



The Canada UK Colloquia

**Britain and Canada:  
Survey of a Changing  
Relationship**

Windsor Great Park

3 - 5 September 1971

**Contents  
Contributors  
Conference Report**

## Contents

Foreword		vii
The Contributors		ix
Introduction	<b>Peter Lyon</b>	xiii
1. Conference Report		1
2. A Memoir	<b>Hon Alastair Buchan</b>	31
3. The Roots of Irritation	<b>James Eayrs</b>	36
4. <b>Britain</b> and Canada Between Two World Wars: A British View	<b>Max Beloff</b>	50
5. The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: The Case of * O. D. Skelton	<b>Norman Hillmer</b>	61
6. Britain and Canada in the 1940s and 1950s	<b>Lord Garner of Chiddingly</b>	85
7. Shadow and Substance: Diplomatic Relations Between Britain and Canada	<b>John W. Holmes</b>	105
8. <b>Defence</b> in the Anglo-Canadian Relationship	<b>Laurence W. Martin</b>	121
* 9. Historical Perspective on Canadian-United Kingdom Economic Relationships	<b>Arthur J. R. Smith</b>	129
10. Britain and Canada: The Economic Relationships in World Context	<b>Harry G. Johnson</b>	141
11. Migration as a Factor in Anglo-Canadian Relations	<b>Freda Hawkins</b>	152
12. <b>Britain and Canada: Cultural Relations</b>	<b>Mavor Moore</b>	164
13. <b>Public Images and Perceptions</b>	<b>Nigel Lawson</b>	173
Index		185

## The Contributors

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**James Eayrs**—Professor of Political Economy, University of Toronto; born in England, a war-time evacuee to Canada in the early 1940s. Columnist, *Toronto Star*; author of several books, including *Diplomacy and Zts Discontents* (1971) and *Zn Defence of Canada in three volumes*—Vol. III *Peacemaking and Deterrence* (1972).

**Max Beloff**—Principal University College Buckingham since 1974, Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration, University of Oxford, and Fellow of All Souls 1957-74; author of many books, including *Europe and the Europeans* (1957), *New Dimensions in Foreign Policy* (1961), *The Future of British Foreign Policy* (1969), *Imperial Sunset, Vol. I* (1969).

**Norman Hillmer**—Directorate of History, Department of National Defence, Ottawa. Educated at the University of Toronto and Christ's College, Cambridge. Fellow of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1970-1, doing research on Anglo-Canadian relations.

- Lord Garner of Chiddingly**—Appointed Dominions Office, 1930; Private Secretary to successive Secretaries of State, 1940-3; Senior Secretary, Office of UK High Commissioner, Ottawa, 1943-6; Deputy High Commissioner for the UK, Ottawa, 1946-8; Assistant Under-Secretary, CRO, 1948-51; Deputy High Commissioner for the UK in India, 1951-3; Deputy Under-Secretary, CRO, 1952-6; British High Commissioner in Canada, 1956-61; Permanent Under-Secretary of State, CRO, 1962-5; Commonwealth Office, 1965-8; Head of HM Diplomatic Service, 1965-8.
- John Holmes**—Graduated from the University of Western Ontario and Toronto, and was a graduate student of history at the University of London. Between 1941 and 1943 he was National Secretary of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. In 1943 he joined the Department of External Affairs, becoming successively First Secretary in London, charge d'Affairs in Moscow, Acting Canadian Representative to the United Nations, and Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. In 1960 he left public service to become President of C.I.I.A. and in 1964 his title changed to Director-General. Author of *The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy* (1970), and many other authoritative articles, especially on Canadian foreign and defence policies, in journals and symposia.
- Laurence W. Martin**—Professor of War Studies, King's College, University of London, since 1968. Taught at Yale, M.I.T. and the Johns Hopkins University. Wilson Professor of International Politics, University of Wales, 1964-8. Author of several books, including *The Sea in Modern Strategy* (1968) and *Arms and Strategy* (1973).
- Harry G. Johnson**—Professor of Economics, London School of Economics, 1966-74, and at University of Chicago since 1959. Educated at Universities of Toronto, Cambridge (England) and Harvard. Has taught in several universities in Canada, the United States and the UK. Holds honorary degrees from several Canadian and British universities. President, Canadian Political Science Association, 1965-6. Author of many books, including *The Overloaded Economy* (1952), *Canada in a Changing World Economy* (1962), *The Canadian Quandary* (1963), *Macro Economics and Monetary Theory* (1972).
- Arthur J. R. Smith**—President, The Conference Board in Canada, formerly Chairman of the Economic Council of Canada.

- Freda** Hawkins-Born in Britain but emigrated to Canada in 1955 and then became a Canadian citizen. Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto. Author of *Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern* (McGill: Queen's University Press, Montreal and London, 1972). On secondment in 1972 to the Department of the Secretary of State as Director of its Immigrant Programs Development Group.
- Mavor** Moore—Professor of Fine Arts, York University, Toronto, Canada. A playwright, whose plays have been shown on British and Canadian television.
- Nigel Lawson**—Conservative Member of Parliament for Blaby (Leics.) since 1974. Journalist; Research Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1972-3; Editorial Staff, *Financial Times*, 1956-60; City Editor, *Sunday Telegraph*, 1961-3; special Assistant to Prime Minister (Sir Alec Douglas-Home), 1963-4; Editor of *The Spectator*, 1966-70; Vice-Chairman, Conservative Political Centre National Adv. Committee, since 1972.

# 1

## Conference Report

Early in September 1971 some fifty to sixty people gathered at Cumberland Lodge in Windsor Great Park, at the joint invitation of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies of the University of London, to discuss Anglo-Canadian Relations. The meeting was made possible by a generous grant from the Nuffield Foundation.

The participants met under the chairmanship of the **Honourable Alastair Buchan**, from 3rd to 5th September. The agenda was a broad one, as the programme shows, and all the formal sessions were plenary. Those taking part in the Colloquy represented many different interests and experiences-business, diplomacy, finance, journalism, politics, and scholarship. A list of participants is attached. Most of those present had general or specialized knowledge of both countries.

The participants owe a sincere debt of gratitude to the Principal of Cumberland Lodge, Professor G. L. Goodwin, and his staff, for the admirable arrangements which were made throughout for their comfort. The Colloquy was also indebted to Mr and Mrs Hillmer, Mrs Anne Barnes and Miss Margaret Beard for their considerable help in the organization and recording of this conference. A first version of this summary of discussion was composed principally by Mr J. M. Lee from his notes of the proceedings, with the assistance of Mr and Mrs Hilhner and some editorial advice from Professor W. H. Morris-Jones and Dr Peter Lyon. Dr Lyon has produced this revised version, with the valuable assistance of a number of the participants.

The views expressed in this report are those which emerged from the Colloquy as a whole and do not, of course, necessarily represent those of particular participants either in their personal or ex officio capacities.

The Colloquy ranged widely in its discussions. It must be stressed, however, that this report is a brief, even though reasonably faithful,

record of what was said. Thus it does not contain any editorial or other after-thoughts, though many elaborations and further relevant points were made outside the formal sessions listed in the programme, and shortage of time prevented many people either from speaking or from saying all that they would have wished to say. The organizers conceived the Colloquy as a swift preliminary reconnaissance of a large field, and it is in this light that the report should be read.

### Programme

#### *Friday 3 September*

##### 1st Session: THE PAST IN THE PRESENT

Traditions and Legacies. Are the traditional ties 'wasting away', as some people allege? Past Anglo-Canadian ups and downs.

