The Canada UK Colloquia

The Commonwealth Foundation Britain and Canada

University of Leeds, England
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INTRODUCTION

In our planning of this colloquium, we determined from the start not to tramp again over themes already well treated at the gathering of 197 1, or elsewhere; for instance, we felt that the history of relations between Britain and Canada from the time of the Balfour Declaration to the 19 50s had been excellently described on many occasions. We did not wish to pursue again all those doubtful analogies between Scotland and Quebec. On the other hand, we did wish to find time and attention for subjects which do not enter as often as they should into meetings of this kind; literary influences, in prose and poetry alike; cultural relations; the promotion of contacts between universities and colleges; and even in the sessions devoted to economic and trading links, we tried not to emphasize the political aspects too heavily.

In order to allow everyone a good opportunity to take part in the discussions, we resolved to keep the numbers down to *30* or 50, even though that decision meant the exclusion of many whom we would have wished to invite. We looked for distinguished figures from the world of government and diplomacy, from business, the civil service, and the cultural life of both countries. We were concerned with Anglo-Canadian relations of the immediate past, the present day and even of the future, which, as the historians point out to us with regularity, is not to be foreseen but which practical men have to predict.

The papers were circulated in advance, and paper-givers offered the opportunity to speak for ten minutes at the beginning of their sessions. The reader of this account may therefore, if he so wishes, follow the experience of those who attended the colloquium, by studying the papers first and then turning up the record of the discussion which follows; or may take papers on one or two subjects only, and refer to the discussion of those items. However, while recognizing that there were many aspects of Anglo-Canadian relations upon which we could not dwell in a conference of two days, we did find themes which recurred, sometimes unexpectedly, in our talks. Although the record of the discussions necessarily omits many interesting points, we hope that it does bring forward the main issues presented. Officials at the colloquium attended in their private capacities; but all members were promised that they would not be 'Hansardized'. No attempt has been made to impose an artificial smoothness on the record of the discussion, or to pretend that agreed views were reached on every issue.

Alas, at the last minute two of the eminent Canadians who had presented

papers could not attend; Professor Arnold Smith's illness deprived the University of Leeds of the pleasure of welcoming back a most valued honorary graduate, while Dr Reuber, who had been appointed Deputy Minister of Finance since the preparation of his paper (it is not suggested that these two events were directly connected) could not come because of the urgent business detaining him in Ottawa after the decision to raise the bank rate.

The colloquium was attended by:

Mr Peter W. Bennett	Chairman of W. H. Smith & Co.
Mr Martin S. Berthoud	Head of North American Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Professor Claude Bissell	President of the University of Toronto, 1958–71; since then University Professor at Toronto.
Mr William G. Buchanan	Vice-President, Corporate Affairs Europe, Canadian National Railways.
Professor Hedley Bull	Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford.
Mr John Chadwick	Director, Commonwealth Foundation.
Mr Barnett J. Danson	Minister for National Defence, Canada, 1976–9.
Professor David Dilks	Professor of International History, University of Leeds.
Sir John Ford	British High Commissioner at Ottawa.
Lord Nicholas Gordon Lennox	Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Mr Allan E. Gotlieb	Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada.
Professor John W. Holmes	Director Emeritus, Canadian Institute of International Affairs.
Mr Gerry F. G. Hughes	Minister (Commercial), Canadian High Commission, London.
Sir John Johnston	British High Commissioner at Ottawa, 1974-78.
Dr Peter Lyon	Secretary of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London.
Professor Peyton V. Lyon	Professor of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa.

The Hon. Paul Martin	**Canadian High Commissioner in the UK.**
Mr Herbert Pickering	**Agent-General for Alberta, London.**
Mr P. Michael Pitfield	**Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet in Ottawa, 197 5–9; Mackenzie King Visiting Professor of Government, Harvard, from September 1979.**
Sir Leo Pliatzky	**Permanent Secretary, Department of Trade, London, 197 7-9.**
Mrs Beryl Plumptre	**Former member of the Economic Council of Canada and Vice-Chairman of the Anti-Inflation Board; Reeve of Rockcliffe Park Village, Ottawa.**
Mr Patrick L. Reid	**Minister for Public Affairs at the Canadian High Commission, London.**
Mr R. Gordon Robertson	**Secretary to the Cabinet, Ottawa, 196 3-7 5, and Secretary to the Cabinet for Federal-Provincial Relations since 1975.**
Professor Dennis Stairs	**Professor of Political Science., Dalhousie University.**
Professor Thomas H. B. Symons	**Vice-President, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.**
Rt Hon. Lord Trend	**Secretary of the Cabinet, 1963-7 3 ; Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford.**
M. Robert Trudel	**Executive Adviser to the Agent-General for Quebec in London.**
Professor William Walsh	**Professor of Commonwealth Literature, University of Leeds.**
Mr Jack H. Warren	**Canadian High Commissioner, London, 197 1-4; Co-ordinator for Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 1977-9.**

Miss Judy Adams and Mr Michael Hellyer, Academic Relations Officer at Canada House, attended as observers.

The posts given are those held at the time of the colloquium. The papers are mostly printed as they were written in the late summer of 1979. The reader will realize that we met shortly after changes of government in both

countries, though the discussion did not dwell lengthily, as it had done in 197 1, upon the personalities of the two Prime Ministers. No one at Leeds laid claim, at least in public, to clairvoyant qualities. The early fall of the Clark administration was not foreseen.

The record of the previous colloquium (*Britain and Canada; Survey of a Changing Relationship,* edited by Dr Peter Lyon, Frank Cass, London 1976) is indispensable reading for any one interested in this subject and deserves to be more widely known, especially in Canada. That gathering had met in the shadow of the Nixon administration's sweeping economic measures of August *197* 1, which provided a reminder of the towering American dimension. In the interval of eight years, Britain had become relatively weaker. The entry into the EEC had upset the balance and emphasis of old relationships, which successive British governments of both parties had found inadequate as a basis for political or economic relations. On the other hand, it was at least arguable that the Community had not thus far provided the economic advantages which had been confidently anticipated by some, and there were important senses in which the new relationship with Europe did not provide an alternative or substitute for close links with the USA, or in other spheres for the Commonwealth connection. In particular, the role of Britain as a base and a nodal point for the defence of Europe had if anything grown in significance between the first colloquium and the second.

Nor has membership of the EEC enhanced Anglo-French relations notably. This fact has its bearing on many aspects of Anglo-Canadian relations. The apparent decline of the Federal Government's power in Canada seems to stand in contrast with the process in the USA. The necessary preoccupation of Canadian governments with internal questions, and perhaps a smaller appetite to play the leading international role which had characterized Mr Pearson s time as Secretary of State for External Affairs and Prime Minister, also have their bearing upon the whole range of Canada's contacts with other powers. During the 1970s, Canada's gross national product has moved substantial1 closer to Britain's, though derived from a population less -than half that oI the UK. By 1979, however, both countries appeared to show acute symptoms of a similar kind; a high rate of inflation, and heavy unemployment, In the month when the colloquium met, the Canadian government's holdings of foreign currency reserves declined by nearly $600,000,000 and the Canadian dollar fell steadily in value. In Newfoundland more than 14 per cent of the insured working population was unemployed, and in New Brunswick more than 10 per cent. In Quebec the

figure was a little over 9 per cent; whereas in the Western Provinces of Canada, unemployment was very much lower and the economic prospect much brighter. Quite apart from all the difficulties which such a situation creates in the relations between the Federal Government and the Provincial administrations, it is hard to resist the impression that a substantial shift of political weight and influence will follow this transformation of the country's economic life. The results of the Canadian elections in 1979 and 1980 do nothing to diminish this impression. Nevertheless, it seems probable that the British economy has the deeper structural weaknesses.

