Bush administration that the UN would prove indispensable in both the legitimation and implementation of the plan for postwar reconstruction. Indeed, the US-UK occupation of Iraq bore out the concern expressed before the war that the marginalization of the UN in the postwar administration of Iraqi territory would decrease the legitimacy of US-UK operations. If the optimists are right, the United States is slowly coming to see that its position as the world's only superpower will remain stable only through a delicate balance of consensus and coercion, and through a willingness to respect weaker states and allow for some autonomy of action.

CULTURE AND INTERVENTION

Having set the tone and general direction of the near-term future of transatlantic relations, what are the issues around which cooperation is likely to pivot? The central theme of this session, led by David Haglund and Rosemary Righter, was the degree to which culture and identity can influence the willingness of states to use military force. While there was discomfort with where such a discussion might lead — that is, into claims that particular ethnic groups are more "warlike" than others — there was general agreement that there are commonalities of approach among English-

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[7]This phrase was first used by Strobe Talbott, former under-secretary of state for Russia in the Clinton administration.

speaking countries such as Canada, Great Britain, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.

An Anglosphere?

David Haglund took up the challenge of arguing that a community of culture, called an "Anglosphere," does exist today, at least in subjective terms. Moreover, he claimed that this community should be characterized as "Anglosphere heavy" rather than "Anglosphere lite." The latter would be held together loosely by common political values, such as a commitment to democracy, but would not necessarily tell us anything about the propensity to intervene. An Anglosphere heavy, by contrast, invokes a more substantive cultural dimension that can explain commonalities in behaviour by certain states.

In making his case for Anglosphere heavy, Haglund rejected the thesis, hinted at earlier,[8] that power is the only factor we need to explain the willingness to intervene. But in doing so, he did not resort to racial categories. For Haglund, it is a common *strategic culture* — created through several decades of cooperation and "self-reinforcing sequences" — that explains why the members of the Anglosphere intervene when they do. In other words, the impact of culture on states' behaviour is best understood through the social science concept of path dependence: that past choices and actions affect a state's conception of itself (its identity), its options, and its "natural allies" in the present and in the future. This concept resonated with some of the participants, who emphasized the effect that the Kosovo War had on Tony Blair's policy toward Iraq. Over the course of his first term as prime minister, Blair had come to believe that military force could be "a force for good in the world," provided western liberal states resorted to it only in extreme cases, and with clear objectives and exit strategies.

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[8]See note 5.

According to Rosemary Righter, the idea of an Anglosphere has particular resonance for the United States today as it reflects on which parts of Europe took its side in the campaign to unseat Saddam Hussein: English-speaking Great Britain and key countries in "New Europe" such as Poland — who believe, rightly or wrongly, that English is the *lingua franca* of both European and international diplomacy. (This suggests that we should talk not of the "English-speaking world" but of the "English-using world.") Would this coming together of the US and UK have happened under different political leadership? Colloquium participants were divided on this question, but many believed the outcome would have been the same.

Arguably, geography is just as important as culture to understanding the proclivity to intervene. It is undeniable that the US, as a continental power far from Europe, has often demonstrated a yearning to retreat to the comfort of the "local" and abide by the maxims of George Washington's Farewell Address. Thus, while it led a formidable military alliance throughout the Cold War, the US remains suspicious of allies — not mainly because it wants to maintain freedom of action, but rather, in Rosemary Righter's words, "out of fear that alliance obligations might force America to act in circumstances not of its choosing."

The British, on the other hand, have been instinctive interventionists for most of their history. The tendency to think and act globally was initially a by-product of imperialism, and then a natural extension of the liberal principle of free trade. This observation led to an interesting discussion of whether the US is becoming more "British" through its contemporary brand of imperialism. Some British participants resisted this comparison, insisting that while Britain had indeed been expansionist, it quickly learned to be prudent on questions of faith and local culture. Through indirect rule, the British won for themselves a degree of legitimacy. The US, on the other hand, is much more dogmatic about the vision for its "colonies."

Other participants reminded us that the US has in fact exhibited imperial tendencies throughout its existence. Indeed, when

seen through the lens of a Latin American country, the United States has never appeared reluctant to intervene or occupy. For some, it is the common historical practice of imperialism — rather than any common culture — that is the real force tying Britain and US together. As one participant explained: "For the English-users, the British Empire and its evolution is a crucial narrative, which dominates the Anglosphere's understanding of the world and how it works. The problem today is that Britain and the US are up against an alternative account of the world and how it works."

For some, all this talk of culture and narratives sounded dangerously deterministic. It is crucial to remember that if identities are at bottom social creations, they can *change* — particularly with the help of history. Germany is the most obvious example here. A country that previously engaged in a series of destructive wars, modern-day Germany now consciously limits its ambitions and is wary about articulating its own, unique foreign policy. Thus, while the US has recently undergone a transformation in its views of what constitutes legitimate intervention, this by no means rules out a "market correction" in the future. Similarly, there is no reason why, as David Haglund reasoned, the Anglosphere must necessarily continue in its current form. Some yet-unforeseeable contingency could emerge, "with the result being that today's Anglo-American self-reinforcing sequence becomes tomorrow's reactive sequence."