#### *Saturday 4 September*

##### 2nd Session : ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Trade, investment and aid. What mutuality exists, presently and potentially, between Britain and Canada in these matters? Anglo-Canadian relations and the EEC-NAFTA and other options. Business corporations and concerns.

##### 3rd Session: DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS

British and Canadian bilateral relations. Working with Washington, with Paris, through the Commonwealth, the UN and allied agencies. Canada and Britain as regional powers.

#### *Sunday 5 September*

##### 4th Session : COMMUNICATIONS AND MOVEMENTS

The flow of ideas and of peoples, migrations and actions. Functional co-operation on mutual problems.

##### 5th Session: POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS

How different 'publics' in each country regard and behave towards others, and what this shows about self-definition. How important are the relations of Canada with Britain, and of Britain with Canada? Options and opportunities.

### Participants

**Lt-Gen W. A. B. Anderson**, Chairman, Ontario Civil Service Commission. Formerly Commander, Mobile Command, Canadian Armed Forces.

**Professor Max Beloff**, Gladstone Professor of Government, All Souls College, Oxford.

**Dr Alexander Brady**, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto.

The **Hon Alastair Buchan**, Commandant, Royal College of Defence Studies, London.

**Mr Ian Clark**, Counsellor (Cultural), Canadian High Oommission, London.

**Mr Brian Crane**, Chairman, National Executive Committee, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Ottawa.

**Mr Barnett Danson**, MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister, Ottawa.

**Mr George Davidson**, President, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Ottawa.

**Lord Diamond**, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 1964-70, and in Cabinet 1968-70. Head of CPA delegation to Canada, September 1971.

**Mr Peter Dobell**, Director, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa.

**Professor James Eayrs**, Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto.

**Mr S. Edwards**, Under-Secretary of State, North Atlantic Department, Department of Trade and Industry, London.

**Mr Jean Fournier**, Délégué-Général du Quebec, London.

**Mr Jean-Louis Gagnon**, Director-General, Information Canada, Ottawa.

The **Right Hon Lord Gamer**, Chairman of Board of Governors, Commonwealth Institute, London. Formerly UK High Commissioner in Canada, 1956-61.

**Dr Craufurd Goodwin**, International Division, The Ford Foundation, New York.

**Professor Geoffrey Goodwin**. Montague Burton Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics, and Principal, Cumberland Lodge.

**Mr John Graham**, Counsellor, Canadian High Commission, London.

**Mr A. G. S. Griffin**, President, Tiarch Corporation Limited, Toronto.

The **Hon H. A. A. Hankey**, Under-Secretary of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London.

**Mr Alan Harvey**, Reuter's London Bureau, London.



- Dr Freda Hawkins**, University of Toronto, and Centre for Multi-Racial Studies, University of Sussex.
- Mr Gordon Hawkins**, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax.
- Sir Peter Hayman**, UK High Commissioner in Canada.
- Mr Ivan Head**, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, Ottawa.
- Mr Norman Hillmer**, Christ's, College, Cambridge, and ICS, London.
- Mr John Holmes**, Director-General, Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Toronto.
- Mr F. D. Hughes**, British Council Representative-Designate to Ottawa.
- Mr W. H. Hugh-Jones**, Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Formerly Head of Chancery, British High Commission, Ottawa.
- Professor H. G. Johnson**, University of Chicago, and London School of Economics.
- Mr Patrick Keatley**, Diplomatic Correspondent, *The Guardian*.
- Mr Nigel Lawson**. Former Editor of *The Spectator*. Journalist.
- Mr J. M. Lee**, Senior Lecturer, ICS London.
- Professor Albert Legault**, Department de Science Politique, Université Laval, Quebec.
- Professor Douglas Lapan**, University of Toronto, Formerly Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.
- Mr Wolf Luetkens**, Foreign News Editor, *Financial Times*, London.
- Mr Christopher Lush**, North America Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London.
- Mr Charles Lynch**, Bureau Chief, **Southam** News Service, Ottawa.
- Dr Peter Lyon**, Secretary, ICS London.
- Mr Roy MacLaren**, Assistant Vice-President, Public Relations, Massey-Ferguson Limited, Ottawa.
- Mr Donald MacLeod**, First Secretary, British High Commission, Ottawa.
- Mr Brian Major**, Canada Desk, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London.
- Professor L. W. Martin**, Head of Department of War Studies, King's College, London.
- Mr Leonard Miall**, Controller of Overseas & Foreign Relations, British Broadcasting Corporation.
- Mr R Middleton**, North-West European Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.
- Mr J. Mavor Moore**, Department of Fine Arts, York University, Toronto.

**Professor W. H. Morris-Jones**, Director, ICS London.

**Mr David Nicholson**, Chairman, Canada Committee, British National Exports Council.

**Mr Paul Painchaud**, Le Directeur pour le Québec, Institut Canadien des Affaires Internationales.

**The Right Hon Lester Pearson**

**Professor Grant Reuber**, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario.

**Mr C. S. A. Ritchie**, High Commissioner for Canada, London.

**Mr Edmund de Rothschild**, N. M. Rothschild & Sons. Deputy Chairman, British Newfoundland Corporation Limited, Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation.

**Sir George Sinclair, MP**, Conservative MP for the Dorking division of Surrey.

**Mr Ian Smart**, Assistant Director, Institute for Strategic Studies. Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa.

**Mr Arnold Smith**, Secretary-General, Commonwealth Secretariat.

**Mr A. J. R. Smith**, Chairman, Economic Council of Canada, Ottawa.

**Mr Ian R Smythe**, Counsellor (Commercial), Canadian High Commission, London.

**Mr Hamilton Southam**, Director-General, National Arts Centre, Ottawa.

**Major-Gen. N. G. Wilson-Smith**, Managing Director, Canadair Services Limited, London. Formerly Deputy Chief, Force Development, Canadian Armed Forces.

### Prologue

In his opening remarks the Chairman said: 'We are here to take stock of a very interesting relationship which has been both international and transnational for over a century. It has gone through several different phases: from the intimacy of four wars and of a cold war which bound us together in a formal allegiance to periods of misunderstanding and mutual mistrust; and it has been continuously affected, in varying degrees, by the cultural, political or economic influences of two powers outside the Commonwealth System, the United States and France.'

'We have come here to talk,' Mr Buchan continued, 'from a sense in all our hearts, I think, that the Anglo-Canadian relationship, political, economic, cultural, has been gradually eroding; that as

Britain prepares to enter the EEC, and Canada becomes more deeply involved in the American economic system as a producer and begins to look more to the Pacific as a trader, as our press and other communications and cultural links become merely part of a global system of electronic chatter, as names like Vimy—or even Falaise and Monte Cassino—cease to be evocative, as the requirements of international politics make the relations of kith and km and the whole concept of cousinly affinities less tenable, we are in danger of repeating the experience of, say, Spain and Peru, countries once so close in their relations that a man could make a profession in either country yet which have virtually lost sight of each other in the Hobbesian jungle that we dignify by the name of the international system.

This was, in fact, a very good moment to be holding such a conference, the Chairman claimed, 'not just because Britain is on the verge of entering the EEC, or so most of us assume, but because the whole of the post-war international system is, twenty-six years after Potsdam, undergoing a major transformation. Soviet power is now less menacing but more widespread and diversified. Both China and Japan have regained their position as great powers, if not super powers.' The American dollar, which had been the lynch pin of the post-war monetary system had just been effectively devalued, and a major *bouleversement* was occurring in Sino-American relations which might merely presage the fact that the fulcrum of the central balance was shifting from Europe to the Far East and would in future be exercised through the quadrilateral relationship of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, and that Europe with all its unsolved problems might become relatively provincial.