Like those who attended the meeting at Cumberland Lodge, we were conscious that a harmonious and beneficial relationship, cemented for an older generation by the shared sacrifice of both wars, may crumble away if we presume too much on the past. The devoted reader who follows the records of discussions will see how constantly this refrain was repeated. No doubt some of the proposals will prove more practical than others. Some have already produced good results. There is every hope that by the time of the next colloquium, the invitation to which from our Canadian colleagues proved universally welcome, there will be substantial progress to report. Many societies, professional associations and clubs do invaluable work for Anglo-Canadian relations in their own fields. That may be the mode of operation best suited to the habits of the two countries; but in times when governments are determined to cut their spending, competition for funds between organisations with not dissimilar purposes often means a dissipation of effort. It is not simply a question of money, for large sums may be spent to poor effect; yet many of the suggestions advanced at the colloquium cannot be brought -to fruition unless substantial funds are raised from trusts and industry. To put it no higher, it is surprising to find that there is no organization the chief purpose of which is to do for relations between Canada and Britain what the Australia-Britain Society is accomplishing in its more difficult sphere,

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

A. Britain and Canada: a perspectiveview

Paper: Dr Peter Lyon

Dr Lyon remarked that although the colloquium would concentrate largely on the bilateral ties between Britain and Canada, those two countries had many multilateral engagements. In both countries, the relationship was generally regarded, and rightly, as cordial but unobtrusive, the continuous concern of a few specialists or minorities conducting affairs in private. The connection was comparatively little analysed in books or articles; a fact which might be regarded either as a sign of good health or as an index of indifference. The main ties between Britain and Canada, *Dr Lyon* argued, consisted of complex and discrete sets of professional, cultural and functional relationships, well known to those participating but screened from the public's view; for those actively engaged, the relationship assumed well-established channels and presumed a comfortable continuity. It remained a question for discussion whether this was, or would be in future, a wise assumption; the answer would depend on the ways in which present and future British/Canadian citizens behaved towards each other.

Dr Lyon remarked on the heightened concern about national identity within the United Kingdom as well as Canada. More were trying to identify 'Englishness' within 'Britishness', and the debates about devolution and the referenda in Scotland and Wales had raised fundamental questions about identities and allegiance. Citizenship and immigration were controversial and related issues. Nevertheless, problems of national identities and political allegiance were more acute and troublesome in Canada than in Britain. The fundamental issue of Quebec's future in relation to the confederation of Canada would reach an important climax shortly. It was notable though understandable that British reactions to the problem of Quebec were deliberately muted.

There existed on both sides a preoccupation with national identity and self interest which did at times inject an element of 'prickly irritability', of neuritis if not neurosis, into the relationship. Sometimes, particular issues would produce open disagreement; a recent example had arisen over Air Canada's use of Heathrow and the proposal that many of its flights should operate from Gatwick. Yet because so much that was, or might become, controversial was discussed in private, it was difficult for most people to learn much of such instances. Agreements were publicized, disagreements normally discussed in private. Such was the rare and in many ways enviable style of Canadian-British relations.

Dr Lyon suggested two areas as specially worthy of discussion: first, the character and working of the main instruments by which the normal business of the two countries is conducted. Were these instrumentalities functioning well? Secondly, what were the main forces which govern the policies of each country towards the other? Was there not some similarity between the prevailing orthodoxies for the management of the government and economy in Britain and Canada alike, an orthodoxy which owed little to the traditions of Mr Pearson or 'Butskellism', but perhaps more to Professors Hayek and Friedman? What had happened to 'Trudeaumania' in Canada? More generally, did the style and substance of Anglo-Canadian relations vary according to the party and power in each country; or did the relations between the officials matter more?

Finally, *Dr Lyon* remarked that Britain's academic relations, and perhaps her more broad interests, with Canada, were becoming better organized and more accurately mapped out. In the academic sphere, this greater coherence was largely due to the activities of the Foundation for Canadian Studies in the United Kingdom; the British Association for Canadian Studies; and the Academic Relations Division at Canada House; all of them launched in the 1970s. Even with the prevailing stringencies, there was a prospect of building up a complementary situation between British and Canadian academic life; alas, it remained true that this cause had greater support and enthusiasm from the Canadian government than from the British.

In the discussion, it was suggested that Canada found it difficult to function as an independent actor because of internal divisions; confederation had never rallied much popular support outside Ontario, nor had the country experienced the revolution or civil war which might have imposed unity. Rather, geography had reinforced history. The vast sprawl of territory had to cope with a multiplicity of cultures which readily became sources of internal division. Canada lived in the shadow of an energetic giant power, and had been crippled by that relationship. In the upshot, Canada barely existed as a nation in the sense of a whole entity possessing a common purpose. Rather, she was a country searching for an identity and lacking common experience or enthusiasm. When such uncertainties existed within, it was hard to construct a national interest which could be pursued in relations with other powers. To advance a Canadian interest consistently over a considerable period normally meant that regional interests had to be sacrificed or threatened, for a policy which would work to the advantage of one part of Canada would very often damage another. All this had to be borne in mind when Anglo-Canadian relations were reviewed; and the more so because that relationship did not possess a national appeal for Canadians and was therefore difficult to develop in a consistent way.

These observations provoked lively exchanges. Some speakers doubted the need for alarm about any lack of nationhood felt in Canada, and argued that a strident patriotism may produce aggressive but damaging foreign policies. It was doubtful whether the British possessed a particularly powerful feeling of nationhood. Moreover. it was argued that a younger generation in Canada did have a strong sense of identity, as had been illustrated at the Commonwealth Games at Edmonton, and a certain hostility to the United States was compatible with such a sense of nationhood. A very large number of people had by emigration to Canada since the war chosen it as their country and remained there with a sense of belonging.

It was conceded that especially in competitive sport it was easy and natural for the young to act with a sense of nationhood. However, this was hardly a sufficient basis for a country to adopt and pursue policies in vital matters affecting the whole nation; and whether or not a lack of national consciousness was a matter for concern, it was a reality in Canada which had to be recognized if the country and its problems were to be understood. Even the attempt to alleviate divisions in Canada in the matter of languages had been unacceptable to many.

A distinction was drawn between the problems of the Canadian government and the attitudes of the Canadian people, most of whom favoured central government and centralization not in the administrative sense but for the pulling-together of the country.