Finally, it is crucial to maintain a distinction between *whether/when* we intervene, and *how* we intervene. Culture can affect both. One participant condemned the way in which the US has alienated a significant portion of the Arab world through its conduct of the war and reconstruction in Iraq. In short, we may be able to detect culture at work on the ground. While the US and UK may be more similar in terms of greater willingness to use military force, the UK is closer to Canada in terms of its military rules of engagement, its style of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction, and its tendency to link security and development issues. This "security-development nexus" in the Canadian and British strategic culture was identified by the Colloquium as a comparative

advantage, and something both countries might sell to the United States.

Neo-Conservative versus Progressive Agendas

A subject that promoted intense debate is the degree to which the values and aims of US neo-conservatives, particularly with respect to democracy and human rights, should be supported by progressive forces in Canada and Europe — regardless of political stripe. To put it another way: Are the neo-cons asking the right questions, even if they have the wrong answers?

Several Colloquium participants noted the strong resemblances between Tony Blair, a self-professed liberal internationalist, and the neo-conservatives supporting the Bush administration. But one can look even further back to find evidence of support for democratization. As one participant reminded us, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali put forth in 1994 *An Agenda for Democracy* that included many elements that resemble the aspirations of the Bush administration for the Middle East. Another participant commented that Canada and Western Europe had actively supported Washington's progressive democratization efforts in the former Soviet empire after 1989.

Some, however, resisted this joining of the progressive and neo-conservative agendas. "Just because something overlaps," one participant insisted, "does not mean it is identical." While liberal internationalists share a concern for human rights and democracy, there remains significant divergence both on how these principles should be configured and on the means to bring them about. In particular, there is deep concern among US allies about the rush to elections in Iraq without putting the deeper foundations of democracy in place, such as the rule of law.

HUMANITARIAN ACTION

While the initial subject for this session was the broad category of humanitarian action (which includes both military and non-

military aspects of humanitarian relief), the discussion focused almost exclusively on the topic of humanitarian intervention: "coercive interference in the internal affairs of state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering."[9] Both speakers, Talbot Imlay and David Hannay, stressed the controversial place of humanitarian intervention in today's international system.

The Status of Humanitarian Intervention

The first issue to be tackled was whether humanitarian intervention can be considered a law of contemporary international politics. According to Talbot Imlay, humanitarian intervention should be thought of as the norm, rather than a clear principle of international action. Moreover, this norm has only appeared with the end of the Cold War and is therefore in its infancy. Not only does humanitarian intervention face opposition (particularly from states in the developing world), but it also exists in an uneasy relationship with other important norms in international society, such as those associated with self-determination, sovereignty, and the prohibition against the use of force. As a result, when states use force for humanitarian purposes, they do so cautiously and without assurance that their actions will be viewed as legitimate. Above all, there remains serious debate as to whether humanitarian intervention is a "right," or only an exceptional response to humanitarian catastrophes.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the international community has seen an expansion of intervention for humanitarian

[9] *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, edited by Jennifer M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 3. Some definitions are more restrictive, suggesting that intervention must be: (a) without the consent of the target states; and (b) without authorization from the Security Council.

purposes in the last 15 years. While very few interventions of this kind occurred during the Cold War, the 1990s and early years of the twenty-first century have witnessed a series of military actions explicitly supported by humanitarian rationale, whether we think of Northern Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, or Cote d'Ivoire.[10] In these cases, the alleged conflict between human rights and sovereignty, which humanitarian intervention shines a spotlight on, has been resolved in one of two ways. The first is through a redefinition of sovereignty, from "sovereign as authority" (control over territory) to "sovereignty as responsibility" (respect for a minimum standard of human rights). Under this new formulation, massive violations of human rights inside the domestic jurisdiction of a state can be transformed into a matter of international concern. The second resolution to the tension is the Security Council's ever-widening definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This creative interpretation by the Council has enabled it to authorize military action to address security threats that emerge from humanitarian crises.

Given this empirical terrain, can we discern any particular transatlantic approach to humanitarian intervention? If we look at what states *say*, in their public diplomacy, there appears to be variation among Canada, the UK, and the US. The most enthusiastic verbal supporter of humanitarian intervention is the Canadian government, which sponsored the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect.* This report concluded that while sovereign states bear the primary responsibility for the welfare of their citizens, there is

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[10]Even these Cold War interventions, such as the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia or the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, were not accompanied by justifications that spoke to humanitarian concerns. It is interesting that when India invaded East Pakistan it originally invoked humanitarian rationale but quickly switched to what it perceived as more persuasive language, rooted in arguments about self-defence.

also a duty of care that exists within the wider international community. Thus, "where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect."[11] Canada's prime minister, Paul Martin, has endorsed the Commission's findings, and recently used the framework of the responsibility to protect in his maiden speech to the United Nations General Assembly. In its public diplomacy, the British government exhibits more cautious support for the idea of humanitarian intervention, although Prime Minister Tony Blair was an eloquent spokesperson for the concept during and after the Kosovo conflict. The United States government is best characterized as indifferent to the notion of humanitarian intervention, and has refrained from supporting the efforts of those like Prime Minister Blair and the drafters of the *Responsibility to Protect,* who seek to establish a set of criteria for members of the international community to decide when military action in humanitarian crises would be justified. This American reluctance to support formal guidelines for humanitarian intervention has stemmed from two sets of concerns: its desire to avoid entanglements that do not directly affect its national interests, and its insistence that in cases where US military action is perceived necessary it must be free to interpret notions such as "last resort" and "proper authority" on its own terms.