Thus the Chairman expressed his hope that evolving out of the discussion there would be some opportunity to 'peer in company at the new world of the late twentieth century', even though the bilateral relationship was the primary concern.

He then proceeded to outline his own conception of the central issues and questions in the following terms :

... the 'importance of political and economic questions—the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC, for instance, presents great difficulty for us both. Even though the colonial period is over for Britain, and Canada has never had one, we both have communal violence on our front door-steps—yet I suspect the central questions of debate will be cultural in the broadest and deepest sense of the word. Two questions occur to me in particular. First, both our countries have had a very close relationship in the past generation, economic, political, cultural,

with the United States, and from this we have derived a great deal of our **strength** in international affairs, though any talk of special relationships is now misplaced. The United States is now grappling with a series of devastating social problems which will take at least a generation to solve. Can we isolate ourselves from her social problems without losing political links, or without encouraging tendencies towards political and economic isolationism in the United States? Does this predicate a new basis for an Anglo-Canadian relationship? Second, there is the question of the relationship of both our countries to continental Western Europe. Reading through some Canadian speeches of my **father's**, I found this phrase in an address to a Canadian-American conference in Kingston in June 1937: 'Canada is a North American nation with a jealously maintained European connection.' Is this still true, or has the 'lone shieling on the misty island', which may not be in the **Hebrides** but may be a Norwegian sater or a Czech farmstead, become so remote that we are in fact now part of two different civilizations? Britain, I think it must be plainly said, **is** interested in becoming a member of the European Community, from a fear of becoming the Canada of Western Europe, a regional power without a region. Nothing can change the facts of Canadian geography, but if the Community is expanded and does develop along intelligent lines, and if there is a continuing sense of kinship with Europe, are there ways in which Canada herself can develop a closer relationship with the Community? If, on the other hand, we are convinced that we are now part of two **different civilisations**, then I think we ought to discuss whether the monarchical connection will continue to make sense over the next twenty or thirty years, not least because **our laird** in the Big Hoose and her man are themselves concerned with the question.

In concluding, the Chairman reminded the participants of some of the 'ground rules' in the following terms :

I have no **idea** about the extent to which we shall find ourselves discussing governmental and institutional mechanisms, and the extent to which we shall remain in the realm of concepts. The agenda has been very well laid out, but I would implore you to remember two things. First, that though about a quarter **of** the conference consists of officials, we are discussing, not negotiating: **this** is a colloquium and not even a conference. Moreover, we all sit here as individuals and not as part of British or Canadian delegations. Second, that we are discussing Anglo-Canadian relations ; even though it may be hard to do so without some discussion of the future shape and objectives of the EEC or of international **politics** in the Far East, we shall waste precious, time if we stray **too far** afield.

The Colloquy was soon **launched, directly** or indirectly, on what

the chairman had characterized as a convergence theory: the idea that Britain and Canada were becoming similar powers. First, this interpretation emphasized that there are some important economic forces equalizing the two countries, and that by 1980 the Canadian GNP will have overtaken that of the United Kingdom if present trends persist. The structure of the Canadian economy also seems to be becoming more like the British. By 1980 one in every ten Canadians will be working in **primary** industries and there should be a considerable growth in those employed in service industries. Canada, like Britain, has a declining rural population. It also faces somewhat similar problems in manufacturing industry. For example, it has short production runs in some of its major products and is therefore unable to use capital efficiently. Indeed, it is arguable that Canada is over-capitalized. Secondly, all but the super-powers are now opting out of a large range of developments in weapons technology, because they are too costly. Britain and Canada are being reduced to much the same kind of 'middle power'. Thirdly, it seems likely that Britain and Canada could find considerable opportunities for co-operation as they share much the same kind of institutions of government, and often the same administrative practices. Some of the participants in the Colloquy claimed that these common traditions represented similar beliefs concerning the desirable shape of the world order.

The question was raised at the outset whether new social ties might be made a basis of future relations. Professor Eayrs quoted a letter from the late Leonard **Beaton**: 'poor old England, too depressing to be endured. . . but the nicest people'. Neither Britain nor Canada today were over-burdened with friends, and recent social changes in Britain seemed to indicate the possibility of new attitudes to Canada. The Chairman, for example, claimed that Britain was now 'ruled from Hampstead, not Hatfield' and that the old Canadian question which expressed annoyance with **Britain**—'Who do they think they are?'—was unlikely to be voiced in the future, not least because the Canadian equivalents of Hampsteaders were now in power in Ottawa.

It was asked whether the position of the Queen did not present an intractable problem in Anglo-Canadian relations. Some French Canadians might feel that the constitutional role of the monarch was a 'nuisance', but it was generally agreed that this was not a major issue in Canadian politics. There might just conceivably have to be a new formula which would alter the Queen's role in Canadian life but many expected that it would be possible to find some form of

middle ground which could link Canada with Britain through the monarchy, and continue the ceremonial associated with it.

What could and should be done, then, to foster relations? At different stages in its discussions the Colloquy examined proposals to develop institutional ties or to promote an increase of personal contacts between Britons and Canadians. The presence of the two High Commissioners at the Colloquy had encouraged some in the idea of a new set of institutional relationships.

All participants accepted the assertion that it was necessary to have something to co-operate about. In so far as there was a difference of emphasis between the official representatives of each country, it lay in their interpretation of the 'closer pragmatic relations' to which each was committed. Britain wanted to show that it had relationships with all parts of Canada, particularly with the **French-Canadians**, not only with the '**Cana-Brits**'. On the other hand, Canada was reluctant to neglect the historical inheritance of good relationships: 'if you drive friendship out, unfriendship can set in'. Yet there was a danger that the purpose of the Colloquy could be misconstrued as that of a 'pressure group' designed to preserve traditional relationships, rather like the Australia-Britain Society. Anglo-Canadian relations must not become merely exercises in neurosis and nostalgia. The **Canadian** convener had been told that trouble arose when Canadian newspapers did not contain sufficient pictures of the Queen!

It was generally admitted that both countries were in a period of introspection. British people were now **re-examining** their national identity, as Canadians had always been prone to do. The British had *always* been fairly **indifferent** to Canadian susceptibilities, but they were now having to experience a set of circumstances which might make them more sensitive to the Canadian position. Similarly, Canadians had not hitherto **been** sufficiently aware of the need to be wary in international affairs. They were conscious of entering a new era without friends. 'No **Briton** ever believed that everyone loved him; until now, every Canadian had expected to be loved from the first sucks of his mother's milk.

The question was posed whether straight bilateral relations (hitherto often obscured by common membership of wider groupings) could not become, perhaps for the first time, a live item on each country's agenda, and capable of fruitful development. If this is the case, then Anglo-Canadian relations need to be construed less in terms of 'rescuing' mutual direct relations of a residual kind (the mere by-products of historical associations) and more in terms of

meeting the challenge to build new connections based upon a *sharing* of experience in the solution of the increasingly similar problems faced by both countries.

The view was expressed that it might be advisable, even urgent, to take deliberate and positive steps now to cultivate new Anglo-Canadian connections, as merely to continue to take existing relations for granted could result in their decay by default. On this view time was not necessarily of itself a **beneficent** healer, for each country is continuously entering into agreements and commitments with others and these then produce new situations of growing and inextricable interdependence. The nature of modern technological co-operation was cited as an important sphere where choice is imperative, and once made is often irreversible and some future options are thus pre-empted. Hence it was argued that, unless Britain and Canada do take thought and care to develop their mutual relations, they might discover that they were so involved in other arrangements that some new ties with each other were precluded.