Canada was a truly federal state, with a dynamic tension between the central government and provinces and no such tendency to centralization as was evident in the USA. This made consistent national policies difficult to formulate, though there was no need to be pessimistic as to the outcome of the new relationship emerging between the federal government and the provinces. The process might be challenging, but was equally likely to be fruitful.

Frequent references were made in the discussion to Canada's preoccupation with her internal problems, her taste for introspection. This factor had a bearing on the decline of the British-Canadian relationship, to which so many of the conference papers had referred in different contexts. But there might be a further dimension; the relationship between Britain and Canada would be affected by the reaction of Britain to the tensions between the federal government and the provinces. The British government might facilitate the federal government's attempt to evoke a unity within Canada or, in pursuance of another view of British interests, might rest content with lip-service to Canadian unity while acting in a manner harmful to the fabric which the Canadian Government was trying to create. It was suggested that the British government might choose to act as protector of the provinces in the matter of the British North American Act, and the question was asked whether Britain should follow the requests of the government of Canada without question, or act according to her own judgement of the issues?

A considerable discussion followed this point. It was clear that the British government did not wish to be drawn into the constitutional debate within Canada, and it had announced that it would do whatever the Canadian parliament desired. But what would Britain do if the Canadian government, faced with irreconcilable differences within the country, acted in a manner contrary to normal parliamentary practice? For example, what would happen if an amendment to the British North American Act were proposed without a two-thirds majority; would the government in London consider this to be contrary to traditional practice and take a hostile view, or merely approve the Canadian government's wishes? The notion that the government in London would act as a guardian of the provinces was contested, but some concern was expressed about the possibility that this issue would be debated on the floor of the British House of Commons if the Canadian government acted without the agreement of all provinces. Although the British government would certainly act in accordance with the wishes of the Canadian parliament, it was quite possible the Canadians might carry the fight to Britain by persuading individual MP's that they had a responsibility to stand up for the rights of the provinces against Ottawa. While no one in the British government accepted the notion that there is a residual parental responsibility for the Canadian constitution, there could not be a guarantee of the outcome if parliament had to legislate in the circumstances of a divided Canada. In fact, a clear understanding had been reached between British and Canadian governments for many years, whereby the former would act according to the desires of the latter in the matter of the British North American Act. That this understanding was honoured had been shown by the refusal of British governments to act in respect of claims by Indians against the federal government. Moreover, individual MPs who might speak or act on behalf of the provinces would be in clear violation of the constitutional practice whereby one nation does not intervene in the internal affairs of the other. It was forcibly argued that the British

government had no right to look beyond the expressed wishes of the Canadian government.

Canada and Britain, it was said, had a somewhat similar status and position in the world; both were significant actors, with many shared interests. Their relations were now much less bedevilled by neurosis or irritability, more important factors in the past when the gap in strength between the two powers had been more marked. It remained to see if they were still important to each other; there it was vital to look at the broad interests of both and to search for common ground. The strong regional interests in Canada reduced the country's capacity to act strongly on the international scene; and foreign policy, requiring planning over a long period and a consistent approach, had been much hampered by that factor.

It was suggested that an examination of the 'Third Option' policy showed how difficult it is to reconcile divergent needs of different regions. Moreover, this policy, seeking to deflect Canada from too great a dependence on the USA, showed no significant move towards Britain; because Canada was looking to countries of greater economic growth, which would see the Canadian economy as useful to them. It might also be said that Britain had not seen Canada as especially relevant to her own interests; British energies in recent times had been directed towards the EEC and the United States. In sum, and although the two countries had a great deal in common, they pursued interests in foreign policy which did not necessarily accord. It was not a question of irritability, but rather of no perceived mutual need to act together. In most great issues of foreign policy, Britain and Canada saw each other as marginal. But this state of affairs need not necessarily be permanent; and with the two new governments in power there might well follow a redefinition of the relationship.

B. British-Canadian Literary Relations

Papers: Professor Claud Bissell and Professor William Walsh

Professor Bissell spoke of the strong European and British bias in the Canadian literature written in English, despite the fact that Canada was inundated with 'literature' from the United States, now quite independent of the British literary tradition. Moreover, Canadian television and radio and popular culture generally were dominated by the USA. In the field of literature, Canada was not indifferent to its neighbour; there had been many individual associations of influence and note; but there were negative factors which related to this European bias. There seemed little recognition in the US for Canadian literature, except for occasional attempts to absorb a few Canadian authors into the American literary scene. In Canada, the fact that popular culture was so dominated by the US excited a certain indignation. There was often an absence of formal structures in cultural relations. There was a lack of critical recognition for Canadian literature in Britain, though *Professor Bissell* judged that this was partly the fault of Canadians who in expressions of nationalism sometimes presented a face of aggressiveness. He suggested a need for Canadian and British critics to discuss the literature of both countries, perhaps through the medium of a journal like the New *York Review of* ***Books;*** in this way Canadian writers would be exposed to good criticism, and their work would reach a wider audience.

Within Canadian literature, *Professor Walsh* observed, there prospered much complex

and thriving poetry. For twenty or thirty years past a most vivid life had been portrayed in poetry and prose alike, to such a degree that the outsider was not conscious of a lack of national identity in Canada's literature. He doubted whether it was possible for any nation to have a powerful literature if there were not a set of tacit assumptions and a common sensibility. He defined four different notes in the Canadian sensibility: first, an English note, exemplified in Wilkinson's poetry which was of high distinction and, in the manner of G. M. Hopkins, united elegance with force; secondly, a European element, not specifically French, characterized by a quiet melancholy or a Viennese unease with life, such as was found in the works of Finch; thirdly, a strong Jewish tradition, notable in the poetry of Klein, who used the experience of being Jewish and almost denied Canadian unease about identity because of the wholeness of the Jewish perspective; fourthly, an indigenous North American element, where the saga of the traveller and the pioneer is portrayed. Professor *Walsh* distinguished Earle Birney as an exemplar of this North American note. These four strands within Canadian poetry exemplified a literature of extraordinary richness, promise and cultural quality, intimating a great promise for the future. *Professor Walsh* added that he judged a strong literature to be vital to the life of any country.

In the discussion it was generally agreed that many aspects of Canadian nationalism had seemed churlish and tiresome, with a distinct anti-American element. There was general agreement on Canada's need to develop her own culture, and the notion of a journal was welcomed, provided that it were not confined to poetry and prose but also included social science and history. It was noted that the Journal of Commonwealth Literature did provide a forum for discussion of the prose and poetry of Britain and Canada.

The account given by both speakers of a vigorous literature within Canada was welcomed. Why, if Canadian literature portrayed a confident sensibility, did other areas of Canadian life not reflect the same strength? The earlier discussion about a Canadian tendency to search for an identity was recalled, and it was asked whether there existed anything equivalent to the great 19th-century English novels which could hardly have been written by anyone outside the English life of the time, so vivid was their portrayal of the values and morals of 19th-century society. Though different strands had been identified within Canadian literature, was there a distinctively Canadian style of literature or literary concern? Another speaker noted that in the governing of an open society, it was necessary to be responsive to such literature, a good yardstick of public needs and the temper of society.