However, when assessing norms and their acceptance, we need to look at not just what states say, but also what they *do.* It has been western governments, particularly the UK, France, and US, that have supplied the bulk of the forces for humanitarian missions since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, while we are seeing the emergence of a new regional approach to humanitarian interven-

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[11] *The Responsibility to Protect,* report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Council, 2001).

tion in Africa with the 2001 *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, the African Union (AU) has been unable to address the unfolding catastrophe in Darfur without significant assistance from western countries.[12] In the end, one is tempted to conclude that the dividing line on this question is not really cultural, but rather a question of political will and capability.

The United Nations High Level Panel

Lord Hannay shared his perspective on humanitarian intervention as a member of Secretary General Kofi Annan's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.[13] For the members of the panel, humanitarian intervention presented a formidable challenge. On the one hand, it was clear the UN Charter could not be redrafted to accommodate it: the notion of a right to humanitarian intervention continues to pose a contradiction between the Westphalian terms of the Charter and the objectives of other crucial UN instruments, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Yet, it was also clear that state practice and normative evolution suggested a broad measure of support for military actions designed to address impending humanitarian crises. In the end, the panel endorsed the "responsibility to protect" framework of the International Commission on State Sovereignty, along with the latter's criteria for legitimate use of force: seriousness of the threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and the balance of consequences (i.e., that force cannot be justified if it is likely to make matters worse). It is also significant that proper purpose now encompasses actions designed to save civilians from

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[12]Article 4 (h) of this act confers the "right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war, genocide and crimes against humanity."

[13]The report, made public on 2 December 2004, is available at http://www.un.org/secureworld.

genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other comparable human rights atrocities.

But panel members also warned against portraying humanitarian intervention, ultimately a policy of coercion, as the only solution to failed states in contemporary international society. In Hannay's words, this tendency "feeds the paranoia of many governments which see themselves as one day being on the receiving end of a western-organized military intervention designed to bring about regime change. Never mind that in fact one of the main causes of failure in the past to prevent humanitarian catastrophes has been the West's unwillingness to wade into the quagmire. That is the perception we are up against."

Furthermore, as noted by one Colloquium participant, the recent enthusiasm for humanitarianism has created new problems on the ground. In situations of crisis and conflict, humanitarian agencies, which often "swoop in" alongside western military forces, are supplanting and contradicting the longer-term efforts of development agencies. The two communities too frequently find themselves on different "sides," when in fact they should be part of a holistic approach. Capacity-building — the goal of both the humanitarian and development communities — has suffered in the process.

Several participants also expressed frustration that the humanitarian agenda is being subsumed by the so-called War on Terror. Indeed, if one follows the trail of spending on development since 9/11, one finds that the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq are receiving a disproportionate share in the foreign assistance budgets of Canada, the UK, and the US. But for much of the developing world, 9/11 is neither the defining event of the decade, nor the most tragic case of the loss of civilian life. For these countries, hunger, poverty, and disease remain the most pressing threats to the livelihood of their societies.

In response to challenges and criticisms such as these, the UN High Level Panel has approached the issue of failed states (what it prefers to call "states under stress") as a single spectrum of activity. It begins with prevention of state breakdown (including more robust early-warning systems), carries through to responses to state

breakdown of both a military and non-military nature, and concludes with a longer-lasting state reconstruction phase. These efforts, as Hannay explained, will require the UN to enter into more meaningful collaboration with other kinds of institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and regional organizations — particularly the African Union, where so many of world's "states under stress" currently exist.

The remaining question, of course, is whether the United Nations is up to such a Herculean task — especially coordinating all of the activities along this spectrum. Four major issues stand out:

First, while the panel offers recommendations on how to change the composition of the Security Council, it does not fully address the deeper problem: what the international community can and should do when the Council is divided in its deliberations and incapable of action (as it was in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq).

Second, although panel members rightly emphasize the importance of early-warning mechanisms in efforts to avoid conflict, they say very little about how to address the reluctance to act on that information. In other words, it is the lack of political will, rather than the lack of knowledge, that most often plagues the international community's preventive capacity.

Third, while the panel has made strides in setting a multi-institutional agenda (i.e., one that includes the World Bank and IMF, as well as UN bodies), it is questionable whether weak states and societies can absorb the demands and conditions of these institutions.

Finally, although the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission is an innovative and welcome recommendation, panel members left unresolved two thorny problems associated with post-conflict reconstruction: the short attention span of western governments (given their electoral cycles); and the basis for the authority of international administrations, particularly when their actions take over the sovereign functions of states under reconstruction.

Canadian and British efforts to support UN reform must take on these deeper challenges if the United Nations is to develop the capacity for new and improved collective security.

CLIMATE CHANGE

Of all the subjects discussed at the Colloquium, climate change inspired the most passionate comments from participants. There was widespread recognition that half-hearted leadership and timid policy-making have plagued this “tragedy of the commons.” There was also concern that our current democratic systems of government and public services are not up to the task of dealing with the complexity associated with climate change. The price of inaction, as speakers Richard Peltier and Sir Crispin Tickell argued, is becoming staggeringly high. It is not only our grandchildren who are likely to feel the devastating impact of climate change on human society and the natural environment. The costs are playing out before our very eyes.