Some participants even claimed that Britain and Canada might find a bond of community in their respective attempts to tackle certain intractable problems **in** both international and domestic affairs. For example, both countries had similar difficulties in commercial policy and in the policy on relative exchange rates; both countries appear to have similar difficulties in their attempts to design appropriate immigration policies, or in planning for the improvement of their environment. Both countries had also recently been dominated by one major issue, which had never been resolved. Britain had been wrestling to improve its economic growth; Canada had become increasingly concerned with the size and scope of American investment in its economy.

Nevertheless, it was feared that, whatever held the two countries together, there were strong forces which impelled their interests to diverge. Participants had been presented beforehand with a set of statistical tables that seemed to indicate that there was a steady reduction in mutual economic interests. Many concluded that this was a dominant general trend which was unlikely to be reversed. Indeed, in all the major fields which the Colloquy discussed, there was considerable evidence that the bilateral relationship between Britain and Canada was less important than outside factors. Certainly, in the economic field, Britain and Canada alone could not exert much influence over the United States. In future diplomatic and military matters, the European nations may come increasingly to see their security problems in a **different** way from that employed

by the Canadians, who could not avoid being part of the North American defence system. In the cultural sphere, there were also signs that Canada's relationship with the United States and also the demand for provision in the arts which would interest the many new immigrant communities in Canada were both likely to compete more strenuously for attention than could cultural exchanges with Britain.

The colloquy was therefore faced with an important paradox. Although there was now much greater mobility at all levels of the population, there was nevertheless 'a new parochialism in the outlook of the general public in both countries'.

There seemed to be so many different levels at which contacts between Britain and Canada could be discussed, and so many specialists now engaged in this form of discussion, that throughout the Colloquy it was difficult to sort out the different levels which were necessary to make possible a deeper analysis of the relationships.

### **Traditional Relations: The Past in the Present**

The first real controversy of the Colloquy arose almost by accident on the first evening. The opening British and Canadian speakers placed very different interpretations on the significance of the two speeches given by Lord Halifax in Toronto and New York in 1944.

Professor Eayrs' paper (see Chapter 2) had drawn attention to Mackenzie King's reaction to Halifax's speeches. Mackenzie King had been strongly opposed to any suggestion that a unified Commonwealth and Empire based on a common foreign policy should make one partner in a triumvirate of great powers with the United States and Russia. To some Canadians at the Colloquy, this reaction had been a formative experience, especially in the Liberal Party, because Lord Halifax in his speech appeared to be trying to submerge Canadian autonomy within a single imperial unit dominated by Britain. In contrast, some of the British at the Colloquy insisted that Lord Halifax's speech was an aberration. It was pointed out that the editorials of British newspapers at the time had been strongly against Halifax, and that he did not appear to have consulted his colleagues just before he delivered these remarks. One British participant said that Halifax had put forward a perfectly respectable proposition, which was also the theme of many speeches by Churchill and others, notably Smuts, that Britain wanted in future to share with the Dominions the responsibility that she had



largely carried on her own shoulders before and during the war. It was therefore an attempt to be fair to the Dominions and also met what the Australians were asking for. The fact that Mackenzie King saw fit to make political advantage out of it did not invalidate the case any more than King's success in the election of 1927 made Lord Byng's action unconstitutional.

A number of participants insisted that the whole incident should be seen in the context of the discussion between Churchill and Roosevelt and their respective governments in 1943-4, and that Lord Halifax's remarks should be related to Britain's attempt to secure a position in the Security Council of the proposed United Nations organization for a 'British Commonwealth and Empire'. In a sense, this was less an aberration and more part of a British 'confidence trick' on the Americans to place Churchill on the same level as Roosevelt in the planning of post-war reconstruction. Another British participant insisted, however, that Halifax was quite right in predicting that Commonwealth countries would be less influential in the post-war world if they did not combine.

Mr Pearson, who was at the time Canadian Minister in Washington, said that he had himself reacted strongly to Halifax's second speech because he had two major fears. First, he wished to keep Canada as a major force in the international system after the war and feared that any over-reaction on the part of Mackenzie King would have led to Canada contracting out of its obligations, as it had done in the 1930s. Second, he feared that, unless he explained Canadian reactions to Britain in fairly strong language, Mackenzie King might have been given a good excuse to exploit isolationist feelings. In his judgement, Mackenzie King was a better Commonwealth man than Churchill because, by insisting on a pluralist definition of the Commonwealth, he encouraged its continuance and development in the post-war world. Perhaps the main value of the debate touched off by Halifax's speech was that a Canadian negative definition of the Commonwealth had been widely accepted—that it was not a collection of countries speaking with a common voice.

It was arguable that the Commonwealth was an interference in Anglo-Canadian relations, and that there was now a real need to focus directly on bilateral relations between Britain and Canada. Certainly traditional relationships between these two countries within the context of the Commonwealth were not the sole basis for future developments. By referring to John Holmes' *Round Table* article, 'The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: A Mood of Exasperation' (*The Round Table*, 1965-6, Vol. 56, pp. 251-68), many participants

admitted and elaborated his claim that there was a 'neurosis' which distorted reality within the traditional relationships on both sides. The timing and arrangements of the Colloquy seemed to symbolize this. For example, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs had already had several bilateral meetings with representative institutions in other countries (e.g. with Mexico and with Poland, and with Czechoslovakia and France) but had found it difficult to arrange a meeting in Britain on a similar footing. The British still seemed sometimes to betray traces of the old 'superior' attitudes which so often before had aroused Canadian annoyance. When the first approaches were made from the Canadian side to people in London, there was a tendency for the British to ask: 'What is there to talk about?'

To some Canadians these initial difficulties in convening the Colloquy seemed to symbolize the too easy, perhaps too optimistic, assumption of mutual understanding which stemmed from the 'family feeling' purveyed from Whitehall by the old Dominions Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office. Professor Eayrs explained the Canadian position in terms of what he called 'prickly irritability'. Canadians sometimes felt that their relationships with Britain were too readily subsumed under either the Commonwealth or North Atlantic titles. In the latter category, the United States was always accorded the prominent role, it was not surprising that some Canadians thought that any renewed emphasis on 'a special relationship' between Canada and Britain might be detrimental to the solution of Canada's domestic problems.

There were, however, two obvious developments in the emotional condition of Anglo-Canadian relations. First, the 'prickly irritability' seemed to have changed sides; it was now the British who felt in a defensive position. Canadians were certainly now more relaxed in their relationships with Britain. One Canadian participant claimed that for the first time in Canada the general public had developed a sense of completeness, expressible in terms that, for better or worse, 'everything that is possible in human life can now be found in our country'. The Cross and Laporte kidnappings had brought a new dimension into the Canadian experience. Second, the Canadians had perhaps become even more neurotic about their other special relationship, that with the United States. It was a general Canadian conclusion to the Colloquy that to avoid talking about relationships with the United States was most refreshing.

There were nevertheless at least three rather important disputes in Anglo-Canadian relations, which showed very clearly that each

side does not always enjoy the same perception of events. First, there was some disagreement as to the specific **significance** of the Commonwealth for Britain. Some Britons thought that Canadians liked to think that the Commonwealth should be retained for its own sake, whereas a more common British view is that the Commonwealth can only be important if some diplomatic achievements can be seen to arise from the web of relationships which it represents. But it was also said by one experienced British diplomat that the Commonwealth does not have to chalk up diplomatic achievements. The Commonwealth is a mode for handling some problems at some times in a universal idiom of diplomatic endeavour, and it will still play a part in the conduct of British external relations, though there were considerable differences of opinion as to whether this will be for better or worse.