The paper-givers agreed that there was a unique body of Canadian literature providing a distilled spirit of the Canadian experience. This was a powerful reason why Canadian works should be better known to, and shared by, the British and American reading publics. True, some Canadians tended to bemoan the lack of an indigenous literature; this meant only that they were unaware of its richness. That view was questioned by one or two other members of the colloquium, who suggested that much of Canadian literature, like the society from which it emerged, was highly cosmopolitan,

It was suggested that of all the forms of Canadian art, the theatre contained the strongest roots in the British tradition. Yet there seemed to be much indifference within the UK to this body of work. The technical director of Toronto Arts Productions had,

through Professor Holmes, brought to notice the difficulties which arise in the Canadian theatre from the practice of selling North American performance rights of new British plays to producers in New York. The sale of such rights prevents most of the theatre-going public in Canada from seeing these productions within a reasonable time. Perhaps one play in ten placed in the hands of a New York producer by this method would go on a North American tour, which will probably touch Toronto but seldom any other Canadian city. The issue was whether Canadian theatre companies, private or public, should be given the right to negotiate performance rights within the boundaries of their own country. This could be achieved if British agents would separate Canadian performance rights from North American rights.

The difficulty of finding an adequate supply of Canadian books in Britain was regretted, and the causes were questioned. It became clear that Canadian members of the colloquium were far from satisfied with the supply of British books in Canada, and it was recognized that the new-found strength of the pound against the dollar did nothing to ease that position; on the other hand, it should make Canadian books a more attractive proposition in Britain. Books produced in Canada could not be sold in Britain simply in virtue of that fact, but only on their merits. The real difficulty was thus one of marketing. Among other problems, Canadian publishers were apparently reluctant to allow British publishers to print Canadian works, because of the danger that the latter might then flood the Canadian market as well. There was general agreement on the need for more energetic selling of suitable works in Britain and Canada alike, and a general welcome for the assurance from the *Chairman of W. H. Smith* that all these points would be carefully investigated.

Many important Canadian works, it appeared, were simply not sent to British critics or journals for review. It was proposed that more bilateral arrangements should be made between British and Canadian publishers. There was agreement that the Canadian publishers could sell considerably more in the British market; and in the light of the comparative lack of recognition which many Canadian works received in Britain, it seemed the more surprising that Canadian literature did contain so strong a British and European tradition.

C. Economic Links and Prospects

Papers: Mr J. H. Warren, Sir Leo Plaitzky (for the Department of Trade), Dr Grant Reuber.

***Sir Leo** Plaitzky* argued that whatever might be found in other contacts between Britain and Canada, there was no neurosis in the trade relations of the two countries. He cited as an example the discussions about the use of Heathrow or Gatwick airports, in the context of the recent international conference on civil aviation; a cut-throat affair in which the USA had done its best to protect the vested interests of Pan-Am, Britain had a severe problem of congestion at the airports; there was clearly a need to shift some traffic from Heathrow to Gatwick. The British government had not backed British Airways against Air Canada; rather, the two airlines had been on the same side against the government. Discussions between the British and Canadian authorities had been sensible, the positions

understood, the relationship not soured. The negotiations with the US government had been of a different kind.

Sir Lea suggested that the notion of a Free Trade Area between Britain and Canada had never been seriously pursued because it ran counter to the essence of the trading situation. The pull of the American market on Canada, and of the European one on the UK, had been irresistible. The UK-Canadian continuing committee, consisting of the two High Commissioners, the Head of the Department of Trade and the Head of the Department of Commerce and Finance, provided a useful forum in which the economic situations and trading opportunities of the two countries could be discussed, together with their respective positions in the multilateral system of international trade. The speaker emphasized the importance of the GATT arrangements, which had helped to prevent the recession from becoming something much worse; it was of course true that many other factors had militated in the same direction. He described how at some moments in the negotiations at Tokyo a breakdown seemed likely, for they had been extremely complicated discussions, especially with the EEC negotiating as a single group. He warned against any undue optimism about the outcome, for many problems of the utmost seriousness remained; unemployment, high inflation, the power of many countries to protect home markets. Though the most important aspect of the Anglo-Canadian trading relationship lay in the actions of those two powers within other groups, *Sir L. Pliatzky* did stress that Britain and Canada were still important markets for each other; though recent trade figures showed relative decline, the value of the trade had increased very substantially.

Ambassador Warren described Canada's sensitivity to tariff questions; a number of difficulties, including the relationship between the Federal Government and the Provinces, the much slower growth of the economy in recent years, and a variety of regional problems, had contributed to this sensitivity. However, the Canadian government was trying to liberalize trade and establish a clear position. The process of government had been widened for the purpose, and spokesmen for the Provinces, for industry and other sections of the national life had been brought into confidential discussions. The result had been that the government of Canada could reach an acceptable position, with all these groups working more closely together than before.

On the subject of the multi-national trade negotiations, *Mr Warren* explained that success was to be measured in terms of keeping the discussions going and avoiding a complete breakdown. There had been some more positive successes, and for Canada in general a mixture of gains and losses. The most important advantage had perhaps come in negotiations with the USA. Canada had often been confronted by the single voice of the EEC, and discussions with the Community had nearly broken down. It had not always been easy to know where the UK stood within the EEC and the inability of the Community's countries to reach agreement among themselves about a fisheries policy had prevented Canada from negotiating an agreement with them on that issue.

The speaker doubted whether in the near future such a comprehensive round of negotiations would be repeated; nevertheless, there was still much of the work to complete, and the talks would not cease. He said that when Britain had first joined the EEC, Canada had hoped that she would act as a benign influence, and modify its protectionism. It was difficult to tell whether this hope was being fulfilled. He judged that the weight of the UK

within the EEC was of the highest importance, and that in the main, Canada would continue to work with the UK through the medium of international institutions rather than within a bilateral relationship.

In the discussion, suggestions that Mr Clark's government had abandoned the Third Option were challenged. However, most observers seemed to believe that if the Third Option policy meant that the Government of Canada would take definite steps to divert trade from the USA towards Europe (rather than some general statement about the possibilities of diversification) this was unlikely to occur under the new Canadian administration. There had in the recent past been positive efforts to open avenues for Canadian trade, especially in respect of Germany; and that the policy was continuing was clear from the increased number of trade missions visiting Canada, especially in the west.

The possible antithesis between the USA and other parts of the world as trading partners was discussed at some length. The economic ties with the US were natural, automatic and based on a good understanding; no-one in Canada would want to scorn the country's best customer. Yet there was also a recognition of important markets outside North America; for example, the EEC, Japan and some other countries in the Far East. The government of Canada recognized that it should assist the private sector to penetrate these markets, and the connection between political and economic links was emphasized. In today's conditions, with a large investment of money and effort before a major foreign market could be opened up, the presence of a stable political relationship was vital. The 'Third Option' policy had therefore been as much a political exercise as an economic one and it was suggested that, even if different language were used, part of the same impetus might be followed by the Clark government.