The starting point for the discussion was the science of climate change. As Richard Peltier demonstrated, there is virtually complete agreement in the scientific community (including in the US) about the impact and trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions. Sir Crispin Tickell introduced the idea of “tipping points”: changes in our environment so dramatic that human societies are completely disrupted. These tipping points include the hydrology of the Amazonian rainforest, the direction of the Gulf Stream and North Atlantic conveyor, changes in the ozone layer, the El Nino phenomenon, the melting of the ice sheets, and the Antarctic circumpolar current. If one or all of these were to change rapidly, the impact on populations could be dramatic, leading to huge numbers of environmental refugees.

The US position on the Kyoto Protocol has been a huge blow to efforts to address these tipping points. Yet, even among those who have ratified the accord — Canada, 25 European countries, and now Russia — there is wide divergence in terms of the steps that have been taken to implement the Protocol’s measures (e.g., the establishment of emissions trading systems). It was of particular concern to Canadian participants that their government has yet to lay out a detailed plan for how Canada will meet its targets, nor has it specified by how much Canadian companies will have to reduce their emissions. The kinder reading of the government’s

approach is that it has been difficult to build a consensus between Ottawa and the provinces; the less charitable is that the government never expected to have to implement Kyoto, since it never believed that Russia would ratify the treaty. This slow response by Canadian policymakers is even more surprising when one considers the significant impact that global warming is likely to have on the Canadian Arctic. Given the projected changes to sea ice and sea routes, Canada could confront serious challenges to its sovereignty at high latitudes.

If politics were the only answer to the climate-change crisis, the future would be bleak. Public opinion in most western democracies remains baffled about the issue and its effects. More importantly, while public opinion in countries such as Canada and the UK expresses concern about the environment, the public has not yet been pressed to make trade-offs between policy priorities or to quantify its willingness to make substantial behavioural changes. As a result, governments continue to move at a glacial pace. Colloquium participants agreed that if progress is to be made on the political front, the framing of environmental issues must be transformed. As one participant suggested, action on climate change must be converted into a "political virtue" — one as powerful as the abolition of slavery was in previous centuries. Countries in the transatlantic community must lead the way in this revolution in discourse.

Again, there is some ground for optimism. Where government action is currently lacking, private action is filling the void. Companies such as Ford and Dupont have come to see, through enlightened self-interest, that an increase in industrial efficiency is the most rational step forward; the sooner they take such measures, the less expensive they are likely to be. Moreover, it is private business that is leading the way with innovative schemes to work within the Kyoto parameters. The International Aluminum Institution, with the support of Alcan, has developed a protocol on emissions for the aluminum sector that includes standardized accounting and reporting mechanisms, benchmarking graphs, training seminars, and information on the greenhouse gas reducing benefits of aluminum recycling. Another interesting example

is the recent deal signed between TransAlta Corporation and a hog farming operation in Chile, where the former will pay millions of dollars to the latter to "buy" pollution credits. The company that brokered the deal, CO_2e.com, is now trying to position itself at the centre of the emerging world of financial deals tied to global greenhouse gas emissions curbs.

In the short term, there is some potential in schemes such as CO_2 extraction and sequestration, efforts to stop deforestation through replanting, and the design of zero emissions coal-fired plants. There is also continued investment in solar, wind, and hydro alternatives. In the long term, however, it was recognized that these alternative energy sources could not meet projected human need. This raised the question of whether countries such as Canada and the UK must turn to the use of clean nuclear power.

In fact, several participants expressed interest in designing a joint Canadian-UK approach on the environment in four areas:

1. *Knowledge-building*: joint research in areas of particular expertise, such as nuclear power and paleontology.
2. *Economic mechanisms*: new schemes to tax energy; carbon financing (e.g., emissions trading regimes); and the establishment of a G8 climate fund.
3. *Mechanisms to limit vulnerability*: strategies to adapt to the "tipping points"; targeted development assistance; and new insurance schemes to address liability concerns related to environmental damage.
4. *Rules and regulations*: reform of trade and investment laws to build in environmental standards and targets.

TRADE AND ECONOMIC TIES

Even when political tension and rivalry have plagued the transatlantic community, trade and investment flows have remained robust. Ever since the postwar Marshall Plan (and arguably well before), the economic fates of Canada, Europe, and the United States have been inextricably woven together. One potent symbol

of this interdependence is the G8, an institution that speaker Nicholas Bayne calls the "index" of the transatlantic community's shared vocation.

New Barriers

But in spite of the professed commitment to liberal principles, and the substantial progress made in reducing traditional trade barriers, the transatlantic community is dogged by a new problem: regulatory incompatibility. In his presentation to the Colloquium, Alcan Senior Vice-President Daniel Gagnier warned that failure to create compatible regulatory regimes (particularly with respect to science-based, risk-management practices) could lead to new discriminatory trade practices and overshadow the victories achieved in multilateral negotiations during the past two decades. Compatibility will be especially important in the area of environmental practices in order to avoid any competitive imbalances arising from the implementation of Kyoto rules. In Gagnier's words: "Regional and global sustainability require the pursuit of cooperative approaches that ensure environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and a minimization of competitive distortions, while addressing social impacts." Leadership must come from members of the transatlantic community, particularly Canada and the UK. At a bilateral level, governments and businesses should support the Canada-EU Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement (TIEA), which is designed to promote mutual recognition of national standards, professional qualifications, and assessment procedures. At a broader level, Canada and the UK should, in the words of one participant, "promote a multilateral trade and investment system as part of the global commons. This means opening up the transatlantic space to competition from the outside."