One Canadian participant expressed what he claimed was a common view held by his fellow countrymen when he extolled the Commonwealth as a **marvellous** formula for getting over the difficult transition of decolonization; if anything, the Commonwealth as a whole had hastened the pace of British decolonization. But this was questioned by some of the British participants. For instance, some advanced the view that the presence of the Commonwealth had been a distinct hindrance to British plans for getting rid of the Empire, especially when overweening optimists had assumed that mere membership of the Commonwealth invested its members with reciprocal family feeling and exempted them from being 'foreigners to each other'.

Secondly, there was some dispute about the British reasons for wishing to join the European Economic Community. It was thought by some of the British present that the Commonwealth had failed to advance Britain's purposes because it could not become a political unit. They thought that Canadians might fail to see adequately enough the political aspects of the British application to join Europe. It would be a mistake for Canadians to think of the European Economic Community too much in economic and not in political terms.

Thirdly, there was some uncertainty about how each side views the other's relationship with the United States of America. This led to quite a lot of speculation on recent history. For rather obvious but basic **geo-political** reasons, Canada's relations with the USA cannot easily be changed. In recent years Britain has sometimes appeared to have behaved rather like Canada in the inter-war period, seeking to avoid any action which **might** upset American

sensitivities. It was suggested that Britain and Canada had perhaps tried too often to out-smart each other in their negotiations with Washington. Although it was obvious that their relationships with the United States should be complementary, there was perhaps a general tendency for Canada always to try to 'get in on the act' when Britain was negotiating in Washington.

It is a common British view that Canada has always tried to get the best of both worlds. Canada likes being involved in British decisions, but at the same time wants to claim the right to criticize. The Colloquy spent quite a considerable portion of its time examining the concept of the Commonwealth and considering whether the Commonwealth had been a help or a hindrance in Anglo-Canadian relations. It was as if it was somehow easier to tackle this question than to tackle the other obvious question: Had the American relationship been a help or a hindrance?

Several participants said that British relations with Canada could be discussed almost irrespective of the Commonwealth and that, far from feeling that Canada had let down the Commonwealth, the British should recognize that the Commonwealth context has been used on regular occasions for the Canadians to express their own national position. In recent years, the British government has been concerned mainly with Canadian opposition: at the time of Suez, over the Rhodesian crisis, over the Gulf or Aqaba, and when Canada announced de reduction of its forces in NATO. The British government would have been happy on many occasions since the war to have seen Canada playing a larger part in the formulation of a policy for the creation of independent states in the Caribbean. But, although Britain had approached both the United States and Canada in its attempts to design a constitutional status for the relatively small islands-later called associated states-it had not received **much** encouragement from either Ottawa or Washington.

At various stages of the discussions the contrast was drawn between Canada and Australia in their respective attitudes to British policy. There were several marked differences between the two countries. Australia appears to see its relation with the United Kingdom of much more immediate concern than does Canada. Throughout the whole period of decolonization, when Britain was wrestling with the **details** of transforming colonies into independent states, Australia had expressed far less interest in the development of the Commonwealth than had Canada. Indeed, Australia not only had less interest than Canada in the way the Commonwealth developed-she positively disapproved. Australians have been much

more concerned with Britain's application to join the Common Market, and have frequently voiced their objections to those British proposals which appear to threaten their interests. Similarly, Australians had been far more vocal than Canadians in their criticism of the recent British Immigration Bill, with its controversial distinction between **patrials** and **non-patrials**—a distinction inserted with the intention of pleasing Australians. A diplomat characterized current Anglo-Canadian relations as a relationship between roughly equal, roughly like-minded people, and in no sense impeded by traditional ties. Rather, the relation between Heath's Britain and Trudeau's Canada was a 'hard-nosed' affair.

Another participant reminded the Colloquy that the discussion had been about neuroses rather than about diplomatics, and that the Anglo-Canadian relationship needed analysis at different levels of action and activity as well as of attitudes.

### Economic Relations

One of the major remaining common interests between Britain and Canada stemmed from the way in which the world is organized for the purpose of international trade. Each country had moved away from the other in trading terms; US trade and the EEC affected each with different force. But Britain and Canada seemed to have similar view of future possibilities. Because of the timing of the Colloquy, the Nixon measures, **announced** on 15 August, naturally played a prominent part in its discussions. Several speakers gave their interpretation of the major reasoning processes inside the American government which had resulted in the set of economic decisions recently announced by President Nixon. The basic thrust of the American decision was to ease its balance of payments problems by forcing a major realignment of world currencies.

Nevertheless, the Colloquy was warned not to treat the present situation as a purely monetary crisis. Pressure upon the Americans to raise the price of gold was described as a 'French trap'. There were important political considerations in the determination of future trade policy, not least because the major gold producers were Russia and South Africa.

Hopes were entertained that Anglo-Canadian action could be an important factor in preventing the United States from becoming more isolationist. Canada occupied the chair at current meetings of the 'Group of 10 and could perhaps exercise an important influence in the course of the next crucial 3-6 months. It might also

serve the long-term common interests of Britain and Canada if Britain, within the European Community, could reduce any isolationist tendencies there. This was considered perhaps an easier proposition than tackling American policy. Many speakers thought that European countries wanted Britain in the Community to encourage outward-looking qualities.

Some feared that Canada would over-react in the present situation, and take retaliatory steps which might increase the American tendency towards protectionism. The growth of American investment in Canada had meant that Canadians tended to see the American economy too much in terms of an orgy of American capital exports, and to think that some kind of control over capital flows was more important than the general trading system. But this perception of the situation was dangerous. The Nixon measures were not to be seen entirely as an attempt to deal with a pure balance of payments problem, even though the President had undoubtedly taken action because of the very sharp deterioration in United States visible balances. The role of American capital in the world was, however, still one of the most important factors in making and maintaining a viable international trading system.

Canadians are now slowly beginning to realize how important it is to consider the social and economic consequences of leaving the exploitation of their own natural resources to foreign capital. For instance, the Japanese had secured permits to mine low-grade coal in Alberta, without having to concern themselves with the problem of open-cast working which left middle-grade coal open to slow combustion. The Canadian authorities ought to have a more positive say in determining the effects of mineral extraction on the immediate environment. But there were so many imponderables. It was difficult to place a value on natural resources: the Kaiser Company appeared to have lost a considerable amount in negotiating its contract with the Japanese for Alberta coal, because it had undervalued the mineral deposits available. Foreign investment might also have uncertain consequences for employment and the pattern of settlement. What happens after a construction company has finished building a dam or a pipeline? What happens after a mining company has exhausted the resources available? In particular, what happens to the **labour** force. These questions were particularly important now that the Canadian economy was no longer booming. The men who had built the St Lawrence Seaway were dispersed to other jobs quite easily.

The distinction was drawn between extractive industries and those

which relied on sources which were naturally replenished, such as the provision of hydro-electric power or the supply of drinking water. There was an authoritative exposition of proposals for a Canadian hydroelectric and water scheme serving the north-east of the United States. Foreign capital could, however, be very destabilizing in the economy if the investment which it brought was not labour-intensive. It might be possible and wiser to link foreign capital more to Canadian manpower than to Canadian natural resources. Some hopes were expressed for more labour-intensive investments. Canadians were reconsidering their qualities as a nation-particularly in the light of the domestic situation of the United States. A large expanse of territory does not of itself mean power in international affairs, and the most comfortable community may well be a small one. The possession of large resources does not guarantee growth. Canada should perhaps put its resources into a secondary position, and concentrate on developing its 'brains' in financial and other skills.