Although *Mr Reuber* was unable to speak to his paper, it was discussed. In response to a suggestion that greater incentives were needed to stimulate trade between Canada and the United Kingdom, it was asserted that much was already being done. All indications for the future showed that trade between the two countries should increase not only in value but perhaps relatively to trade with other parts of the world. It appeared that Canada, especially in the western provinces, offered excellent opportunities for British investment and export, and that much had already been done to encourage visits there from teams of industrialists and financiers. Some important joint projects were described, such as the liaison between the Edmonton Research Park and the Research Park at Cambridge.

Several speakers identified a growing Canadian interest in the British market, but noted the difficulty of securing more than minor changes in the percentage of trade between two major countries; a very large proportion of Canadian trade would always lie with the United States. In the general development of new avenues for trade, the removal of misconceptions was often the first step. For instance, many provincial governments in Canada had to make great efforts to persuade potential trading partners and investors in Germany that they had mistaken notions about business in Canada. On the reverse side, there were many in Canada who had assumed that German industry was essentially monolithic and that Canadian attempts to penetrate that market would be hindered. In fact, it turned out that there were many excellent small enterprises within German industry. In the realm of investment within Canada, it was noted that the British proportion was high, much higher than its share of trade. It was thought that British investment was apt to be highly

specialized, and not as firmly tied to the growth industries as the investment of Japan or Germany. Now that an agreement had been concluded between the EEC and Canada, a new channel for trade had been negotiated and it remained to be seen how well it would be used. A number of the major British companies, including Boots, W. H. Smith, Marks & Spencers and several of the major banks, had recently increased their investment in Canada.

The judgement that political links had to be firm and friendly before a large trade could flourish was generally accepted and the good relations which had existed between the governments of Canada and West Germany, and between Chancellor Schmidt and Mr Trudeau, were cited as examples. Other influences were needed to make such links effective; in this case, the importance of the German community within Canada had certainly played a part. It was thought essential to follow up official contacts with good personal links among the politicians and the businessmen. Many of the latter, not only in Britain, were hesitant to adapt to the commercial practices of other countries ; there was a reluctance to invest money and time, for an uncertain reward, in coping with different rules and conventions, especially if there appeared to be easier markets for the taking elsewhere.

The general condition of British business and industry was pointed to as the reason for its poor performance. Profits in British companies, by comparison with those of their main competitors abroad, had fallen sharply for some years. Recessions accordingly hit British companies harder, and it was more difficult to reinforce success when markets were buoyant. While new trading links between Britain and Canada were to be welcomed, the most important single task for Britain in this field was to increase profits, so that companies had two resources to reinforce their position when good opportunities arose, and enough to invest largely for the future. It was generally thought that the ending of exchange controls would have beneficial results.

The decline in the relative importance of Britain and Canada as customers to each other was mentioned repeatedly in the discussion, in which a number of participants asked whether it was Britain's entry into the EEC which had led to a new concentration upon Europe, or whether an increase in British trade with Europe had made that step more desirable or even inevitable. Answering this and other points, *Sir L. Pliatzky* drew a distinction between trade policy and trade promotion. Patterns of trade were changing constantly and had to be adjusted to. The most important factor was the terms for export credits; some orders could be won or lost on this score. A system for trade promotion was necessary, but it was to be doubted whether it made a very substantial difference to the essentials; probably it only affected a small part of the volume of trade. Trade policy was a different matter, involving tariffs, customs barriers and general questions of access to other markets. It was suggested that at the recent GATT negotiations, Canada had achieved as much as she could expect for some time; for until disagreements within the European Community had been resolved, countries outside it were unlikely to obtain much more.

The main purpose of the multilateral trade negotiations was described *as* the containing of greed and selfishness, an effort to give the market system a chance to work. The crucial factor was the volume of world trade. In the UK, industrial performance had often been bad, and tended to create a vicious circle whereby poor performance led to a stronger demand for protection. The more uncompetitive sections of industry became, the greater

the need for protection. At one point in the mid-70s, it had almost seemed that a straight choice would have to be made between complete reliance upon international aid, or the rigours of a fortress economy. There were of course other methods of dealing with some of the problems, or at any rate some of the symptoms. Subsidization was a method favoured by the French Government. With the new Conservative administration in Britain, it was likely that rather different policies would be followed. The enduring feature, however, was that if a high level of international trade was desired, it was essential to keep unduly protective policies at bay. This could be achieved only by a reasonable level of economic growth and the avoidance of high unemployment. To this goal the multi-national trade negotiations had contributed something; but the domestic policies of the powers would be more significant.

As for the position of British trade with Europe, broadly 50 per cent of the trade was with the EEC or with the EFTA countries combined. This represented a very large shift from the patterns of even a few years ago, and consisted of a great variety of products. One benefit of the EEC association lay in its tendency to keep the level of world trade high, since it outlawed trade barriers between member states and therefore promoted a high volume of trade, and with it economic growth. This was despite the protectionism of the organization as a whole in its relations with the rest of the world. The UK faced certain dilemmas within the Community. If the dispute over the budget could not be resolved, Britain's attitude to the EEC might become an open question again; many of different political persuasions thought that France and Germany were being too greedy and obstinate, so that if the positions of those countries remained unchanged, the situation might become tense.

In the further discussion, there was some disagreement about usefulness of trade promotion. About one-third of the members of the British Diplomatic Service were engaged in the task of promoting British trade. It was argued, with a good deal of acceptance, that Britain's record would have been much worse but for this considerable effort. Reference was also made to pessimistic figures brought forward in some of the papers and rather gloomy predictions for future economic relations between Britain and Canada. The increased volume of British trade with the EEC was thought to account for the trend in part; and it was argued that while Canadian exports to Britain had not quite kept pace with the devaluation of money, it had been on the balance a good performance by Canada to have retained a substantial export market in Britain. If one compared the USA and Canada as customers of the British, it seemed spectacular that British exports to the US had risen by 217 per cent; but by comparison, Canadian exports to the USA had risen more than fourfold, and imports into Canada from the USA had increased by less than that figure. In addition to the trade figures, the fact that British investment in Canada was so high, with more coming from Britain than from all the other countries of Europe put together, was thought significant and hopeful.

The considerable diversion of Canada's trade from the UK to other parts of Europe, and over a comparatively short period, was linked to the development of new political relationships, especially in the case of Germany. Thus what was true for the UK had proved true for Canada too. In both instances the secure political relationship had contributed heavily to an increase of trade. Carrying this interaction between political and

economic factors a stage further, the notion that within North America there existed a natural economic unity was questioned; rather, it was suggested that the USA and Canada were competitive economic units. The volume of Canadian trade with the USA, in other words, was the result of administrative policy and regulations stemming from a political relation&p, man-made as well as geographical. It was not unnatural for Canada to be seeking other partners. Europe was not a natural economic unit, but that fact did not deflect Britain from an increased concentration upon her trade with the EEC and European countries outside it. No more than France did the UK wish to lose her identity within the EEC, or Canada her identity alongside the United States. The Canadians might in fact draw some encouragement from difficulties within the EEC, for they demonstrated clearly that Europe still consisted in essence of separate units stubbornly defending their independence, and Canadians might therefore look to the establishment of still closer economic links with the United States without fearing that they would be politically submerged. This analogy gave rise to a good deal of debate. Some members of the colloquium judged that there could be no useful comparison between Canada's position in relation to the USA, and Britain's in relation to Europe. Others spoke of dyadic relationships between unequal powers in which the smaller country had not been absorbed. It was also suggested that the inequality of power between Canada and the United States had some parallel with Britain's position within the Community. There had been two phases of Britain's decline as a world power ; it had been apparent in the 19 50s that she could not match the USA and more recently it transpired that she was not the equal of powers like France or Germany. It had once been thought that within the EEC the three powers might act together; but in most issues that had not happened and the economic advantages to Britain of membership had been less than predicted.