The problem, however, is that regulatory cooperation lacks the vision and "sex appeal" associated with free trade agreements. As one Colloquium participant claimed: "No one goes to the barricades over Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures." Seen in this light, the TIEA represents a failure for Canada, as it is a "pale imitation"

of the trade agreement reached between the US and the EU. The toughest issues facing Canada-EU trade and investment — mutual recognition of standards, competition policy, and procurement practices — have been singled out and treated individually rather than being combined into a comprehensive package. But other participants were quick to point out TIEA's potential as a model for other regions of the world. Rather than replicating the arrangements of the past, that is, free trade agreements, countries such as Canada and the UK need to innovate and create the structures that will address twenty-first century problems.

An additional challenge to tackling the remaining barriers to trade and investment is that Europe and North America have been preoccupied with their own regional arrangements. By focusing their efforts "locally" — on free trade zones such as NAFTA and the EU, or bilateral free trade arrangements — members of the transatlantic community have detracted from broader multilateral efforts to liberalize trade and investment, and created complications for European and North American companies that want to operate across regions as part of a global marketplace. As Daniel Gagnier explained, while regional trade initiatives such as NAFTA and the EU have had positive effects on companies such as Alcan, they have also complicated decision-making with respect to production and sourcing. Thus, the economic realm presents a paradox for the transatlantic community: the road to greater growth and prosperity lies less in strengthening the existing community, and more in spreading the community's values and operating principles to the wider, global marketplace.

Assessing the G8

Nicholas Bayne's argument for a shared transatlantic economic vocation drew upon the G8's success as a catalyst for cooperation on the problems posed by advancing globalization. Most of the G8 political leaders view the annual summit as a valuable opportunity to set priorities for the global economy and mobilize political oxygen for high-profile political initiatives, whether on

information technology, terrorism, infectious disease, or renewable energy. Tony Blair, who will host the next summit, has put the G8 agenda for Africa (trade access, debt relief, and finance for development) at the heart of his international diplomacy for 2005. It is also important to note the degree to which the United States has invested in G8-style multilateralism since the end of the Cold War.

But while the G8 unquestionably enjoys the media spotlight, some participants questioned what it has actually delivered over the past decade. The lesson from the failed Doha Round was that a body such as the G8 cannot "fix" the future of multilateral trade; instead, impetus must come from a body with a wider membership of developed and developing countries. In fact, the G8 has failed even to generate a common view on multilateral trade among *developed* economies. There was also a sense among many participants that the G8 has blurred the boundaries of the institutional division of labour by taking on issues previously handled by more representative bodies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the UN.

Finally, participants noted that G8 leaders have failed to insulate themselves from parochial interests, particularly on issues such as the environment. The result, as Nicholas Bayne explained, is that projects are initiated but not sustained: "It is the failure to develop outward-looking alternatives to inward-looking domestic pressures that most threatens the shared economic vocation of the North Atlantic powers." The domestic pull also prevents G8 leaders from devising the architecture needed to address global problems more holistically, by combining trade, the environment, and economic development. The private sector has learned, much more quickly than governments, that there are "triple-win solutions" to the problems of stalled growth, underdevelopment, and environmental degradation.

These limitations of the G8 led many Colloquium participants to endorse the creation of an "L20" (comprising the leaders of the G20 group of countries) as a new forum for the management of global issues. Many countries and civil society organizations

question the G8's legitimacy because of its restricted membership, and insist that those who are affected by policy-making must also be at the table. Championing the so-called L20 does not mean the end of the G8; in the end, the two bodies should be complementary. But a forum with wider membership might permit the G8 to revert to something closer to its origins: a closely-knit group of political leaders, meeting informally, to develop coherent positions on pressing issues of joint concern.

CONCLUSION

As the Colloquium's discussion of the G8 demonstrates, legitimacy is an elusive asset for states and organizations: when you have it, your power is almost unlimited; when you don't, your every action is scrutinized. This scrutiny is particularly intense when the agenda for action is ambitious.

For the transatlantic community, legitimacy could come from a variety of sources. The first is legitimacy through process. The transatlantic community strives to make decisions collaboratively, to negotiate solutions to problems, and to allow for a full airing of views from its membership. Most European countries, and Canada, are attracted to this conception of legitimacy. Because the process for decision-making is viewed as "right," so too are the decisions that result from it. The consensus on the legitimacy of the military campaign in Kosovo (if not its legality) is an obvious example.

Another source of legitimacy is linked firmly to outcomes: Have we achieved more good through our actions than bad? This performance-based conception of legitimacy is most frequently held by those who are the recipients or targets of transatlantic policy. Hence the view of Central European states that the opening up of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to new members were legitimate policies, and the view of the Iraqi opposition that the West's campaign against Saddam Hussein has been a disaster.