The trouble at the moment was that all the prognostications about Canada's tremendous growth potential depended on the creation of new jobs. The Canadian **labour** force would increase more rapidly by 1980 than that of Germany, the UK or Italy, but there was a very important underlying fear about the growth of unemployment. It was estimated that by February 1972 there would be between 800,000 and 900,000 unemployed. Canadians sometimes advocated an approach to their natural resources similar to that of the Soviet Union. But it was pointed out that the Soviet government could afford to exploit the natural resources of Siberia in a fairly rigorous **manner** because it controlled the consumers of the goods produced. Canada was always in the position of supplying customers abroad, and it did not want to be placed in the invidious position of subsidizing exports to the United States.

In spite of the unemployment problem, **Canadians** were still tempted to look for a solution to their economic problems by increasing their population and thus increasing the domestic market. Immigration policy in past years in Canada had usually been related to the state of the **labour** market. The present immigration regulations allowed the admission of skilled workers, according to the needs of the economy. But it was also asserted that it could be a mistake to try and stimulate the growth of population artificially.

The discussion tended to centre around one major question in Anglo-Canadian relations: **How** can Britain help Canada? There was an extensive exchange of views about the present extent and

prospects of any bilateral investment and trade where Britain might help Canada, in order thereby to help herself commercially. Surely there were opportunities for British enterprise in Canada, even though it was obvious that Britain did not possess the resources to increase its rate of investment, and that the United States would continue to play the dominant role. Some speakers advocated the entry of British merchant banks into the Canadian market, following the example of Hambros. The presence of British entrepreneurs in the financial field might 'shake up' Canadian banks and discount houses. Nobody at the Colloquy effectively answered the question: What is the extent of Canadian activity in the British market? There had been some recent increases in British imports of Canadian manufactured goods, but there seemed to be no general British concern for developing a Canadian connection.

Although in the discussion there were several references to the role of the international company, there was little agreement as to what could be said about it. Many international companies were in fact clearly identified with their parent nation, and were not international in any true sense. Some Canadians felt that many British companies were at fault in not employing local Canadian managers, as American companies did. Pilkington Bros., a British firm with an all-Canadian local management, was perhaps an exception, but there were no figures available for the Colloquy to examine. Foreign capital in the Canadian economy might have the effect of developing market 'know how' among Canadian businessmen and extend their contacts in world markets. British membership of the EEC might give further impetus to the development of London as a financial centre, and particularly of the Euro-dollar market. Canadians might then be grateful for their links with Britain. Some of the British speakers also foresaw British entry into the Common Market as a catalyst of social and industrial change in Britain itself, and this might lead to the removal of some of the business characteristics which annoyed Canadians. It was widely believed in Canada that British businessmen lacked receptivity to the demands of the North American market. Stories were told of 'bad' British businessmen who refused to adapt their specifications and their systems for spare parts and inventories to American requirements.

Canada was the only major trading partner for Britain where the proportion of British exports had continually decreased in recent years. Some thought that British businessmen needed more encouragement to enter the North American market. For example, it was suggested that medium and small firms found it difficult to



secure the necessary information. Canada had a reputation in Britain for being a difficult market to penetrate. The two High Commissions could perhaps do more to assist mutual trade promotion. But there was some debate as to whether the present position could be diagnosed adequately as being due to a 'failure of communication'. It might be that British businessmen found it easier to make their profits elsewhere. Canada had to make bigger efforts to attract British capital which at present had other outlets where the going was easier. It required a high capital investment to create a job in Canada-some said \$125,000 per man. The British had invested in Canada during 'bad times', and had not been able to secure a compensating profit.

Several British speakers thought that Canadians must now realize how **much** Britain is going to be concerned, in future years, with harmonizing relationships in the European Community. It was argued that Canadians might misconceive Britain's future role if they thought that it was going to be able to persuade European countries to alter their trading practice in such a way as to please the United States or Canada.

There was a danger of Canadians relying on 'the old boy approach' in trade and investment. Some Canadians thought that more effort should be placed into an exploitation of those markets where Canadian bilingualism was an advantage. Canadians would certainly exploit the position of Britain 'as a bridge into the European Economic Community' but would be unwise to ignore other possibilities.

### **Diplomatic and Military Relations: Government to Government**

Participants started from the premise that Britain and Canada generally shared common assumptions and approaches towards questions of international order and security.

One of the most valuable aspects of the Anglo-Canadian dialogue within the Commonwealth context had been the attitude of both countries towards the Third World. Each country believed in maintaining a bridge between the rich and the poor nations, and in preventing any widening of the 'gap' between them.

It was, nevertheless, acknowledged that any substantial shift in American policies might produce a divergence between British and Canadian interests. Neither Britain nor Canada was capable of protecting the other, and each was closely involved with American policy. President Nixon **had** shown that he could afford to **recon-**

**struct** his **defence** policy with small concern for the balance of power in Europe. If the President continued on these lines, Britain would be concerned with the discussion of a European security system in which Canada could not play a major part. If the **West** Europeans attempted eventually to establish a nuclear force independent of the Americans, Canadians might feel excluded and become alienated from their British allies. Some of the British participants thought that the Canadian view of Europe did not coincide with theirs. Canadians were perhaps too ready to make concessions, on the assumption that a detente with Russia existed or was a meaningful concept.

Although the 1971 Canadian White Paper on **Defence** had re-emphasized that Canada was committed to NATO, future British and Canadian attitudes and interests with regard to NATO may diverge significantly.

One participant stressed that there was now much vocal support in Canada for the NDP's opposition to NATO—viewed by many as a 'military-industrial **con-game**'—and some Canadians thought that it was unrealistic of Europeans to think that Canada and the United States would be in NATO for much longer. But other participants insisted that a Canadian defection from NATO was not imminent, and that there is now a considerable appreciation in Canada of the political value of NATO.

Diplomatic and military relations were perhaps the most nostalgic for both sides in the Anglo-Canadian dialogue. Traditional relationships could be very durable, for better or worse. There had been a 'long habit of talking'; we were 'old arguing partners'. Since 1945 Canada had 'come of age' and found that she had a significant role to play in the post-war world. Perhaps this role had initially been somewhat inhibited by Whitehall habits of business. One important landmark was the establishment of the Anglo-Canadian Continuing Committee of officials in 1949, to discuss economic matters between those officials most directly concerned. There had been a Ministerial Committee, but this 'withered on the bough', apparently because Ministers were not interested. There were, however, signs that the forms of regular **consultation** between Britain and Canada would have to be reconsidered. The Commonwealth Relations Office had now been absorbed into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Canada is principally dealt with from the North American Department. The Anglo-Canadian Continuing Committee, which at its origin had only three officials on each side, now had about thirty officials from each country. In any **develop-**

ment of this institutional system, both officials and Ministers from the two governments would have to confer,

One newly intrusive ingredient in Anglo-Canadian relations was the activity of France. The French government had had very clear motives for entering into Quebec politics and for starting cultural activities in Quebec Province. The position of France was described by one French-Canadian as 'une *maîtresse installée à côté de l'épouse légitime*'. It was certainly true that Canada's relationships with France were *sui generis*. Some French-Canadians felt that Britain's entry into the Common Market would have an important effect on Anglo-Canadian relations, which in turn would feed back into Franco-Canadian relations. It was suggested that the whole position of Quebec had to be viewed within the relationships of the Britain-Canada-United States-France quadrilateral.

Canadian experience of the world outside the British tradition of diplomatic relations, stimulated particularly since the rise to prominence of the Quebec problem, had challenged the Canadian government to develop new skills. Since 1963 Quebec had been able to influence Canadian foreign policy, particularly in such matters as aid to developing countries. Canada was clearly going to be increasingly involved with diplomatic activity outside the European orbit. It was perhaps indicative of the change in climate that there had been no public dispute about the recent agreement to allow the British army to train in Canada at Suffield (Alberta). Several speakers pointed out that it would be quite impossible for American troops to train in Canada without causing a large political rumpus.