It was agreed that the number of British tourists travelling to the USA and Canada had increased markedly within the last year or two. The strength of the pound against the dollar aided the process. Conversely, the number of Canadians visiting the UK had fallen, and there had been a substantial decline in *the* number of students coming from Canada *to* British universities; this was attributed to the combined effects of the exchange rate, the generally high cost of living and the large increases in fees. It was also thought that the absence of a central authority with responsibility for education in Canada led to difficulties of organization and planning. A general hope was expressed that more could be done to encourage cultural exchanges,

More generally most members of the colloquium shared a conviction that Britain and Canada had enjoyed a special relationship of value to themselves and to a wider community; that it had been somewhat eroded; and that a positive effort should be made to restore its vitality.

D. Britain and Canada in the Wider World: The Commonwealth Context, NATO and the USA

Papers : Professors Peyton Lyon and Arnold Smith.

Professor Lyon discussed the foreign policy of the Clark administration which suggested that the issue of nuclear weapons might be a future source of tension between Britain and Canada. However, there was no indication that this issue would be raised immediately in the context of NATO, and he anticipated that Canada would remain the quiet nation on

the NATO Council which it had been under Mr Trudeau's Government. Doubting whether the 'Third Option' policy was moribund, Professor Lyon conceded that public appreciation of the policy was slight but judged that the merits of the policy might become more apparent at a later date. He remarked that in most issues of British-Canadian relations, there was a lack of intensity or passion. A great challenge to both countries, or a sharp argument between them, might provide the occasion for a more urgent examination of the relationship; as it was, he felt that it would probably continue in a path of mutual indifference.

Although *Professor Smith* was prevented by illness from speaking to his paper, it was discussed by the colloquium. *Professor John Holmes* spoke of the modern Commonwealth and suggested that it was in a period of transformation; for at Lusaka, a month or two earlier, it had performed an extraordinary role which could not have been predicted by those involved in the shaping of the organization immediately after the war. If the Lusaka compromise did produce a result, that must strengthen the Commonwealth and enhance its importance, though it did not follow that if the compromise proved unsuccessful the Commonwealth would be proportionately devalued, He doubted whether other organizations, for instance NATO, could have played the same role. Clearly the relationship between Britain and Canada had to be seen within the context of a number of organizations of which the Commonwealth was only one. In its post-war form, the Commonwealth had been conceived as a largely consultative body, the shape which seemed at the time to offer the best hope for the future. Though it had grown so greatly in recent years, Professor Holmes thought the Commonwealth's discussions were now of a higher value than those of the immediate post-war period. Most of the issues being discussed in that forum were of greater importance than they had sometimes been in the past and there remained many subjects which concerned all the Commonwealth countries, and particularly Britain and Canada. They needed to be thoroughly appraised, and the fact that the discussions took place within a multilateral context should not be allowed to mask their significance.

It was suggested in discussion that in the eyes of the British public, as distinct from the government, the Commonwealth had declined in importance since the previous colloquium held in 1971. That had been the time of Britain's negotiation of entry into the EEC, when the Government had had to establish its priorities. It had also been a time of sharp difficulties over the issue of arms for South Africa, although in the event the Commonwealth proved very useful in the resolution of that crisis. The Lusaka Conference of August, 1979, should be viewed as the culmination of a process of learning over the previous months ; the new Conservative government in Britain had realized that it was impossible to rush into the recognition of Bishop Muzorewa's regime, chiefly because of the effect which such recognition would produce on Britain's relations with other Commonwealth countries. There was in Britain a persistent ambivalence towards the Commonwealth; comparatively little was known about its working by most people. This, it was suggested, was a most unfortunate position.

The enhanced role of the Commonwealth was seen as the result of changing patterns of international politics, and the diminution in importance of some regional associations. It was pointed out that the British press reported the Lusaka meeting as if Rhodesia were the only issue; in fact, the main sessions had been occupied by other subjects. It appeared that

Canada had played a modest role. Nevertheless, the general importance of the Commonwealth was stressed because it provided a forum for discussion and consultation, one which was vital to the international community as a whole, and was capable of generating practical discussions and programmes. Moreover, the form of Commonwealth conferences often contributed to their usefulness. The Commonwealth was a consultative body and also a club, a friendly association where the leaders could often play a more important role than was possible in other gatherings, or independently. There was a willingness to talk and listen; the fact of scheduled meetings stimulated consultation and allowed for preparation of policy; whereas the private meetings, an opportunity for informal contact, allowed unstructured discussions on matters of interest, when the leading statesmen and officials could talk at greater leisure than is normally possible in summit meetings, and need not be too concerned about striking public postures. The attitude of the Canadian representatives at Lusaka had contributed to the spirit of reasonableness and co-operation which prevailed there and the fact that Mr Clark, as a newly elected Prime Minister, had been relaxed and unflurried at Lusaka was a good sign of Canada's maturity at international meetings and reflected the nature of these gatherings.

It was remarked that Prime Minister Trudeau's opinion of the Commonwealth had altered markedly as he came to recognize its value and to be regarded as an elder statesman within an association which fostered good personal relationships among its leaders. Amidst the polarization of countries into blocs and the rigid structures of voting in other international organizations, which reduced their effectiveness, the Commonwealth had survived comparatively free from such tendencies. Although now a large body, it was neither split into groups nor too formal in its processes; on the whole the newer members seemed content to leave it to older, though not necessarily larger, nations to play the leading roles.

It was argued that the Commonwealth, though not becoming less important on a balanced view of its function, had suffered from contracting horizons in Britain which followed the reduction of overseas obligations, the concentration upon Europe and the effort put into membership of the EEC. It was comparatively rare in the press or television or radio, or even in many universities, to find any serious attempt made to explain the evolution and working of the modern Commonwealth. A chasm had grown up between the experts' view of its usefulness and the more general perception; and the lack of serious education on this score had important implications for British-Canadian relations, for this was the only organization in which those two countries were still the major actors.