A third and final way to think about legitimacy focuses on purposes: Is our goal just and noble? For many years, the institutions

of the United Nations system relied on this conception of legitimacy, drawing upon its purpose to "prevent succeeding generations from the scourge of war." But purpose is also what drives the United States in its international action. Hence, it has never wavered in its belief that the war in Iraq, and subsequent exercise in state-building, have been legitimate.

What Holds It All Together?

The appeal to purposes brings us back to the central question of this Colloquium: Is it pragmatism, or common values and goals, that underpin transatlantic relations today? Can we continue to speak of a transatlantic community if all that holds it together is "bookkeeping"? I suspect, as did many Colloquium participants, that the answer is "no." As the great British parliamentarian and philosopher, Edmund Burke, once wrote:

> In the intercourse between nations, we are apt to rely too much on the instrumental part. We lay too much weight upon the formality of treaties and compacts … Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life. They have more than the force of treaties in themselves. They are obligations written in the heart.[14]

What has become clear, however, is that both sides of the Atlantic must renew their commitment to those resemblances and conformities. Values and beliefs are best articulated in situations of conflict — in opposition *to* something. Yet, in the latter decades of the twentieth century, liberal-capitalism was largely unopposed and basking in its significant victories. In this first decade of a

[14]Edmund Burke, "First Letter on a Regicide Peace," in *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke,* ed. Paul Langford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981-present), Vol. IX, p. 247.

new century, the transatlantic community must return to its foundations and reassert them. A procedural focus is no longer enough.

In our final session, André Pratte and Michael Clarke suggested that the bonds joining the members of the transatlantic alliance are less easy to articulate than they were during the time of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Mackenzie King. For at least the last three decades, the priority for transatlantic diplomacy and policy-making has been to maintain the postwar institutions that embodied the aspirations of the Founding Fathers of the transatlantic community. But is this game still possible? Today, it is difficult to embody the transatlantic relationship in a single institution like NATO. In fact, it is interesting to note just how little attention was paid during the Colloquium to traditional institutions such as the Commonwealth, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation, or NATO. As Michael Clarke argued, institutions like these "no longer capture the dynamism of western societies." Moreover, as we have seen, different perceptions of threat are proving corrosive to old Cold War structures.

Does this then spell death for the transatlantic community? According to André Pratte, we must understand where the divergence *really* lies, and ensure that we are not exaggerating it. On human rights and democracy, we remain aligned. There may be a worthwhile debate over *how* to create the conditions for liberal democracy, and whether western societies themselves are succeeding, but the desired endpoint is not in doubt. It is an obvious point, but nonetheless crucial to state: most individuals who live in the transatlantic community would be comfortable living under the tenets of the US Bill of Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or the new EU Constitution.

On social issues such as gay marriage, abortion, stem-cell research, or the death penalty, there are real differences between government *policy* in Europe and Canada on the one hand, and the United States on the other. However, if we scratch beneath the surface, we see pockets of conservative and liberal values at work on both sides of the Atlantic. In reality, there are not two

separate sets of values, European-Canadian and American, but several intersecting sets of values, with the largest area still being the intersection.[15] Even if we take the most talked-about difference between the United States and Europe, the importance of religion, generalizations are difficult to sustain, particularly with respect to countries such as Poland and Ukraine.

On the realm of foreign policy, there is a noticeable gap in style between the US and its European and Canadian allies. While the Bush administration seems to act on instinct or faith, the technocrats in Ottawa and Brussels prefer facts and analysis. But how far can this difference really take us? As André Pratte asked Colloquium participants: "If Tony Blair had been the leader of the 'coalition of the willing,' rather than George W. Bush, would Canadians have been more likely to support it?"

There are, nonetheless, two important areas where values are diverging within the transatlantic community. The first is with respect to the rule of law at the international level. While the charge of unilateralism against the Bush administration is hard to maintain, Europeans and Canadians are justifiably troubled by Washington's disregard for a rule-based international system, one that extends not only to states, but also to individuals. The treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay was the most symbolic example of a deeper trend that must be halted if the transatlantic partnership is to survive. But in order to overcome this value conflict, we must understand its roots. According to Michael Clarke, much of the explanation lies in the different speeds at which Europe, Canada, and the United States have adjusted to globalization and transitioned from "nation-states" to "market states." Europe (and to a lesser extent Canada) has become postmodern: it has come to recognize, through painful experience, that unbridled sovereign ambition brings only blood and tears. Thus, European states pin their futures on negotiation, pooled sovereignty, and qualified majority voting. The US, by contrast, remains stubbornly

[15]Garton Ash, *Free World,* chapter two.

modern, and is reluctantly relinquishing the trappings of sovereign statehood.

The second difference relates to military power and its usefulness, particularly in the pursuit of progressive ideals. For Europeans (especially those who endured the horrors of Nazi occupation), war can never be just a "means" of foreign policy like any other. Because of its destructive and long-term effects — and its potential to breed crimes against humanity — war must always be a last resort. It is not a panacea for change, but a failure of diplomacy. It is this perspective, more than anything else, that makes the wounds of Iraq so difficult to heal. The brains behind Bush's foreign policy, such as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, insist that the United States must use this historic interregnum as the world's only superpower to actively shape the international system: if necessary, through the use of force.