Britain has also been obliged to look outside the traditional Commonwealth relationship, and is beginning to find that its diplomatic ties in Canada provide a new means of access. For instance, perhaps China's 'new policies could well be appraised by Britain with the help of Ottawa. Canada had only very recently pioneered the policy of detente with China. Britain recognized Peking in 1950.

When it came to the preservation of the Commonwealth context of negotiation, the British and Canadian positions were very similar. Both countries wanted to maintain Commonwealth channels for very much more than the transmission of money and technical assistance from rich to poor nations. There were many ways of exploiting Commonwealth ties. For example, the annual meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers, which this year fell between that of the bankers' 'Group of 10 and that of the World Bank, provided an excellent forum for bringing 'poor nations' into the discussions

of world trade problems which the 'rich nations', represented by Britain and Canada, are conducting.

### **Communications and Movement: Ideas and People**

Here the Colloquy briefly examined the major flows of ideas and people in spheres other than the **inter-governmental** level.

The Chairman **identified** four categories: the arts; the media of mass communication; education; and the migration of peoples. These movements engendered a people-to-people understanding far bigger than anything which could deliberately be contrived by **government-to-government** agreements. It would continue to influence Canadian **policy** and way of life. It was nevertheless hard to marshal the vast amount of available information to cover all the many different networks which fall into these four categories.

The opening speaker at this session, Dr **Freda** Hawkins, stressed that Anglo-Canadian relations are not only a matter of traditions and legacies or of intergovernmental communication, or of the neuroses which may **afflict** policy-makers and senior public servants and analysts of foreign policy. They are also based on a very substantial and continuing transfer of populations which has engendered a process of communication and exchange between Canada and Britain on a people to people **level** which is growing ever larger in volume, and is expanding, not declining. Dr. Hawkins emphasized the very substantial influence which this continuing transfer of populations has had on many areas of public policy in Canada and on many Canadian institutions.

Some time was spent discussing 'the revolution in communications'. 'Communications' could be used to cover broadcasting, television, the press, the book trade, and even package holiday travel. The importance of this aspect of the discussion in regard to speculation about the future of Anglo-Canadian relations was that it provided some opportunity to examine the 'new parochialism'. It was through mass communications, or the lack of them, that the British and Canadian now learnt to understand each other. The two final sessions of the Colloquy, held on the Sunday, called 'Communications and Movements' and 'Policies and Perceptions', tended to run into each other in terms of their discussion. The flow of ideas and people could not easily be separated from the perceptions which they generated. This account, therefore, brings both these sessions **under** the same heading.

Several participants tried to sketch British and Canadian **stereo-**

types of the other side. It was said that a lot of Canadians entertained out-of-date views about Britain, and failed to appreciate changes in British society. For instance, many of them were **unaware** of the 'melting pot' quality of British society made by the recent infusion of 1,500,000 new Commonwealth immigrants. Canadians were conscious that their own particular experience of **Englishness** was not necessarily the same as that of what one speaker called 'the pagan pleasure-loving Southern English'. Just as the **French-speaking** Canadians drew their ancestry from Normandy and not the 'South of France, so many English-speaking Canadians saw their forbears as of north-country stock or Scottish school-teachers. In drawing these stereotypes and tracing these genealogical roots, there were some inconsistencies, particularly when the older generation tried to link their own image of Britain with that entertained by young people. Today, Britain held a relatively high place in what was called the 'international counter-culture of youth'.

Three important changes in the pattern of communications were discussed. First, United States citizens may well replace the British at the top of the list of Canadian immigrants, in the near future. Canadians were now much more aware of their country as a 'refuge' from the United States **than** as a land welcoming Englishmen. Thus the number of Canadians of British origin is becoming a steadily smaller minority of Canada's population. Secondly, the North Atlantic **traffic**, particularly by air, had greatly increased in recent years and there were now a large number of specialist meetings in which Britons and Canadians took part, but so far these were more general international conferences than specifically Anglo-Canadian ones. Canadians had stopped thinking about international meetings solely in English-speaking terms. Thirdly, the Canadian federal government had become interested in opening its doors to the Francophone world, to provide French-speaking Canadians in Quebec and in other Provinces (approximately one million) with access to cultural, economic, linguistic and other matters, in much the same way as the Commonwealth had traditionally provided access for English-speaking Canadians. Relations between Canada and the countries in which French is spoken in Europe have been increased considerably and, in addition, Canadian interest in the Francophone part of the Third World has been developed substantially, particularly in the field of aid.

These three areas of change were particularly important to **Anglo-Canadian** relations in cultural affairs. In recent years **many** Canadians had personal, and perhaps puzzling, experience of the

differences between British and French official attitudes to culture. The French government was prepared to put money into cultural exchanges as a form of propaganda, and to use cultural questions in the formulation of their foreign policy, as shown, for example, in the provision of an infrastructure for the conclusion and administration of cultural agreements. In contrast, the British government was reluctant to subsidize the arts and did not provide a comparable *infra-structure*. British authorities generally seemed to regard the arts solely in commercial terms. The British Treasury had on occasion imposed sudden cuts in the budgets of services which were of considerable importance, such as the BBC external services, and, unlike the French order of priorities, British decisions to 'economise' removed funds from cultural affairs first.

It was said that Canadian exchanges in such fields as music, the theatre, and ballet, tended to be mostly a 'one way street'—Britain to Canada rather than Canada to Britain. One central Canadian dilemma in cultural affairs stemmed from the size and influence of the United States, which was able to dominate the English-speaking world in so many fields. Three major areas of difficulty were discussed. First, copyright questions had tended to be conceived in terms of 'North American rights'. This meant that in bookselling and theatrical tours Canada tended to be part of the network centred on the United States. Several speakers referred to the 'underground sales traffic' whereby Canadians tried to avoid the 30 per cent mark-up on British books by placing orders with British bookshops, most notably with Blackwells.

Secondly, what one speaker called 'American proficiency in mindless entertainment' caused great difficulties to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Radio signals do not stop at the border, and most Canadians live close to stations in the United States. At the beginning of broadcasting history, Canada had taken eight years to get its own wave lengths recognized by the United States. The Canadian Radio and Television Commission had recently issued regulations limiting the importation of foreign material to 40 per cent, 30 per cent from any other single foreign country (which meant the United States) and 10 per cent from outside North America. The BBC had a good record in providing a large proportion of this 10 per cent. But there was no equivalent export of Canadian programmes to Britain. The proximity of the United States had also had the effect of stimulating 'indigenous' French-Canadian programmes.

Thirdly, the small amount of Canadian news that appeared in

the world's press tended for the most part to be written by correspondents based in the United States, who merely paid fleeting visits to Canada when some dramatic event briefly captured their attention. There was a great contrast in the size of the CBC staff in London and the recent closing of the BBC office in Ottawa. But in the newspaper world there were no permanent Canadian correspondents for British newspapers. An advantage enjoyed in Canada by visiting journalists from Britain was that they understood the constitutional structure rather more easily than, for example, the French correspondents reporting for, say, *Le Monde*. The contrast was evident in the coverage of the Cross kidnapping. Some Canadians were resentful of their position as a mere extension of the reporting of events in the United States. But it was also claimed that the stringer system, as used in Canada at least by the *Financial Times*, could produce results as good and sometimes better than those of resident correspondents.