A member of the colloquium with long experience of Commonwealth conferences pointed out that one important strength of the association lay in its freedom from the need to advocate a response to every difficulty or crisis. That did not mean that the Commonwealth could not act usefully on particular occasions; but it did imply that there was no call to have a whole apparatus of rules or a veto, and no compulsion to reach strict or binding formulae. He regarded the Commonwealth, in short, as an example of advanced political behaviour where there was an opportunity to discuss complicated matters in a civilized way. This was what advanced parliamentary democracies tried to achieve, these were habits of the utmost value. They owed much to the example of the older Commonwealth countries, not least Canada and Britain. As the world faced increased threats to political freedom, it was more than ever necessary for like-minded countries to consult,

even when they could not reach immediate agreement about policy. They had at least some economic problems to face in common, they had to weigh the risks of Russian aggression and the tilting of the strategic balance away from ample American superiority; it seemed likely that the policy of detente would collapse; there were risks of a wholesale shift in the social and technological fabric of many societies. These changes and dangers threatened social stresses which might undermine political freedom. Such issues could be dealt with only by individual governments; but consultation with and help from allies were vital, as was exchange of views between public and academic opinion in different countries about the ways in which political freedom and reasoned discussion might be sustained against these threats.

Canada's role in the world was pointed to as a vital element in the relations with Britain. Had the two countries done enough, in their relations with other powers, to advance each other's interests and views? Britain and Canada held common membership of more multilateral organizations than any other two powers. Both attended the summit meetings of the major industrial nations. Both were committed to a role in the affairs of the world. Each had unique qualities to contribute to these associations; Canada as a primary producer and industrial power, free of a colonial past and thus able to move more freely in the ex-colonial world, Britain with the attributes which had served her well in the past and with the additional prospect of a more buoyant economy thanks to the exploitation of North Sea Oil. In broad terms, the two powers held similar views of the world and the direction in which it should evolve; in fact, they were bound together in an almost metaphysical relationship. Family ties, much common culture and education, shared experiences and sacrifices over several generations, formed a link not less strong for being difficult to define. It would not necessarily produce agreement in point of policy. Foreign policies could hardly coincide exactly, for they were at least in part the outcome of domestic pressures and Canada and Britain had different geographical and economic situations. Nevertheless, there remained a large area where there was room for reciprocal support and standing. Both could do more in the international field by working together in a world moving towards even greater interdependence.

The tendency to treat Canada and Britain as powers of comparable stature was cautioned against. Whatever might be shown by figures for gross national product, Britain was much the more important of the two powers in international terms. Simply to describe both countries as middle powers took too statistical a view; because of its history, geography and traditions in foreign policy, Britain was a metropolitan power in a central position and Canada was not. Moreover, Canada's doubts about cohesion and national identity were perhaps attributable in part to the exceptional position which Canada had enjoyed for a period after the Second World War. As might be expected, this thesis did not find universal favour in the colloquium. It was admitted that Britain was still the more important power of the two, but the rapid rise of Canada's wealth should not be ignored, and it was important that Canadians should not regard themselves as citizens of an unimportant power nor as a mere adjunct of the USA, In practice, Canada's ability to influence issues and play a moderator s role varied from one issue to another, not simply according to some index of economic strength, but according to the merits and nature of the issue.

It was asked whether in view of the apparent collapse of detente and the threat to the negotiations for arms control, the conviction in Britain and Europe that the USSR was stronger and that something had to be done, Canada would share European views or become more detached? Several speakers argued that while there was legitimate reason for concern with the rising military strength of the USSR, there was equal cause for concern about the dangers of an unduly vigorous reaction from the USA. However, it was generally thought that Canada was unlikely, or unable, to play an effective role in moderating policy of the United States and she possessed neither the military power nor the strategic position to exert such leverage.

Other speakers sensed a divergence of interest between Canada and Western Europe, and argued that one reason for the Canadian dislike of the British nuclear deterrent was the fear that Europe might become a unit in defence, with Canada more or less excluded., However, several of those with experience of political and military co-operation within the community and NATO argued that the mechanism was often cumbersome and creaky, and unlikely to threaten Britain's relations with other allies. But it was agreed that the association with the EEC had in some connections, notably at the UN, reduced the number and frequency of consultations with Commonwealth partners. The Commonwealth talks which had been so helpful on many occasions in the past were often missed, and at a later stage of negotiation Commonwealth countries would find themselves faced with a European policy which was necessarily less flexible because it had been hard to reach a compromise within the Community in the first place. This had meant that in some instances the British government was not free to modify a policy as a result of talks with Commonwealth partners.

As for NATO, the political importance attached to the Organization by successive Canadian Governments derived chiefly from the fact that it constituted Canada's most important link with Europe, With the tendency of the EEC to work out common policies in advance, the significance of NATO to Canada increased. While most Canadians shared the view that the integration of Europe had been one of the more important achievements of the post-war period, it seemed undeniable that members of the Community were moving towards a common foreign policy not only about European issues but also in such matters as the Middle East. The process inevitably took time and as Britain devoted more and more energy to these European consultations, she had less opportunity for discussion with Canada.

The colloquium naturally spent some time discussing the possible moves in foreign policy of Canada's new government. Miss MacDonald's speech at the Empire Club, Toronto, in early October indicated that the aid programme would be examined and suggested that it might be operated on a more obvious basis of self-interest. It also indicated that Canada might look less far afield in acts of foreign policy, and raised doubts about the continued involvement in Namibia. The Minister for External Affairs had also raised substantial questions about Canada's future participation in peace-keeping ventures. The problem for the British was to know whether these views which, the Minister had stressed in the speech, were put forward not as a definite statement of policy but in order to provoke discussion, were likely to be followed in practice by the Clark government? The consequences for Britain, if Canada did pull out of Namibia, or peace-keeping, would be substantial. If there was to be a process of some contraction in the field of Canadian

foreign policy, in which direction would that lie? It was thought that the new Canadian government's foreign policies showed a considerable continuity with that of the old. This was particularly true of the efforts made under Mr Trudeau and Mr Clark alike to build up contacts with major countries throughout the world. Thus it was not surprising to find that the same speech contained references to Mexico and Venezuela, countries of increasing economic and political significance. Like their predecessors, the Conservative government in Canada regarded NATO as fundamental to Canada's foreign policy and defence; new commitments to the defence budget would be honoured, which hardly reflected any inward-turning attitude. The overwhelming task of the Canadian government was the reinforcement. of the country's ties with NATO, the French-speaking countries and the Commonwealth. It was perhaps better that the widespread concern (by no means confined to Canada) about the autocratic nature of some governments, and the violation of human rights, in the Third World should be voiced. If the issue were not faced, a diminution of support for aid to the Third World was almost certain to follow. It did not seem likely that there would be any early change in Canada's peace-keeping role.

For all the strains in both countries, the major economic problems and the reductions of public spending, the desire of both governments to reduce the claims of the public sector and the size of the public service, there was a general belief that the association was one of value and that more could be done to strengthen it. This was not simply a question for governments.