Washington's European and Canadian allies are (understandably) nervous about the direction, and cost, of this transformational agenda. They have comprehended more quickly than their American cousins that the challenge for our post-9/11 world is not eliminating threats, but limiting vulnerability. In an age of cheap technology, this requires more than a massive build-up of conventional and nuclear weaponry. It also necessitates more attention to the sources of hostility, the possibilities for preventive diplomacy, and the long-term reconstruction of zones of conflict. Though the United States may not want to admit it, many countries around the world believe Europe and Canada are the more positive forces at work in solving global problems.

Where to from Here? A Potential Agenda for Canada-UK Relations

Most participants in the Canada-UK Colloquium believed that, despite these important differences, enough common ground remains to carry the transatlantic relationship forward. Indeed, the events of 2003 have tended to obscure some of the positive collaborative efforts of the 1990s, most notably in rebuilding the

Balkans. Rather than viewing differences as irreconcilable, the image of the transatlantic community going forward must be one of a division of labour. To use Kagan's terms, the world needs saloon-keepers just as much as it needs sheriffs.[16] Both Canada and Europe have important relationships, skills, and expertise to bring to bear in the zones of conflict and trouble spots that now grip Washington's imagination.

Moving beyond Iraq, there are a number of concrete action items that Canada and the UK in particular, as key members of the transatlantic community, can and must pursue:

- helping the Palestinians to embrace democratic reform, subdue their competing militia, and re-enter negotiations with Israel;
- supporting renovation of the United Nations according to the recommendations of the High Level Panel;
- encouraging institutional innovation, in the form of the L20, to focus on issues such as global health, world water supplies, and counter-terrorism;
- putting new energy and commitment behind the Millennium Development Goals and the Kyoto Protocol, and pursuing the next generation of sustainable development solutions;
- sharing our perspective on the nexus between security and development and embedding this perspective in peace-building missions;
- augmenting and refining the comparative advantage we have in state-building (particularly with respect to the rule of law and good governance); and
- engaging with the US in the crisis states it is most concerned about, such as Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Georgia

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[16]For an elaboration on what the division of labour might entail, see Menon, Nicolaidis, and Welsh, "In Defence of Europe."

Above all, we need to remember the importance of people-to-people ties. As Sir Andrew Burns observed in our first session, the bedrock of the transatlantic community has always been the friendship between ordinary people. "That friendship is the product of millions of individual visits, close family ties, intense student experiences, daily personal dealings between traders, investors and financiers and a huge common appetite for the cultural offerings of the different component countries." What makes this mix even more fascinating is the multicultural character of the countries that make up the transatlantic community, especially Canada and the UK. Indeed, it is the relatively successful integration of diverse communities that makes the British and Canadian experience so attractive, and so vital, to our twenty-first century world.

APPENDIX

PROGRAM/ PROGRAMME

Président du colloque/Colloquium Chairman:
Hugh Segal, President, Institute for Research and Public Policy (IRPP)

Thursday November 18, 2004/ Jeudi 18 novembre 2004

Salon Petit Frontenac Room
7:45 p.m. Cash bar/Bar payant

8:30 p.m. Welcome and informal dinner/Accueil et dîner informel

Friday November 19, 2004/ Vendredi 19 novembre 2004

Salon Place d'Armes Room
7:30 a.m. Breakfast/Petit déjeuner

Salon Jacques Cartier Room
8:45 a.m. **Opening remarks/Mot de bienvenue :**
Baroness Fookes, Chairman of the British Committee, CUKC
Professor Robert Wolfe, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University
Introduction of the chairman, Hugh Segal, President, IRPP

9:00 a.m. **Session 1/Séance 1 : Current State of Transatlantic Relations**
Canada: Paul Heinbecker, Centre for International Governance Innovation, former Canadian ambassador to the UN
UK: Sir Andrew Burns KCMG, Honorary President British Committee CUKC, Chairman, Royal Holloway, University of London

10:30 a.m. **Coffee Break/Pause café**

10:45 a.m. **Session 2/Séance 2 : Culture and International Intervention**
Canada: Professor David Haglund, Queen's University
UK: Rosemary Righter, Associate Editor of The Times

Salon Place d'Armes Room
12:45 p.m. **Lunch/Déjeuner**

Salon Jacques Cartier Room

2:00 p.m. **Session 3/Séance 3 : Humanitarian Action**
Canada: Professor Talbot Imlay, Université Laval
UK: Lord David Hannay GCMG, CH, Member of the UN Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

3:30 p.m. **Coffee Break/Pause café**

3:45 p.m. **Session 4/Séance 4 : Protecting the Commons: The Case of Climate Change**
Canada: Professor Richard Peltier, University of Toronto
UK: Sir Crispin Tickell GCMG, KCVO, Chancellor of the University of Kent

5:30 p.m Gather in the main Lobby of the Château Frontenac for transportation to the reception at City Hall/Rencontre dans le hall d'entrée du Château Frontenac pour le transport à la réception à l'Hôtel de Ville

6:00 p.m. **Reception/Vin d'honneur**
City Hall of Quebec City/Hôtel de ville de Québec
Host/Hôte : **Jacques Joli-Coeur**
Deputy mayor and councillor for international relations/ Maire suppléant et conseiller responsable des relations internationales
Conseiller municipal/City councillor
District électoral de Samuel-De Champlain, Arrondissement de la Cité