British blindness to events in Canada was attributed not so much to a wilful neglect of specifically Canadian affairs as to being an aspect of the now lamentably low coverage of overseas affairs in general. There is also an important contrast between the two newspaper reading publics. In Canada there is a natural audience for British news among the 900,000 British immigrants; there is no equivalently sized group of former Canadians in Britain. Some speakers thought that, in fact, the relative absence of Canadian news in British newspapers was a tribute to Canada. Any exchange of news—a definition of 'news value'—must be based on a 'need to know'. One Canadian said that his country's press representatives in Britain failed to report British politics but gave much space to British society. Canada, in British eyes, was 'a real country' which was covered by the British press only when things went wrong, because violence and sudden disaster were subjects of great 'news value'. Canada had never had a 'bogey man', such as Dr Nkrumah, who attracted the attention of British journalists. (This opinion elicited a wry comment from a former Canadian Prime Minister.)

The only recent event of significance which seemed to one Canadian journalist present to have been grossly ignored by the British press, when there was a real 'need to know', was Mr Trudeau's visit to Russia. The British press could hardly have been expected to 'pick up' the story if the British public had not been given adequate preparation by being exposed to important developments in Canadian political thinking. Yet the visit to Russia was indicative of new developments in Canadian diplomacy. These

challenging views were challenged by some Canadians present.

The Colloquy did not reach agreement on whether the two governments should take deliberate steps to stimulate contacts between the two peoples. Newspapermen cautioned the Colloquy against contrived efforts to promote the flow of news. Some others thought that the two governments should consider a form of cultural agreement. The latter might cover such subjects as film co-production, an industry which could take advantage of the widespread appeal of Canadian English in the English-speaking world. The problems of negotiating a film co-production agreement were explained to the Colloquy. On the Canadian side, the slowness of the pace of negotiation arose in part from difficulties in the context of Federal/ Provincial jurisdiction. But the main impediment seemed to be in fundamentally different styles.

There were several self-confessed 'unrepentant elitists' who expressed their views; they spoke in favour of schemes which would allow senior men in the professions to act as the main channels of Anglo-Canadian understanding and to be 'a source of infection' as the result of exchange visits. It was claimed for example that a tour of Canada arranged by Canada House for a BBC producer had resulted in far more Canadian material being included in BBC programmes.

Cultural relations between Canada and Britain continue to move in traditional grooves, and there is a regular transatlantic flow of ideas, both way, and of academics, artists and art administrators. However, the basic assumption that effective cross-fertilization between Britain and Canada can be sustained in this way is open to serious question. Nevertheless, the assumption of an active cultural flow between Canada and Britain is part of the argument for the implementation of cultural programmes with countries wholly and partly French-speaking.

The development of Canada's cultural programme with the French-speaking countries of Western Europe, as well as other West European countries, has reached a point where cultural parity with the traditional Anglo-Canadian relationship has been met, if not surpassed. It would now seem that there is a requirement to investigate the possibility of both countries developing, on a bilateral basis, cultural policies and programmes. As the negotiation and signing of a formal cultural agreement between Canada and the UK is not deemed practicable for various reasons on both sides, it should be possible for both countries to explore the advantage of establishing regular meetings of mixed commissions, made up of



interested officials in the arts, even on an informal basis, to examine the state of bilateral cultural relations. It was hoped that further discussions along these lines could be held **between** the British High Commission in Ottawa and Canadian officials, and **between the** Canadian High Commission and the British Council. It might appear difficult on the surface to make exchange agreements on the basis of equality, for some of the reasons **already** expressed. But the argument that there was no natural audience for things Canadian in Britain should **not** be too great a deterrent to overcome if the Canadian cultural in-put is of high quality. It was perhaps typical of the idiom of Anglo-Canadian relations that neither the representative of the CBC nor that of the BBC wished to lose their independence as bodies that could contact each other directly without going through another government agency, which might be the case if there were treaty obligations.

The Colloquy proceeded to discuss some specific proposals. The Earl of Athlone Scholarships were mentioned by a Canadian participant as an example of a **unilateral** scholarship programme which should be replaced by a bilateral programme. This would mean that the heritage of Empire was being replaced by an adult bilateral programme of mutual interest where both **countries** are donor and receiver. Particularly in view of the recent decision to abandon the Earl of Athlone Scholarships, some speakers were anxious to extend links between British and Canadian universities. French Canadians expressed the view that a lot of Quebec students did not wish to go to France and would welcome the opportunity to study in Britain. It was suggested that when the British started discussions with their European colleagues after joining the Community, in order to work out a scheme for the equivalence of diplomas in higher education, Canada-and particularly French Canada-might be considered. It was proposed that Canada House, the Agent-General for Quebec, and the British Council should play a larger part in providing information about British universities to would-be Canadian graduate students. There was also a suggestion, which attracted considerable support, that in the near future one of the British universities ought to establish a chair of Canadian studies. It was widely agreed that Anglo-Canadian relations would be improved if there were specific joint projects at the graduate research level which were both highly specialized and privately funded.

There was less enthusiasm for the suggestion that the civil service on both sides of the Atlantic might benefit from a wider experience

of each other's handling of public policy questions. Britain had learnt from Ontario at the time of the drafting of the Race Relations Act; there were also important pieces of administrative experience in immigration policy on both sides of the Atlantic which British and Canadian civil servants would find it useful to consider. Britain, for example, might learn more about language training for immigrants, and Canada might learn from the British experience of community councils.

But it was hard with any of these suggestions to find a common basis of agreement. So much of the evidence was not available, and so many activities seemed possible without government intervention. One speaker put a question which was not fully answered: Were Anglo-Canadian relations so special that they deserved more space than their news value to the British and Canadian publics seemed to demand?

In marked contrast, one British participant thought that present Anglo-Canadian relations were perhaps in rather better condition than present needs demanded. Each side could afford to be relaxed. The British thought of Canadians as 'North Americans who are not foreign'; and most Canadians nowadays were not much bothered about their 'traditional relationships'. Thus the present situation looked like good relations 'in a semi-vacuum', though there were a great number of 'special publics'—**medicine**, the church, voluntary organizations—which enjoyed regular and frank discussions. Among the groups enjoying fruitful bilateral relations one should not overlook the many visits by Cabinet Ministers (about twelve Canadian Ministers came to London in 1970), senior civil servants, and scientists.

It was generally agreed that the 'hang-overs' from history should not be allowed to obscure issues which are now arising, and that the Anglo-Canadian dialogue can continue successfully if each side adapts its methods of approach. But the Chairman **reaffirmed** the general feeling that there is an enormous amount of **unfinished** intellectual business to be discussed between Canadians and the British, and a number of participants expressed the hope that it would be possible to arrange similar meetings in the future.

### Overview

Are the traditionally friendly relations between Canada and Britain now drifting into the sands of mutual indifference, or are

they being redefined in ways that are relevant and practical today and in the immediate future? It was with the hope that the second would be true but out of an uneasy sense that perhaps the first question was pertinent that the Colloquy had originally been convened.

The basic presupposition had not been that Anglo-Canadian relations were so special and valuable that they should be nourished and developed at any cost. Throughout the Colloquy the basic concern had been not so much with the relative importance of mutual relations between Britain and Canada as compared with other bilateral or multilateral relationships but rather with the question of what is the present and likely future state of this particular bilateral relationship. Was it actually in a state of drift, and, if so, was this needless or inevitable? Thus the progenitors of the Colloquy had thought that the time was ripe to encourage informed and cool-headed stock-taking and assessment of the relationship, which could also underline its hazards and suggest remedial measures where possible and practicable. The issues were accentuated by Britain's impending entry into the European Community in January 1973. The point was strongly made that in many respects Britain's impending entry left only a short time in which to place relations between Britain and Canada on a better footing before British industry, technology and other interests and energies become more irretrievably committed to Europe, and was therefore a situation about which neither side could afford to relax.