E. Cultural and Academic Relations

This session was introduced by *Professor Symons*, author of the report To *Know Ourselves.* He argued that though history had given Britain and Canada a largely shared cultural inheritance, both countries were living upon it rather than renewing it. Despite some encouraging developments, not the least of which had been the appointment of an Academic Relations Officer at Canada House in London, the cultural and academic relationship seemed in general to be deteriorating, or at any rate not improving in quality or intensity. In relation to the size and importance of the country, the British Council's operation in Canada remained very small. There was no British press correspondent permanently based in Ottawa. Until recently there had been no Chair of Canadian Studies in any British university. It was not a question of faults on one side only; there was an indifference within Canada, there had been reductions in the cultural and educational expenditure, even the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship plan was threatened. The British Council had given notice that certain travel grants under the Commonwealth Universities Interchange Scheme would have to be withdrawn. A programme of collaborative research which the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada had been exploring with the SSRC in Britain had been cancelled because of cuts in British spending. Over the Commonwealth Interchange Scheme, Canadians could scarcely complain since their government had never made any contribution. Within Canada, there had been cuts in the budget held by the Department of External Affairs for all cultural and academic activities.

Moreover, British entry into the EEC had repercussions in this sphere of activity. In broad terms, anything which reduced contact and consultation between Britain and

Canada, even in purely political or economic matters, must produce an ill effect on cultural ties; the establishment of an inner group of EEC countries, excluding Canada, affected mobility and career-opportunities. There were consequences in the field of taxation; for example, the Commonwealth associations based in London were to be charged a 15 per cent Value Added Tax, which had extremely serious implications for many of them; Professor Symons instanced the Association of Commonwealth Universities.

The Provinces' responsibility for education in Canada made it difficult to know with whom to deal and how educational problems might be tackled. By comparison with the UK, there was a multiplicity of organizations in the field, added to the problem of cultural and linguistic diversity. Like other speakers, *Professor Symons* detected a widespread tendency within Canada not to support academic and cultural enterprises. The fact that no central agency in Canada had responsibility for the collation of information in the field of education for the whole country made it hard to plan.

Even within Canada, as Professor Symons' Report had emphasized, there was a startling lack of awareness of Canadian literature and culture. Only 4 per cent of the books, music and journals bought by Canadians were written by their compatriots. He suggested that until Canadians learned to appreciate their own culture, they could hardly complain of lack of appreciation on the part of others. He believed that in this sphere at least, the essential lines of interest ran from Canada to Europe, rather than from Canada to the United States. The opportunities to develop the relationship were very great; many of them were being missed; and it would be fatal to take the historic relationship for granted.

In the discussion, the Commonwealth Foundation was cited as one organization which had increased its spending in recent years, and one to which the Government of Canada was a most important contributor. Recent examples included assistance in the funding of a Visiting Chair of Commonwealth History at the University of Leeds, the establishment of a fund designed to further links between British and French speaking communities in Africa and Canada, a contribution to a cultural festival associated with the Commonwealth Games at Edmonton. The Foundation also provided many travel grants, help to conferences and assistance to all kinds of study.

Many speakers referred to the difficulties which resulted in the sphere of educational and cultural exchange from the Canadian system of government. There had been a time, perhaps 25 years ago, when the Federal Government could more easily be firm and positive on cultural subjects and take initiatives. During the 1960s and 1970s the initiatives had lain more obviously with the provinces and it did not seem likely that any very decisive leadership could come in the foreseeable future from the Federal Government because of the sensitivity of Provincial Governments. One speaker suggested that the situation was easier for those dealing with the Provincial Governments in these matters from abroad than for those within Canada. Canada House itself had initiated in the cultural sphere about 150 projects in the year 1979, 60 of which had been undertaken in co-operation with one or more of the provinces. In the strictly educational, as distinct from cultural, activities, the difficulties were rather greater despite the excellent work of the Academic Relations Officer in London. There had been no decrease in the Federal Government's funding to support academic relations with Britain and on the cultural side there had been a substantial increase. It was even suggested that in these areas the High Commission had as

much money as it could wisely expend upon good projects for the moment. Against this it was pointed out that further cuts had recently been made in Canada at the source, the effects of which would be felt later.

The changing experience of new generations of Canadians was referred to. Many of the leaders in the fields of government, administration and education had attended universities, or served in the war, in the United Kingdom. This was not a continuing factor. The majority nowadays were not educated outside North America. There was a change in the intellectual climate which meant that many students were advised to further their education in the United States rather than in the UK or Europe. This fact must have an important impact on the future Canadian leadership and on the cultural life of the country in general. Those now coming forward to the universities, born about 1962, had not experienced any great British-Canadian occasions. There was no special reason or natural inclination for most of them to think about Britain. There was little in most school or university curricula to move them in that direction; rather, the United States tended to predominate.

Cultural relations between Britain and Canada were placed in the context of a general decline in Britain's cultural and educational interest in other English-speaking countries. The pull of the United States for Canadians was not simply a question of economic strength; it reflected also the growing excellence of many American universities. It did not necessarily follow that Britain should be unhappy at this situation; she was now less cocooned by Commonwealth and Imperial ties ; the world had many more multilateral relationships; and British influence had been drastically reduced. It might well be argued that there was need for a change in policy to accommodate to the new world which Britain inhabited. One necessary step was to improve Britain's own universities, where a far larger Canadian presence was feasible if a greater willingness to learn from Canada were shown.

Since it was impossible to separate cultural and academic relations from the more general political and economic questions, a number of speakers again dwelt upon the gap between the experts and the rest'; it was a challenge to members of the colloquium, and to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, to follow up the discussions in a way which would diminish that divide, and enable the two countries to become better known to each other. Commentators on political affairs, editors of newspapers, Trade Union leaders, youth leaders, should be educated by conferences and seminars in the importance of the British-Canadian relationship and, more generally, the value of the Commonwealth and the significance of NATO. There was room for a vast improvement in the coverage by the British press, radio and television of Canadian affairs, and by the Canadian media of British affairs. Many speakers felt that everything possible should be done not only to bring good Canadian students to British universities but equally to send good British students to Canadian. It was pointed out that so far as British universities were concerned, there was latitude to fix fees at low levels, or to cancel them altogether, for academic exchanges. There was every reason to encourage direct arrangements between universities, thus to avoid many of the difficulties with the Federal and Provincial authorities to which reference had been made.

A number of projects to improve cultural relations were mentioned. The *Chairman of W. H. Smith* said that his company was intending to market a far greater number of Canadian books in the UK under new arrangements with Canadian publishers. It was

noted that the Government of Alberta was keenly concerned with building up universities in the field of applied science, and forging links with British institutions for co-operative research. It was suggested that universities in both countries might do more to seek the interest of great business corporations and others who could assist them with financial help for academic and cultural exchange schemes.

It was not only in the United Kingdom or Canada that high fees became a barrier to easy exchange. It was pointed out that fees at many of the more distinguished American universities have also risen sharply; with the result that most Canadian students stayed within their own country for postgraduate study. While this might lead to a greater insularity, it did also mean that Canada no longer tended to lose its best students. While academic exchanges should certainly not be retained for reasons of nostalgia, there were undoubtedly benefits to be obtained from teaching and learning in a new environment. Moreover, it had to be remembered that education extended beyond the sphere of universities and some evidence was produced by a member of the colloquium also a trustee of a grant-giving body that there had been less interest in visits to Canada by trade unionists, librarians, teachers and broadcasters than in visits to Australia and New Zealand. It was pointed out again that to develop such contacts on a substantial scale would, at a time of cuts in official spending, certainly call for outside finance.