7:00 p.m. Gather at the entrance for transportation to the dinner/ Rencontre à l'entrée pour le transport au dîner

7:30 p.m. **Dinner/Dîner**
Keynote speaker/Conférencière d'honneur :
Barbara McDougall, P.C. O.C., C.F.A., LL.D.
Former minister of external affairs/Ancienne ministre des Affaires extérieures
Senior Counsel, Aird & Berlis
Le Cercle de la Garnison de Québec
97, rue St-Louis Street

Saturday November 20, 2004/
Samedi 20 novembre 2004

	Salon Place d'Armes Room
7:30 a.m.	Breakfast/Petit déjeuner
	Salon Jacques Cartier Room
9:00 a.m.	**Session 5/Séance 5 : Trade and Economics**
	Canada: Daniel Gagnier, Senior Vice President, Corporate and External Affairs, Alcan, and President, Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters
	UK: Sir Nicholas Bayne, KCMG, London School of Economics
10:30 a.m.	**Coffee Break/Pause café**
10:45 a.m.	**Session 6/Séance 6 : A Transatlantic Community of Values?**
	Canada: André Pratte, Chief Editorialist, *La Presse*
	UK: Professor Michael Clarke, Kings College, London
	Salon Place d'Armes Room
12:45 p.m.	**Lunch/Déjeuner**
	Salon Jacques Cartier Room
2:00 p.m.	**Session 7/Séance 7: Rapporteur**
	Professor Jennifer M. Welsh, Oxford University
3:15 p.m.	***Salon Montmorency Room***
	Meeting of the organizers of the 2005 Colloquium/ Réunion du comité organisateur du colloque 2005
	Salon Rose Room
7:30 p.m.	**Informal dinner/Dîner informel**

Sunday November 21, 2004/
Dimanche 21 novembre 2004

	Salon St-Louis Room
8:00 a.m.	Breakfast/Petit déjeuner

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS/ LISTE DES PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRMAN/PRÉSIDENT :
Mr. Hugh Segal
Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP)

RAPPORTEUR :
Professor Jennifer M. Welsh
Oxford University

ADVISER TO THE UK COMMITTEE/
CONSEILLER DU COMITÉ DU ROYAUME-UNI
Mr. William Hopkinson

CANADIAN ORGANIZERS OF THE 2004 COLLOQUIUM/
ORGANISATEURS CANADIENS DU COLLOQUE 2004

Professor Robert Wolfe
Queen's University

Professor David Haglund
Queen's University

Professor Louis Bélanger
Institut québécois des hautes études internationales de l'Université Laval

Mr. Hugh Segal
Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP)

SPEAKER, DINNER, NOVEMBER 19/
CONFÉRENCIÈRE, DÎNER DU 19 NOVEMBRE

Barbara McDougall, P.C. O.C., C.F.A., LL.D.
Former minister of external affairs/Ancienne ministre des Affaires extérieures
Senior Counsel, Aird & Berlis

CANADIAN SPEAKERS (in order of presentation)/
CONFÉRENCIERS CANADIENS (en ordre de présentation)

Mr. Paul Heinbecker
Centre for International Governance Innovation

Professor David Haglund
Queen's University

Professor Talbot Imlay
Université Laval

The Honourable Barbara McDougall, P.C. O.C., C.F.A., LL.D.
Former minister of external affairs/Ancienne ministre des Affaires extérieures
Senior Counsel, Aird & Berlis

Professor Richard Peltier
University of Toronto

M. Daniel Gagnier
Corporate and External Affairs, Alcan

M. André Pratte
Chief Editorialist, *La Presse*

BRITISH SPEAKERS (in order of presentation)/
CONFÉRENCIERS BRITANNIQUES (en ordre de présentation)

Sir Andrew Burns, KCMG
Honorary President, British Committee, CUKC,
Chairman, Royal Holloway, University of London

Ms. Rosemary Righter FRGS
Associate Editor of *The Times*

Lord David Hannay of Chiswick, GCMG, CH
Member of the UN Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
Cross-bench member of House of Lords

Sir Crispin Tickell GCMG, KCVO
Chancellor of the University of Kent

Sir Nicholas Bayne, KCMG
London School of Economics

Professor Michael Clarke
King's College London

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The Globe and Mail

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Professor Amy Verdun
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Mr. John Bridgeman CBE, TD, DL
Chairman of various organisations

Mr. Peter Chenery, FRSA
British Council Representative, Ottawa

Mr. Dan Clayton-Jones, OSTJ, TD, KLJ, DL
Honorary Canadian Consul to Wales

Mr. John Cooke
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Mr. George Edmonds-Brown
Executive Secretary British Committee, CUKC

Mr. Robert Elegant
Writer and journalist

Mr. Julian Filochowski, CMG, OBE
Catholic Agency for Overseas Development.

Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald
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Mr. David Reddaway, CMG, MBE
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Mr. Martin Rickerd, OBE, MVO
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Ms. Maria Ryan
University of Birmingham

Mr. Angus Robertson, MP
MP for Moray (SNP), Scottish Shadow Minister
for Defence and Foreign Affairs

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